Carter Page sued the publisher of the HuffPost over some 2016 articles about the Russia collusion matter that Page claimed were defamatory. These articles were written by “contributors” to the HuffPost, who, according to the court, “control their own work and post freely to the site”.
The court threw out the defamation claims concerning these articles, in part because it found that HuffPost was immune from suit thanks to Section 230. The court determined that HuffPost was not the “information content provider” since the content was written by these so-called contributors.
Page v. Oath Inc., 2021 WL 528472 (Superior Ct. Del., February 11, 2021)
Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney.
Plaintiffs sued Google claiming that loot boxes in games available through the Google Play store were illegal “slot machines or devices”. (Players who buy loot boxes get a randomized chance at receiving an item designed to enhance game play, such as a better weapon, faster car, or skin.) Plaintiffs characterized these loot boxes as a “gamble” because the player does not know what the loot box actually contains until it is opened. Defendant Google moved to dismiss the lawsuit on Section 230 grounds. The court granted the motion.
As relevant here, Section 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 203(e)(3).
The court held that Google was immune under Section 230 because (a) it is an interactive computer service provider, (b) plaintiffs’ claims over the loot boxes sought to treat Google as the “publisher or speaker” of the games containing the allegedly illegal loot boxes, and (c) the games constituted information provided by third parties.
Of particular interest was the court’s treatment of plaintiff’s argument that Section 230 only relates to “speech” and that Google’s provision of software did not fit into that category. Rejecting this argument, the court cited to the case of Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2013 WL 4426359(N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) in which the court used Section 230 to knock out Chubby Checker’s trademark and unfair competition claims against HP over a game HP made available.
Coffee v. Google, LLC, 2021 WL 493387 (N.D. Cal., February 10, 2021)
Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago.
Twitter enjoyed Section 230 immunity for aiding and abetting defamation because plaintiffs’ claims on that point did not transform Twitter into a party that created or developed content.
An anonymous Twitter user posted some tweets that plaintiffs thought were defamatory. So plaintiffs sued Twitter for defamation after Twitter refused to take the tweets down. Twitter moved to dismiss the lawsuit. It argued that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) at 47 U.S.C. §230 barred the claim. The court agreed that Section 230 provided immunity to Twitter, and granted the motion to dismiss.
The court applied the Second Circuit’s test for Section 230 immunity as set out in La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2020). Under this test, which parses Section 230’s language, plaintiffs’ claims failed because:
(1) Twitter was a provider of an interactive computer service,
(2) the claims were based on information provided by another information content provider, and
(3) the claims treated Twitter as the publisher or speaker of that information.
Twitter is a provider of an interactive computer service
The CDA defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). The court found that Twitter is an online platform that allows multiple users to access and share the content hosted on its servers. As such, it is an interactive computer service for purposes of the CDA.
Plaintiffs’ claims were based on information provided by another information content provider
The court also found that the claims against Twitter were based on information provided by another information content provider. The CDA defines an “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). In this case, the court found that plaintiffs’ claims were based on information created or developed by another information content provider – the unknown Twitter user who posted the alleged defamatory content. Plaintiffs did not allege that Twitter played any role in the “creation or development” of the challenged tweets.
The claim treated Twitter as the publisher or speaker of the alleged defamatory information
The court gave careful analysis to this third prong of the test. Plaintiffs alleged that Twitter had “allowed and helped” the unknown Twitter user to defame plaintiffs by hosting its tweets on its platform, or by refusing to remove those tweets when plaintiffs reported them. The court found that either theory would amount to holding Twitter liable as the “publisher or speaker” of “information provided by another information content provider.” The court observed that making information public and distributing it to interested parties are quintessential acts of publishing. Plaintiffs’ theory of liability would “eviscerate” Section 230 protection because it would hold Twitter liable simply for organizing and displaying content exclusively provided by third parties.
Similarly, the court concluded that holding Twitter liable for failing to remove the tweets plaintiffs found objectionable would also hold Twitter liable based on its role as a publisher of those tweets, because deciding whether or not to remove content falls squarely within the exercise of a publisher’s traditional role and is therefore subject to the CDA’s broad immunity.
