software – Attorney Evan Brown

February 18, 2024 Contracts, Licensing

Software reseller not entitled to preliminary injunction to protect customer relationships

Plaintiff CD appointed defendant SST to be the exclusive reseller to certain customers of CD’s software development platform. CD sued SST for breach, and SST likewise filed counterclaims for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. SST sought a preliminary injunction against CD, asking that the court prohibit CD from unilaterally terminating the reseller agreement.

SST asserted, among other things, that it would suffer irreparable harm from this termination, citing potential loss of solicited clients and reputational damage. CD argued, however, that these asserted harms could be remedied monetarily, and thus did not qualify as irreparable.

The court agreed with CD, finding SST’s arguments regarding reputational damage and loss of client relationships to be speculative and unsupported by concrete evidence. As such, these claims did not meet the stringent criteria for irreparable harm, which requires a clear, immediate threat of injury that monetary compensation could not redress.

Further undermining SST’s claim of irreparable harm was the notion that any potential financial losses due to CD’s actions, including the costs associated with resolving issues with target accounts or transitioning to alternative software solutions, were quantifiable and thus recoverable in monetary terms. The court noted that SST’s reluctance to make additional payments to CD for resolving software access issues did not constitute irreparable harm, as those could be recouped in resolution of the contract dispute. Moreover, the court pointed out that SST’s concerns about CD not restoring access post-payment were speculative and lacked evidentiary support, given the record showing ongoing negotiations and concrete offers from CD.

Citizen Developer, LLC v. System Soft Tech., Inc., 2024 WL 554140 (M.D. Penn. February 12, 2024)

Unauthorized press release caused drone software deal to crash

drone software

Usually back in the boilerplate section, technology contracts often contain a provision saying the parties will not issue press releases without the prior written consent of the other party. Here is a recent case where failure to strictly abide by such a requirement resulted in the breakdown of an important licensing arrangement, followed by expensive and difficult litigation.

An exciting drone software collaboration

Plaintiff entered into a software licensing agreement with defendant whereby plaintiff could use defendant’s avionics software for drones. The agreement gave plaintiff a limited exclusive license to certain functionality in the software.

The licensing agreement defined confidential information to include the terms of the agreement. The parties could not use any confidential information other than as required to exercise a right or perform an obligation under the agreement. The agreement also restricted the parties from issuing press releases without the other party’s prior written approval.

Fateful quick email exchange right before vacation

On a Sunday in August 2022, an employee of defendant wrote to defendant’s CEO, letting defendant know that plaintiff was developing a press release. The message concluded with, “Let me know if you have any objections, or if you want to send us a quote or have our PR team make a quote[.]”

Three minutes later the CEO wrote back with the following: “That sounds great. I’m on vacay all week up in the Adirondacks. You guys can make up some quote – I’m sure it will be fine or at least a great start.”

Going public with what should have stayed private

On Wednesday of that week – without further contact with defendant – plaintiff issued a press release discussing the parties’ relationship. The press release stated, in part, that under the terms of the software licensing agreement between the parties, the “software will only be made available to [plaintiff],” and that “[c]ompetitors will have to develop their own software or secure licenses from others with inferior test performance.”

On Friday (probably the last day of the CEO’s “vacay . . . up in the Adirondacks”), defendant sent a letter to plaintiff terminating the agreement. Defendant cited to a provision of the agreement enabling it to terminate immediately upon breach of the agreement’s confidentiality provision. The letter explained that plaintiff had issued the press release without defendant’s consent and that the press release included confidential information.

And then the lawsuit

Plaintiff sued, asserting breach of contract, namely, that defendant improperly declared the agreement terminated, and improperly ceased fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. Defendant moved to dismiss the claims. The court granted the motion.

Court: defendant had the right to terminate

The court found that it was “express and plain” that the definition of confidential information included the terms of the agreement. And when plaintiffs disclosed language from the agreement discussing the exclusive license, plaintiffs breached the agreement, giving defendant a right to terminate, which it exercised.

The court also rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s CEO’s Sunday pre-vacation quick response email gave consent for the press release. The court found that rather than serving as approval of the press release that was issued, the consent the CEO provided was for the continued development of a press release and qualified permission to make up a quote for him as part of the development process. Moreover, the harms to defendant arising from plaintiff’s mischaracterization of the parties’ relationship were “precisely the effects that are avoided by requiring ‘prior written consent’ before publication of Confidential Information in a press release.”

Red Cat Holdings, Inc. v. Autonodyne LLC, 2024 WL 342515 (Del. Ch., January 30, 2024)

What are audit provisions in a technology contract?

audit provision

An audit provision in a technology contract is a clause that allows for one party to inspect and perhaps copy certain business records and other information of the other party. Often an audit provision authorizes a party that owns licensed technology or software (the provider or licensor) to periodically inspect and audit the customer’s use of the technology or software. These types of provisions help ensure that the customer is using the technology or software in accordance with the terms of the agreement and that it is not infringing or otherwise misusing the technology or software. They can also be used to ensure that the customer is paying the appropriate license fees or royalties.

