Right of Publicity – Attorney Evan Brown

December 3, 2024 Right of Publicity, Section 230, Social Media

Section 230 protected Meta from Huckabee cannabis lawsuit

Mike Huckabee, the former governor of Arkansas, sued Meta Platforms, Inc., the parent company of Facebook, for using his name and likeness without his permission in advertisements for CBD products. Huckabee argued that these ads falsely claimed he endorsed the products and made misleading statements about his personal health. He asked the court to hold Meta accountable under various legal theories, including violation of his publicity rights and privacy.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant approved and maintained advertisements that misappropriated plaintiff’s name, image, and likeness. Plaintiff further claimed that the ads placed plaintiff in a false light by attributing statements and endorsements to him that he never made. Additionally, plaintiff argued that defendant had been unjustly enriched by profiting from these misleading ads. Defendant, however, sought to dismiss the claims, relying on the Communications Decency Act at 47 U.S.C. 230, which grants immunity to platforms for third-party content.

The court granted Meta’s motion to dismiss. It determined that Section 230 shielded defendant from liability for the third-party content at issue. The court also noted that plaintiff’s allegations lacked the specificity needed to overcome the protections provided by Section 230. Furthermore, the court emphasized that federal law, such as Section 230, preempts conflicting state laws, such as Arkansas’s Frank Broyles Publicity Protection Act.

Three reasons why this case matters:

Defines Section 230 Protections: It reaffirms the broad immunity tech companies enjoy under Section 230, even in cases involving misuse of publicity rights.
Digital Rights and Privacy: The case highlights the tension between protecting individual rights and maintaining the free flow of online content.
Challenges for State Laws: It shows how federal law can preempt state-specific protections, leaving individuals with limited recourse.

Mike Huckabee v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2024 WL 4817657 (D. Del. Nov. 18, 2024)

March 23, 2024 Artificial Intelligence, Right of Publicity

AI and voice clones: Three things to know about Tennessee’s ELVIS Act

On March 21, 2024, the governor of Tennessee signed the ELVIS Act (the Ensuring Likeness, Voice, and Image Security Act of 2024) which is aimed at the problem of people using AI to simulate voices in a way not authorized by the person whose voice is being imitated.

Here are three key things to know about the new law:

(1) Voice defined.

The law adds the following definition to existing Tennessee law:

“Voice” means a sound in a medium that is readily identifiable and attributable to a particular individual, regardless of whether the sound contains the actual voice or a simulation of the voice of the individual;

There are a couple of interesting things to note. One could generate or use the voice of another without using the other person’s name. The voice simply has to be “readily identifiable” and “attributable” to a particular human. Those seem to be pretty open concepts and we could expect quite a bit of litigation over what it takes for a voice to be identifiable and attributable to another. Would this cover situations where a person naturally sounds like another, or is just trying to imitate another musical style?

(2) Voice is now a property right.

The following underlined words were added to the existing statute:

Every individual has a property right in the use of that individual’s name, photograph, voice, or likeness in any medium in any manner.

The word “person’s” was changed to “individual’s” presumably to clarify that this is a right belonging to a natural person (i.e., real human beings and not companies). And of course the word “voice” was added to expressly include that attribute as something in which the person can have a property interest.

(3) Two new things are banned under law.

The following two paragraphs have been added:

A person is liable to a civil action if the person publishes, performs, distributes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to the public an individual’s voice or likeness, with knowledge that use of the voice or likeness was not authorized by the individual or, in the case of a minor, the minor’s parent or legal guardian, or in the case of a deceased individual, the executor or administrator, heirs, or devisees of such deceased individual.

A person is liable to a civil action if the person distributes, transmits, or otherwise makes available an algorithm, software, tool, or other technology, service, or device, the primary purpose or function of which is the production of an individual’s photograph, voice, or likeness without authorization from the individual or, in the case of a minor, the minor’s parent or legal guardian, or in the case of a deceased individual, the executor or administrator, heirs, or devisees of such deceased individual.

With this language, we see the heart of the new law’s impact. One can sue another for making his or her voice publicly available without permission. Note that this restriction is not only on commercial use of another’s voice. Most states’ laws discussing name, image and likeness restrict commercial use by another. This statute is broader, and would make more things unlawful, for example, creating a deepfaked voice simply for fun (or harassment, of course), if the person whose voice is being imitated has not consented.

Note the other interesting new prohibition, the one on making available tools having as their “primary purpose or function” the production of another’s voice without authorization. If you were planning on launching that new app where you can make your voice sound like a celebrity’s voice, consider whether this Tennessee statute might shut you down.

