Attorney Evan Brown

May 18, 2021 Contracts

Murdered Uber passenger’s mom can keep her case in court and out of arbitration

An Uber driver murdered plaintiff’s son. So plaintiff – the Uber user’s mom – sued Uber for wrongful death. The lower court threw out the case, saying that the Uber terms and conditions required the matter to go to arbitration. Plaintiff sought review with the Georgia Court of Appeals. On review, the court reversed and sent the case back to the lower court.

The appellate court found that it was improper to dismiss the case because it was not clear that plaintiff’s son – the one killed by the Uber driver – actually agreed to the Uber terms and conditions that contained the provision requiring arbitration.

First, there was a dispute as to whether he even saw the link to the terms and conditions when he signed up for Uber in 2016. That’s because he was using an Android phone, and plaintiff alleged the on-screen keyboard within the app may have covered up the link to the terms and conditions.

Second, the court noted that even though Uber submitted evidence it emailed updated terms and conditions to plaintiff’s son, and that he continued using Uber thereafter (thereby binding him to the terms), it was unclear that the email was ever sent to plaintiff’s son. If the customer never saw those terms, they would not apply, and therefore arbitration would not be proper.

Thornton v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2021 WL 1960199 (Ct. App. Ga. May 17, 2021)

May 4, 2021 Section 230

Section 230 did not protect Snapchat from negligence liability in car crash lawsuit over Speed Filter

The tragic facts

Landen Brown was using Snapchat’s Speed Filter in 2017 when the car in which he was riding with two other young men crashed after reaching speeds above 120 miles per hour. The Speed Filter documented how fast the car was traveling. The crash killed Landon and the other two occupants.

The parents of two of the passengers sued Snap, Inc. (the purveyor of Snapchat), claiming that the app was negligently designed. The parents alleged, among other things, that Snap should have known that users believed they would be rewarded within the app for using the filter to record a speed above 100 miles per hour. The negligence claim was based in part on the notion that Snap did not remove or restrict access to Snapchat while traveling at dangerous speeds.

Immune, then not

The lower court dismissed the case, holding that 47 U.S.C. 230 protected Snapchat from liability. Plaintiffs sought review with the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the court reversed, finding that Section 230 liability did not apply to the negligent design claim.

Section 230’s role in the case

Section 230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” In this case, the court held that the parents’ complaint did not seek to hold Snap liable for its conduct as a publisher or speaker. The negligent design lawsuit treated Snap as a products manufacturer, accusing it of negligently designing a product (Snapchat) with a defect (the interplay between Snapchat’s reward system and the Speed Filter). Thus, the duty that Snap allegedly violated sprang from its distinct capacity as a product designer. Simply stated, in the court’s view, Snap’s alleged duty in this case case had nothing to do with its editing, monitoring, or removing of the content that its users generate through Snapchat.

Lemmon v. Snap, Inc. — F.3d —, 2021 WL 1743576 (9th Cir. May 4, 2021)

April 28, 2021 Computer Crime

Money for pain and suffering because your email was hacked?

Plaintiff and defendant worked together doing real estate appraisals. Defendant accessed plaintiff’s email account without authorization and was later found liable for violating the federal Stored Communications Act. When it came time to assess damages, plaintiff asked for $150,000 for the pain and suffering he endured because of the email access. He alleged that he suffered mental decline, began drinking a lot and had troubles with his marriage.

The court was sympathetic to plaintiff’s “very real difficulties” but found that the amount he was seeking bore “an outsized relationship to the actual offense.” From the court’s opinion:

[Defendant], on one occasion, committed a targeted SCA offense. [Defendant] searched solely for emails related to [plaintiff’s] disparagement of [defendant] and printed four of them. Immediately, [plaintiff] learned of the breach and quickly put security measures in place to prevent further unauthorized access. Because the offense was objectively narrow in scope, the Court credits that [plaintiff] suffered a brief period of emotional harm related to the offense. The original intrusion was startling and, no doubt, produced some anxiety during the time it took [plaintiff] to protect his privacy by installing computer security software, changing passwords, and contacting his internet service provider who assured him they had taken “care of everything.”

The court ended up awarding plaintiff $1,000 for his pain and suffering tied to the breach.