The court found that plaintiffs’ suggestion that Twitter aided and abetted defamation by arranging and displaying others’ content on its platform failed to overcome Twitter’s immunity under the CDA. In the court’s view, such activity would be tantamount to holding Twitter responsible as the “developer” or “creator” of that content. But in reality, to impose liability on Twitter as a developer or creator of third-party content – rather than as a publisher of it – Twitter would have to directly and materially contribute to what made the content itself unlawful.
Plaintiffs in this case did not allege that Twitter contributed to the defamatory content of the tweets at issue, and thus pled no basis upon which Twitter could be held liable as the creator or developer of those tweets. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ defamation claims against Twitter also satisfied the final requirement for CDA immunity: the claims sought to hold Twitter, an interactive computer service, liable as the publisher of information provided by another information content provider. Ultimately, Twitter had Section 230 immunity for aiding and abetting defamation.
Brikman v. Twitter, Inc., 2020 WL 5594637 (E.D.N.Y., September 17, 2020)
Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago practicing copyright, trademark, technology and in other areas of the law. His clients include individuals and companies in many industries, as well as the technology companies that serve them. Twitter: @internetcases
Section 230 protected a website from liability over content its users posted, in a recent case from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff sued defendant website operator for trade libel. The website had a forum board, and two forum board users posted that plaintiff was under federal investigation.
Likely recognizing Section 230 immunity would be an obstacle, plaintiff pled certain key facts about the posts’ authors. It claimed the two authors were longtime users. And it noted defendant occasionally paid its users to generate content. So plaintiff claimed the authors were “volunteers, employees, servants, contractors or agents of [defendant].” According to plaintiff’s logic, this would make the defendant website operator the “information content provider” of the offending posts.
The court did not buy that argument. Neither did the appellate court. The Communications Decency Act (at 47 U.S.C. §230) immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties. The Act provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”
The court held that these facts that plaintiff put forward did not plausibly show that defendant website operator was an information content provider. Since the facts only showed that independent parties created the offending posts, Section 230 immunity applied.
East Coast Test Prep LLC v. Allnurses.com, Inc., — F.3d —, 2020 WL 4809911 (8th Cir. August 19, 2020)
Do you need help with an internet law issue? Give me a call or drop me a line: (630) 362-7237 – ebrown@internetcases.com.
About the author
Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago practicing copyright, trademark, technology and in other areas of the law. His clients include individuals and companies in many industries, as well as the technology companies that serve them. Twitter: @internetcases
Plaintiff Turo operates an online and mobile peer-to-peer car sharing marketplace. It allows car owners to rent their cars to other Turo users. It filed a declaratory judgment action against the City of Los Angeles, asking the court to determine the service was not being run in violation of applicable law.
The city filed counterclaims against Turo alleging (1) violation of local airport commerce regulations; (2) trespass; (3) aiding and abetting trespass; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) unlawful and unfair business practices under California statute.
Should Section 230 apply?
Turo moved to dismiss. It argued that the City’s counterclaims sought to hold Turo liable for content published by users on Turo’s platform. In Turo’s mind, that should make it immune under Section 230.
Section 230(c) provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”
Turo argued that the city’s claims were barred by Section 230 because they sought to hold Turo liable for its users’ actions. Those users published rental listings and selected LAX as the designated pickup point for car rentals. According to Turo, because the content of the rental listings were provided by third-party users, and because the city’s claims sought to hold Turo liable as an interactive computer service responsible for that content, Section 230 should apply.
No immunity, based on what the platform did
The court rejected Turo’s arguments that Section 230 immunized Turo from liability arising from the city’s counterclaims.
It held that Section 230 did not provide immunity because the city sought to hold Turo liable for its role facilitating online rental car transactions, not as the publisher or speaker of its users’ listings.
Citing to Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), the court observed that “Section 230(c)(1) limits liability based on the function the defendant performs, not its identity.”
And the court compared the situation to the one in HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2019). In that case, Section 230 did not immunize companies providing peer-to-peer home rental platform services from a government ordinance that required homeowners to register their properties with the city before listing them on a home sharing platform.