See also:

March 19, 2024 Right of Publicity

Months long video surveillance of house did not violate the Fourth Amendment

video surveillance fourth amendment

“As video cameras proliferate throughout society, regrettably, the reasonable expectation of privacy from filming is diminished.”

Defendant was convicted of stealing government funds and of wire fraud for receiving disability benefits provided to veterans when in fact defendant – though being a veteran – was not disabled. Part of the evidence the government used against defendant was video footage obtained from a pole camera the government had set up on the roof of a school across the street from defendant’s home. It surveilled his house for 15 hours a day for 68 days. After being convicted, defendant sought review with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the near-continual surveillance of his house was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court disagreed and affirmed the conviction.

The development of a reasonable expectation of privacy

The court observed the importance of the notion of a citizen’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” a concept that has evolved over time from its original ties to common-law trespass to encompass a broader range of privacy expectations recognized by society as legitimate.

Historically, the Supreme Court has maintained that activities exposed to public view do not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the court held warrantless observation of a home’s exterior from public airspace was not a Fourth Amendment violation on the grounds that these observations did not penetrate private, concealed areas.

In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the court held that the use of thermal imaging to discern details within a home, unobservable to the naked eye, was a search requiring a warrant. This marked a departure towards acknowledging privacy infringements facilitated by technology not widely available to the public.

In United States v. Jackson, 213 F. 3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2000) the Tenth Circuit held that video surveillance capturing activity visible without enhancement did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court grounded its decision in the principle that what one knowingly exposes to public observation falls outside the Fourth Amendment’s protection. The surveillance in question, similar to the one in this case involved recording the exterior of a residence, capturing scenes observable from public vantage points, thus not constituting a search under the Fourth Amendment.

But in this case, the surveillance was constant

In this case, defendant relied heavily on the case of Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), where the Supreme Court ruled that accessing historical cell-site location information constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. This decision underscored the intrusive potential of prolonged surveillance, highlighting the significant privacy concerns associated with compiling a comprehensive record of an individual’s movements over time. But the court in this case observed that the scope of the Carpenter case scope was explicitly narrow, not extending to conventional surveillance methods such as security cameras.

So the court distinguished the present situation from Carpenter, noting that the pole camera only captured what was visible from the street and did not provide a comprehensive record of defendant’s movements beyond the monitored location. Accordingly, in the court’s view, the surveillance did not infringe upon the reasonable expectation of privacy as articulated in Carpenter, which pertained to the aggregate of an individual’s movements over an extended period.

More technology = changing norms regarding privacy

Furthermore (in probably the most intriguing part of the opinion), the court noted the evolving societal norms around privacy, especially in the context of the widespread proliferation of cameras in public and private spheres. This ubiquity of video recording technology, coupled with the societal acclimatization to being recorded, has inevitably influenced expectations of privacy. As surveillance technologies become more integrated into everyday life, the threshold for what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy” shifts, reflecting the dynamic interplay between technological advancements and societal norms.

So the court concluded that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the footage captured by the pole camera, as it only recorded what was visible to any passerby from the street.

United States v. Hay, — F.4th — 2024 WL 1163349 (10th Cir., March 19, 2024)

See also:

September 12, 2022 Right of Publicity

Court dismisses company executive’s name and likeness lawsuit over YouTube videos

name likeness

Strouse was the president and CEO of a company but departed with the company was sold. He did not approve of how the new company continued to use YouTube videos Strouse had made when he was with the company. So Strouse sued under Pennsylvania law for unauthorized use of his name and likeness. The company moved to dismiss the claim and the court granted the motion.

There are three elements to a claim for unauthorized use of name and likeness under Pennsylvania law:

a natural person’s name or likeness must have commercial value;
the accused party must make an unauthorized use of that name or likeness; and
the use is for commercial or advertising purposes.

The court found that Strouse’s claim failed on the first and second elements.

Although he claimed he suffered substantial damages due to the company’s supposed misappropriation, the court found he offered no explanation for how or why these damages occurred. He did not allege that his name had any special reputation or prestige such that mention of his name or use of his image in a video on the company’s website could confer an actionable benefit.

And the court found that Strouse’s pleadings did not establish that the company was using the videos without authorization. Strouse had made the videos as president and CEO of the company – he certainly authorized such use then. The acquiring company purchased the business’s assets, including the videos that were made.