Skapinetz v. CoesterVMS, Inc., 2021 WL 1634712 (D.Md. April 27, 2021)

February 14, 2021 Section 230

HuffPost protected by Section 230 in Carter Page defamation suit

Section 230

Carter Page sued the publisher of the HuffPost over some 2016 articles about the Russia collusion matter that Page claimed were defamatory. These articles were written by “contributors” to the HuffPost, who, according to the court, “control their own work and post freely to the site”.

The court threw out the defamation claims concerning these articles, in part because it found that HuffPost was immune from suit thanks to Section 230. The court determined that HuffPost was not the “information content provider” since the content was written by these so-called contributors.

Page v. Oath Inc., 2021 WL 528472 (Superior Ct. Del., February 11, 2021)

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney.

February 11, 2021 Contracts

What’s going on legally with Jeep pulling the Bruce Springsteen ad?

Morals clauses in talent agreements can fuel cancel culture.

Jeep featured Bruce Springsteen in an ad that aired during Sunday’s Super Bowl. Since then, news broke that Springsteen had been arrested almost three months prior for drunk driving. So Jeep pulled further use of the ad.

This scenario shines light on a key provision in the contract that celebrities and brands typically sign. An agreement of this sort will contain a “morals clause”. Here is the language of a typical clause like this (this is just an example of such a clause – not the one in the Jeep/Springsteen agreement):

Company will have the right to terminate this Agreement for cause, which includes, without limitation, . . . commission of any act (in the past or present) which degrades Talent, Company or the Products or brings Talent, or Company or the Products into public disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule. Upon termination for cause, Company shall have no further obligation to Talent (including, but not limited to, any payment obligations).

Companies want these provisions for obvious reasons – if the face of the company comes under public scrutiny for any bad reason, the company needs a method to part ways. Talent with more negotiating power may be able to narrow the scope of the circumstances in which the company can terminate the agreement. For example, it could require actual conviction of a serious crime.

One problem, however, particularly for talent, is how broadly morals clauses can be written. The example clause above is broad and vague. And note how the language in this example pulls in past conduct as well (old tweets, anyone?). Given the polarized character of modern public discourse, just about everything done in public is subject to contempt, scandal or ridicule by at someone. These clauses provide the means for the commercial side of cancel culture to flourish.

Evan Brown is an intellectual property and technology attorney in Chicago.

February 11, 2021 Section 230

Section 230 protected Google in illegal gambling lawsuit over loot boxes

Section 230

Plaintiffs sued Google claiming that loot boxes in games available through the Google Play store were illegal “slot machines or devices”. (Players who buy loot boxes get a randomized chance at receiving an item designed to enhance game play, such as a better weapon, faster car, or skin.) Plaintiffs characterized these loot boxes as a “gamble” because the player does not know what the loot box actually contains until it is opened. Defendant Google moved to dismiss the lawsuit on Section 230 grounds. The court granted the motion.

As relevant here, Section 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 203(e)(3).

The court held that Google was immune under Section 230 because (a) it is an interactive computer service provider, (b) plaintiffs’ claims over the loot boxes sought to treat Google as the “publisher or speaker” of the games containing the allegedly illegal loot boxes, and (c) the games constituted information provided by third parties.

Of particular interest was the court’s treatment of plaintiff’s argument that Section 230 only relates to “speech” and that Google’s provision of software did not fit into that category. Rejecting this argument, the court cited to the case of Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2013 WL 4426359(N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) in which the court used Section 230 to knock out Chubby Checker’s trademark and unfair competition claims against HP over a game HP made available.

Coffee v. Google, LLC, 2021 WL 493387 (N.D. Cal., February 10, 2021)

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago.

February 8, 2021 Contracts

Court finds clickwrap independent contractor agreement enforceable

Plaintiffs were companies that sued some of their former independent contractors who worked for the companies in a “direct sales community”. The court needed to determine whether defendants had entered into a valid contract with plaintiffs. Applying Texas law, the court observed that other courts have recognized the validity of electronic contracts. It found that the agreements at issue were valid clickwrap agreements and that plaintiffs had – through screenshots they submitted – at minimum, made the requisite showing that contracts existed between plaintiffs and each defendant.

Elepreneurs Holdings, LLC et al. v. Benson et at., 2021 WL 410001 (E.D. Tex., February 5, 2021)

This post originally appeared on evan.law.