The court explained that Section 230 immunity did not apply because the government plaintiff did not seek to hold the platform companies liable for the content of the bookings posted by their users, but only for their actions of processing transactions for unregistered properties.
Turo v. City of Los Angeles, 2020 WL 3422262 (C.D. Cal., June 19, 2020)
Evan Brown is an intellectual property and technology attorney advising companies on issues relating to the internet and new technologies.
Have a question? Email Evan to set up a time to talk: ebrown@internetcases.com. Or call (630) 362-7237.
Late yesterday President Trump took steps to make good on his promise to regulate online platforms like Twitter and Facebook. He released a draft executive order to that end. You can read the actual draft executive order. Here is a summary of the key points. The draft order:
States that it is the policy of the U.S. to foster clear, nondiscriminatory ground rules promoting free and open debate on the Internet. It is the policy of the U.S. that the scope of Section 230 immunity should be clarified.
Argues that a platform becomes a “publisher or speaker” of content, and therefore not subject to Section 230 immunity, when it does not act in good faith to to restrict access to content (in accordance with Section 230(c)(2) that it considers to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise objectionable.” The executive order argues that Section 230 “does not extend to deceptive or pretextual actions restricting online content or actions inconsistent with an online platform’s terms of service.”
Orders the Secretary of Commerce to petition the FCC, requesting that the FCC propose regulations to clarify the conditions around a platform’s “good faith” when restricting access or availability of content. In particuar, the requested rules would examine whether the action was, among other things, deceptive, pretextual, inconsistent with the provider’s terms of service, the product of unreasoned explanation, or without meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Directs each federal executive department and agency to review its advertising and marketing spending on online platforms. Each is to provide a report in 30 days on: amount spent, which platforms supported, any viewpoint-based restrictions of the platform, assessment whether the platform is appropriate, and statutory authority available to restrict advertising on platforms not deemed appropriate.
States that it is the policy of the U.S. that “large social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, as the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum, should not infringe on protected speech”.
Re-establishes the White House “Tech Bias Reporting Tool” that allows Americans to report incidents of online censorship. These complaints are to be forwarded to the DoJ and the FTC.
Directs the FTC to “consider” taking action against entities covered by Section 230 who restrict speech in ways that do not align with those entities’ public representations about those practices.
Directs the FTC to develop a publicly-available report describing complaints of activity of Twitter and other “large internet platforms” that may violate the law in ways that implicate the policy that these are public fora and should not infringe on protected speech.
Establishes a working group with states’ attorneys general regarding enforcement of state statutes prohibiting online platforms from engaging in unfair and deceptive acts and practices.
This working group is also to collect publicly available information for the creation and monitoring of user watch lists, based on their interactions with content and other users (likes, follows, time spent). This working group is also to monitor users based on their activity “off the platform”. (It is not clear whether that means “off the internet” or “on other online places”.)
Despite a recent Ninth Circuit decision denying immunity to malware detection provider for targeting competitor’s software, court holds that Section 230 protected Malwarebytes from liability for designating software driver program as potentially unwanted program.
Plaintiff provided software that works in real time in the background of the operating system to optimize processing and locate and install missing and outdated software drivers. Defendant provided malware detection software designed to scan consumer’s computers and to report potentially unwanted programs. After defendant’s software categorized plaintiff’s sofware as a potentially unwanted program, plaintiff sued, putting forth a number of business torts, including business disparagement, tortious interference and common law unfair competition.
Defendant moved to dismiss under 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(2)(B), which provides that no provider of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any action taken to enable or make available others the technical means to restrict access to material that the provider deems to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.
The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Malwarebytes was immune from suit under Section 230. It differentiated the case from the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2019), in which the court held that Section 230 immunity did not protect Malwarebytes for designating a competitor’s anti-malware software as “otherwise objectionable”. In this case, the court found that plaintiff’s software did not make it a competitor to defendant. Since the parties were not direct competitors, the limitations on Section 230’s protection did not apply.