Wurth Baer Supply Co. v. Strouse, 2022 WL 4125802 (M.D. Pennsylvania, September 9, 2022)

Right of publicity case against Shaquille O’Neal over a photo he tweeted and posted to Instagram moves forward

19569476993_1a7bba1a85_o

A federal court has held that a plaintiff has successfully pled a claim of “appropriation” (essentially, right of publicity claim) against former NBA star Shaquille O’Neal, for Shaq’s use of plaintiff’s photo on Twitter and Instagram. The case is useful inasmuch as it shows how courts will consider social media as providing a benefit to its user.

Shaq acquired a photo of plaintiff, who suffers from a condition that affects his hair, skin and teeth, then placed a photo of himself making a contorted face next to the photo, apparently to imitate the way plaintiff appeared. Given that Shaq has millions of followers, this garnered many, many likes and comments. (I of course won’t republish the image here, but if you really want to see it, just do a Google Image search using the parties’ last names.)

Plaintiff sued under several theories, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, appropriation, and unjust enrichment. Shaq moved to dismiss most of the claims. The court did throw out some of the claims (e.g., negligence — plaintiff has pled Shaq acted intentionally). On the appropriation claim, the court, applying Michigan law, held that Shaq had made use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit. The court rejected Shaq’s argument that plaintiff lacked any pecuniary interest in his identify, holding that the tort of appropriation under Michigan law “is not limited to commercial appropriation” and “applies also when the defendant makes use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.”

The court went on to clarify that even if the tort of appropriation under Michigan law did require a plaintiff to demonstrate a significant commercial or pecuniary interest in his identity, plaintiff’s case still survived the motion to dismiss. “[A] plaintiff need not be a national celebrity to demonstrate significant commercial value.”

Binion v. O’Neal, No. NO. 15-60869, 2016 WL 111344 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 11, 2016).

Evan Brown is a Chicago attorney advising enterprises on important aspects of technology law, including software development, technology and content licensing, and general privacy issues.

October 12, 2015 First Amendment, Privacy, Right of Publicity

California court okays lawsuit against mugshot posting website

The Court of Appeal of California has held that defendant website operator – who posted arrestees’ mugshots and names, and generated revenue from advertisements using arrestees’ names and by accepting money to take the photos down – was not entitled to have the lawsuit against it dismissed. Defendant’s profiting from the photos and their takedown was not in connection with an issue of public interest, and therefore did not entitle defendant to the relief afforded by an anti-SLAPP motion.

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against defendant website operator, arguing that the website’s practice of accepting money to take down mugshots it posted violated California laws against misappropriation of likeness, and constituted unfair and unlawful business practices.

Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing plaintiff’s claims comprised a “strategic lawsuit against public participation” (or “SLAPP”). California has an anti-SLAPP statute that allows defendants to move to strike any cause of action “arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue …, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”

The court held that the posting of mugshots was in furtherance of defendant’s free speech rights and was in connection with a public issue. But the actual complained-of conduct – the generating of revenue through advertisements, and from fees generated for taking the photos down – was not protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Because the claims did not arise from the part of defendant’s conduct that would be considered “protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute, but instead arose from other, non-protected activity (making money off of people’s names and photos), the anti-SLAPP statute did not protect defendant. Unless the parties settle, the case will proceed.

Rogers v. Justmugshots.Com, Corp., 2015 WL 5838403, (Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d) (October 7, 2015)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago helping clients manage issues involving technology and new media.

October 22, 2014 Right of Publicity

Court denies request of plaintiffs in right of publicity suit to exhume the body of Aunt Jemima

The great-grandsons of Anna S. Harringon, whose image formed the basis for Aunt Jemima, sued Quaker Oats Company and others for $2 billion claiming that defendants failed to pay royalties to Harrington’s estate after her death in 1955. One of the allegations in the case is that defendants played a role in Harrington’s death. Apparently, in an effort to support those allegations, plaintiffs sought an order from the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (where the matter is pending) allowing them to exhume the body of their great-grandmother for evidence of this malfeasance.

The court denied the request. Apart from it being just a bizarre ask, it turns out the “evidence” upon which the defendants’ role in Aunt Jemima’s death was based on a parody article from Uncyclopedia. In denying the motion, the court found the following:

The motion is primarily based on statements purportedly made by Quaker Oats executives about the death of the woman who had been identified as “Aunt Jemima.” But the source of the information is an uncyclopedia.wikia.com article, which is a parody website of Wikipedia. Uncyclopedia proudly bills itself as “an encyclopedia full of misinformation and utter lies.” See uncyclopedia.wikia.com/wiki/Uncyclopedia:About.

The court also threatened the pro se plaintiffs: “Plaintiffs must take greater care in their submissions to the Court, or else face sanctions and, if litigation abuse continues, outright dismissal of the case.”