One often sees audit provisions in reseller agreements and revenue sharing agreements, to give the right of one party to inspect records that confirm it is being paid in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Since commissions are often calculated as a percentage of revenue, a referral partner may want to see the underlying records supporting the amounts the referral partner is being paid.

The audit provision typically outlines the procedures for the audit, such as the frequency of the audits (often expressed as “no more often than x times per calendar year”), who may conduct the audits (e.g., designees of the auditing party), and what information must be made available for review during the audit. It may also outline the rights and responsibilities of both parties during the audit process, including any limitations on the scope of the audit and the handling of any confidential information that is revealed during the audit.

An audit provision in a technology contract may provide that if the audit uncovers underpayment by the audited party (perhaps by at least a certain percentage) then the audited party will be responsible not only for the amount of the underpayment, but also for the costs incurred by the auditing party in conducting the audit.

Overall, audit provisions are an important aspect of technology agreements and play a vital role in protecting the interests of both parties involved. It is important for both parties to understand the audit provisions in the agreement and to comply with them fully in order to avoid any potential legal disputes.

Evan Brown is a Chicago attorney helping businesses negotiate and draft technology services and development contracts. He also handles many other issues involving the internet, copyright and trademarks, domain names and new media. Call him at (630) 362-7237 or email ebrown@internetcases.com. Follow him on Twitter: @internetcases

January 11, 2023 Contracts, Licensing

Why are indemnification provisions important in technology contracts?

vicarious liability copyright

Indemnification provisions in technology agreements play a crucial role in protecting the parties involved in a technology transaction. These provisions are often included in agreements among technology vendors, customers, software developers, and other related parties to shift the risk of losses and legal liabilities from one party to another.

Picking up the tab

Indemnification is a legal concept that involves one party (the indemnitor) agreeing to compensate the other party (the indemnitee) for any losses or damages that may occur as a result of a specific event or occurrence. Similarly, a provision of this sort may provide that one party will “defend” the other party by retaining counsel and paying the costs of defense in court, as those costs are incurred. In technology agreements, indemnification provisions are often used to shift the risk of losses or damages that may result from a party’s breach of contract or negligence. Customers will often seek to insist that the vendor indemnify the customer in the event a third party files a lawsuit against the customer because the technology infringes that third party’s intellectual property rights.

The main purpose of indemnification provisions in technology agreements is to protect the parties involved from potential financial losses, legal liabilities, and other costs associated with legal disputes. For example, a contract may provide that if a software developer breaches a contract and causes a loss to the client, the indemnification provision would require the developer to compensate the client for any damages.

Key elements

Indemnification provisions in technology agreements typically contain several key elements, including the types of losses or damages that will be covered, the parties that are responsible for indemnifying the other party, and the time frame for indemnification to take place. It also often covers the notification requirements, the documentation and information that should be provided in case of losses or damages, and the limitation of liability.

Another key aspect of indemnification provisions is that they are often mutual, meaning that both parties are responsible for indemnifying each other in certain situations. This can help to ensure that both parties are protected in the event of a legal dispute, and it also helps to create a balance of risk between the parties.

Why bother?

Indemnification provisions in technology agreements play a vital role in protecting the parties involved from financial losses, legal liabilities, and other costs associated with legal disputes. It’s important for both parties to understand the concept of indemnification, the purpose of these provisions, and how they are typically used in technology agreements.

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. Follow him on Twitter at @internetcases.

October 29, 2019 Contracts

Software development breach of contract lawsuit moves forward

Plaintiff sued defendant software developer for breach of contract and other claims, asserting that defendant failed to develop and deliver a video editing application on time and within budget. Defendant moved to dismiss the case, arguing that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court denied the motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, allowing that claim to move forward.

The court found that plaintiff had successfully pled a breach of contract claim under Texas law. Defendant had argued that the parties agreed to benchmark the developed software’s performance in comparison to “recreational” software, but that plaintiff later demanded the software be benchmarked against professional grade software. Plaintiff responded that it had asked defendant to benchmark the program’s speed to iMovie, which it characterized as recreational and not professional.

The court looked past this benchmarking aspect and found that even in light of the apparent disagreement on the standard, the allegations in the complaint – that defendant had not provided a viable product under the agreement – were sufficient to support a breach of contract claim.

Polar Pro Filters, Inc. v Frogslayer LLC, 2019 WL 5400934 (S.D. Texas, October 22, 2019)

October 26, 2017 Copyright

Online platform’s EULA barred software developer from claiming copyright ownership

Developer entered into an agreement with the TD Ameritrade platform that gave him access to the platform’s APIs so that he could develop his own analytical tools. He claimed that without his authorization, the platform incorporated his software routines into its own technology. Developer sued for copyright infringement. The platform moved to dismiss the claim and the court granted the motion.

Developer had presented to the court a registration certificate as evidence that he owned the copyright in the software he created. Such a registration certificate serves as prima facie evidence of copyright ownership, and establishes a rebuttable presumption of such ownership.