The case can be met with a bit of a sigh of relief to those who, along with Professor Goldman expressed concern that the Enigma case would make it more difficult for anti-malware providers to offer their services. Though Enigma did limit Section 230 protection for these vendors, this decision shows that Section 230 immunity in this space is not dead.
Asurvio LP v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 2020 WL 1478345 (N.D. Cal. March 26, 2020)
Amazon.com scored a Ninth Circuit win on Section 230 grounds when the court affirmed the lower court’s summary judgment against a pro se plaintiff’s claim against Amazon for tortious interference with prospective and actual business relations, and interference with an economic advantage. The claim apparently arose out of a third party posting a review on Amazon that plaintiff did not like. Citing to Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), the court observed that the Communications Decency Act (at Section 230(c)(1)) provides immunity from liability if a claim “inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.” Plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Amazon was not a publisher or speaker of content within the meaning of Section 230.
Sen v. Amazon.com, 2020 WL 708701 (9th Cir. February 12, 2020)
Plaintiff sued Google for false advertising and violations of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act over Google’s provision of Adwords services for other defendants’ website, which plaintiff claimed sold counterfeit versions of plaintiff’s products. Google moved to dismiss these two claims and the court granted the motion.
On the false advertising issue, the court held that plaintiff had failed to allege the critical element that Google was the party that made the alleged misrepresentations concerning the counterfeit products.
As for the Consumer Fraud Act claim, the court held that Google enjoyed immunity from such a claim in accordance with the Communications Decency Act at 47 U.S.C. 230(c).
Specifically, the court found: (1) Google’s services made Google the provider of an interactive computer service, (2) the claim sought to hold Google liable for the publishing of the offending ads, and (3) the offending ads were published by a party other than Google, namely, the purveyor of the allegedly counterfeit goods. CDA immunity applied because all three of these elements were met.
The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act was an intellectual property statute and that therefore under Section 230(e)(2), CDA immunity did not apply. With immunity present, the court dismissed the consumer fraud claim.
InvenTel Products, LLC v. Li, No. 19-9190, 2019 WL 5078807 (D.N.J. October 10, 2019)
About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown@internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.
Plaintiffs owned and operated a Facebook page that Facebook shut down in 2018 because of concerns the page was associated with Russian interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. After getting shut down, plaintiffs sued Facebook alleging a number of claims, including:
damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for deprivation of a constitutional right by one acting under color of state law;
civil rights violations under California law;
breach of contract; and
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Facebook moved to dismiss these claims under the Communications Decency Act at 47 U.S.C. §230. The court granted the motion to dismiss.
Section 230 immunizes defendants from liability if:
defendant is a provider or user of an interactive computer service;
the information for which plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable is information provided by another information content provider; and
plaintiff’s claim seeks to hold defendant liable as the publisher or speaker of that information.
In this case, there was no dispute Facebook met the first two elements, i.e., it is a provider of an interactive computer service and the information (namely, the content of plaintiffs’ page) was provided by a party other than Facebook. The real dispute came under the third element.
Plaintiffs argued that Section 230 should not immunize Facebook because this case did not concern obscenity or any other form of unprotected speech. Instead, plaintiffs argued, the case concerned political speech that strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. The court rejected this argument, holding that immunity under the Communications Decency Act does not contain a political speech exception. The statutory text provides that no “provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. (Emphasis added). No distinction is made between political speech and non-political speech.
Plaintiff also argued that granting Facebook immunity would be counter to congressional intent behind the Communications Decency Act. But the court borrowed language from Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) on this point: “Both parties make a lot of sound and fury on the congressional intent of the immunity under section 230, but such noise ultimately signifies nothing. It is the language of the statute that defines and enacts the concerns and aims of Congress; a particular concern does not rewrite the language.” Looking to Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), the court noted that Ninth Circuit case law interpreting the language of the Communications Decency Act has held that “activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.”
Federal Agency of News LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 2019 WL 3254208 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2019)
Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago practicing copyright, trademark, technology and in other areas of the law. His clients include individuals and companies in many industries, as well as the technology companies that serve them. Twitter: 