Hunter et al. v. PepsiCo Inc. et al., No. 1:14-cv-06011 (N.D. Ill. October 21, 2014)

BTW: Some info about Anna Harrington’s grave.

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago advising clients on matters dealing with technology, the internet and new media.

January 7, 2014 Cryptocurrency, Right of Publicity, Trademarks

The trademark and right of publicity woes of having a cryptocurrency named after you

Not too surprisingly, Kanye West’s lawyers have demanded the developers of the Coinye West cryptocurrency not use his name. The somewhat obnoxious letter shows that Kanye’s lawyers are asserting, among other things, trademark infringement and right of publicity misappropriation.

Russell Brandom at the Verge observes that “[o]nce the code is public, the original coders will be unable to prevent its use, forcing West’s legal team to prosecute every instance of Coinye individually.”

That observation raises a couple of interesting points. The first one is more of a clarification — once the code is in the wild, we should assume Kanye would only care to stop the use of his name, and would not seek (nor have any basis upon which) to stop anyone from using the code.

Stopping users of a cryptocurrency from using the name of that cryptocurrency could be a bit tough. Kanye’s lawyer threatens to “purse all legal remedies against any business that accepts the purported COINYE WEST currency.”

Infringement and misappropriation both depend on a use of the offending term in a commercial way. But users of the decentralized system, and the vendors who accept that currency, are not providers of any goods or services onto which Kanye’s identity will be attached. If one is merely using the currency as a tool, it’s hard to see how that’s any different from implicating the rights of the historical figures who appear on paper currency. So might it all be about the Benjamins? Maybe not at all.

November 12, 2013 Privacy, Right of Publicity

Guy faces lawsuit for using another man’s Facebook pics to send sexually explicit communications to undercover cops

Defendant emailed three pictures, thinking he was communicating with two 14-year-old girls. But he was actually communicating with a police detective. And the pictures were not of defendant, but of plaintiff — a cop in a neighboring community. The pictures were not sexually explicit, but the accompanying communications were. Defendant had copied them from plaintiff’s Facebook page.

Plaintiff and his wife sued defendant under a number of tort theories. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for false light publicity and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court denied the motion.

It found that the false light in which defendant placed plaintiff through his conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and that defendant had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the identity of the person in the photo, and the false light into which the plaintiff would be placed.

As for the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court found that: (1) defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the conduct was the cause of plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.

Defendant argued that his conduct was not extreme and outrageous. The court addressed that argument by noting that:

[Defendant] cannot do that with a straight face. The test is whether “the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!” . . . This is such a case.

Plaintiff’s wife’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim survived as well. This was not, as defendant argued, an allegation of bystander emotional distress, such as that of a witness to an automobile accident. Defendant’s conduct implied that plaintiff was a sexual predator. This would naturally reflect on his spouse and cause her great personal embarrassment and natural concern for her own personal health quite apart from the distress she may have experienced from observing her husband’s own travail.

Dzamko v. Dossantos, 2013 WL 5969531 (Conn.Super. October 23, 2013)

January 18, 2013 Right of Publicity

Seventh Circuit tosses right of publicity case against Joan Rivers

Bogie v. Rosenberg, — F.3d —, 2013 WL 174113 (7th Cir. 2013)

The Seventh Circuit has held it was not an invasion of privacy, nor a misappropriation of plaintiff’s right of publicity, to include a video clip of a 16-second conversation between plaintiff and comedian Joan Rivers filmed backstage. These claims failed under Wisconsin law.

Someone filmed plaintiff having a conversation with Joan Rivers about the comments a heckler made in the just-concluded show. The producers of a documentary about Rivers included the clip in their work. The clip comprised 0.3 percent of the entire work.

Plaintiff sued, alleging claims under Wisconsin law for invasion of privacy and misappropriation of her right of publicity. The district court dismissed her claims for failure to state a claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The privacy claim failed because, as the court found, plaintiff enjoyed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the backstage context where the conversation took place. There were several people around, and the “din of chatter” could be heard in the background. The court also found that the inclusion of the video would not be offensive to a reasonable person. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that her embarrassment over the contents of her communications contributed to a finding of offensiveness — quoting from a popular treatise, the court noted that the law “does not protect one from being associated with highly offensive material, but rather from a highly offensive intrusion on privacy.”

The court held there was no misappropriation of plaintiff’s right to publicity, finding the inclusion of the video subject to the “public interest” exception to the Wisconsin statute. The film’s objectives were broader than just showcasing Rivers — it was to portray generally America’s interest in comedy and show business. The court also found the clip to be subject to the “incidental use” exception — it was but a tiny portion of the overall work.