February 1, 2021 Copyright

Chicago area retailers sued over iconic David Bowie photo

Brian Duffy was an English photographer. He died in 2010 but the Brian Duffy Archive owns and enforces the copyright in his works. Defendants are small retailers around Chicago who developed and sold gift items alleged to appropriate one of Duffy’s well-known David Bowie photos. Who among us hasn’t wished for a Rebel Rebel Pouch or a Ziggy Stardust Koozie? Apparently not the Brian Duffy Archive. It has sued for copyright infringement.

Plaintiff first noticed allegedly infringing works on Instagram and then chased down the defendant retailers who do business both online and through brick and mortar stores. Plaintiff filed the case in January and things are just getting underway. Here are some of the interesting issues that could arise in the litigation:

Registration timing issues – the photo was taken in 1973 but not registered in the U.S. until 2017.
Whether the photo was ever published before 1989 without a copyright notice. That could have placed it in the public domain.
Fair use – Are these uses transformative? Have they affected the market for the original work?

The Duffy Archive is certainly trying to keep defendants under pressure. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, maximum damages, costs and attorneys fees and anything else the court will give it.

Duffy Archive Limited v. The Found, Inc. et al., No. 21-cv-00181 (N.D.Ill., filed January 12, 2021)

About the author: Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. This post originally appeared on evan.law.

January 26, 2021 Computer Crime

Former employee committed vandalism by deleting company’s YouTube videos

Of all the things that can go wrong when deleting your former employer’s YouTube videos, being liable for vandalism may not be the first thing that comes to mind. But it happened to the former employee of an Ohio company.

Defendant worked for plaintiff as vice president of sales and left the company in 2017. During that time plaintiff authorized defendant to access the company’s two YouTube channels and to upload content. Two years after defendant left, however, all the videos on both channels disappeared. Through detailed forensic work, plaintiff showed that defendant deleted the videos using his iPhone.

So plaintiff sued defendant for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, “vandalism” under Ohio law, and breach of a confidentiality provision in defendant’s employment contract. Plaintiff sought summary judgment on these claims, and the court granted plaintiff’s motion, finding there was no reasonable dispute the defendant deleted the YouTube videos.

The vandalism claim is particularly interesting. Under the applicable Ohio law, one is liable if he or she knowingly causes physical harm to the property of another. The decision does not indicate that defendant argued the deletion of YouTube videos would not meet this criterion. Instead, the decision indicates that defendant essentially stipulated he would be liable if plaintiff proved he deleted the videos. The court believed the so-called “mountain” of evidence plaintiff produced showing that defendant was the one who did the deletion.

Kaivac, Inc. v. Stillwagon, 2021 WL 184593 (S.D. Ohio, January 19, 2021)

About the author: Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. This post originally appeared on http://evan.law.

Is it defamation to accuse someone of sending a bogus DMCA takedown notice?

Esports aren’t only about 21st century video games. Apparently there is a relatively robust community of Tecmo Bowl enthusiasts who – though the game is three decades old – gets together to compete in tournaments. A couple of members of that community got into it with one another online, and the spat spawned some fierce litigation. That scuffle raised the question of whether accusing someone of sending a bogus DMCA takedown notice is defamatory.

The online scuffle

Plaintiff was upset about posts defendant made in the forum of a Tecmo Bowl tournament website. One of plaintiff’s claims was that defendant had wrongfully accused plaintiff of sending bogus DMCA takedown notices to Facebook concerning a page related to a previous Tecmo Bowl tournament.

Claims of bogus DMCA takedown notices defamatory?

So plaintiff sued defendant in Texas state court for defamation, and lost. He believed that he had established a defamation claim, since defendant had – in plaintiff’s view – accused plaintiff of violating the law by abusing the DMCA process. So plaintiff sought review with the Court of Appeals of Texas. But that higher court agreed with the lower court. It was proper to dismiss the defamation case.

The court evaluated whether an objectively reasonable reader of the forum posts would draw the implication that plaintiff had committed a crime. Specifically, plaintiff had asserted that defendant accused plaintiff of committing perjury, since DMCA takedown notices have to be sworn to. See 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(3)(A)(vi).

But the court did not agree with plaintiff’s theory. It found “that the general public, or more accurately the reasonable reader, is not likely aware of what a “DMCA claim” [is] or what the acronym DMCA even means.” So in this court’s view, and on these facts, accusing someone of sending a DMCA takedown notice that was bogus was not defamatory.

Hawkins v. Knobbe, 2020 WL 7693111 (Ct. App. Texas) December 28, 2020

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About the author:

Evan Brown is an intellectual property and technology attorney in Chicago. This post originally appeared on evan.law.