In its argument to dismiss developer’s claims, the platform pointed to its agreement with developer that stated, among other things, that use of the services “[would] not confer any title, ownership interest, or any intellectual property rights to me.” It also expressly prohibited the developer from creating derivative works from the services. The platform looked to these provisions in the agreement to rebut the presumption that the developer owned the copyright in the tools. The court agreed.

Developer argued that the platform had actually encouraged – and thereby authorized – the development of tools such as the ones he had created. But the court observed that while such a claim is “possible,” the developer had failed to allege any facts to demonstrate that the claim is “plausible.” So in sum, the court credited the terms of the agreement, and took those terms to preclude the developer from owning the copyright in the software he had developed. It should be noted that the court left open the option for plaintiff to re-plead. But that does little to mitigate the extent to which the court’s reasoning here as to how the agreement could limit a claim of copyright is questionable.

TD Ameritrade v. Matthews, 2017 WL 4812035 (D. Alaska, October 25, 2017)

[Post updated 27 Oct 2017 at 8:08 CST to address option to re-plead.]

About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.

February 10, 2017 Copyright

Ninth Circuit revives software download copyright infringement case

The main issue before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Design Data Corp. v. Unigate Enterprise was whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in defendant’s favor on the theory that one unauthorized download of a copy of plaintiff’s software was a de minimis infringement. The court held that the grant of summary judgment was not proper and sent the case back to the lower court.

Defendant claimed that it downloaded an authorized free trial version of the plaintiff’s software. But plaintiff brought forward evidence that it did not offer free trial versions. And plaintiff found evidence of the installation of two versions of its software on defendant’s computer systems, as well as patches designed to circumvent the software’s licensing requirements.

The Ninth Circuit determined that on this record, important questions of fact remained to be resolved surrounding the downloading and use of the software. Importantly, the appellate court held that the trial court committed error in determining that any infringement would have been merely de minimis. It was a mistake to have granted summary judgment in light of “the overwhelming thrust of authority” that upholds liability even under circumstances where use of a copyrighted work is of minimal consequence.

Another interesting issue before the court was whether defendant’s distribution of output files generated by its contractor’s use of an unauthorized copy of the software was actionable as infringement. The court affirmed summary judgment on this issue. It noted that copyright protection may extend to a program’s output if the program does the “lion’s share” of the work, with the user’s role being so “marginal” that the output reflects the program’s contents. But in this case, plaintiff did not put forth enough evidence to meet this standard, so the appellate court let stand the grant of summary judgment in defendant’s favor on this issue.

Design Data Corp. v. Unigate Enterprise, Inc. — F.3d —, 2017 WL 541010 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017)

June 23, 2014 Section 230

No Section 230 immunity for healthcare software provider

Company could be liable for modifications made to its software that provided abbreviated third-party warnings for prescription drugs.

Cases dealing with the Communications Decency Act often involve websites. See, for example, the recent decision from the Sixth Circuit involving thedirty.com, and earlier cases about Roommates.com and Amazon. But this case considered a sort of unique suggested application of Section 230 immunity. The question was whether a provider of software that facilitated the delivery of prescription monographs (including warning information) could claim immunity. It’s unusual for Section 230 to show up in a products liability/personal injury action, but that is how it happened here.

Plaintiff suffered blindness and other injuries allegedly from taking medication she says she would not have taken had it been accompanied with certain warnings. She sued several defendants, including a software company that provided the technology whereby warnings drafted by third parties were provided to pharmacy retailers.

Defendant software company moved to dismiss on several grounds, including immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and defendant sought review. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that Section 230 immunity did not apply.

At the request of the retailer that sold plaintiff her medicine, defendant software company modified its software to provide only abbreviated product warnings. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant arose from that modification.

Defendant argued that Section 230 immunity should protect it because defendant did not play any role in the decisions of the product warning. Instead, defendant was an independent provider of software that distributed drug information to pharmacy customers. Its software enabled pharmacies to access a third party’s database of product warnings. Defendant did not author the warnings but instead, provided the information under an authorization in a data license agreement. Defendant thus functioned as a pass through entity to distribute warnings that were prepared by third parties to retailers selling prescription drugs, and were printed and distributed to the individual customer when a prescription was filled.

The court found unpersuasive defendant’s claim that Section 230 immunized it from liability for providing electronic access to third party warnings. Section 230 provides, in relevant part, that (1) “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” and (2) “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local rule that is inconsistent with this section.”

It held that plaintiff’s claim against defendant did not arise from defendant’s role as the software or service provider that enabled the retailer to access the third-party drafted warnings. Instead, the court found that plaintiff’s claim arose from defendant’s modification of its software to allow the retailer to distribute abbreviated drug monographs that automatically omitted warnings of serious risks. The appellate court agreed with the trial court which found, “this is not a case in which a defendant merely distributed information from a third party author or publisher.” Instead, in the court’s view, defendant’s conduct in modifying the software so that only abbreviated warnings would appear, it participated in creating or modifying the content.

Hardin v. PDX, Inc., 2014 WL 2768863 (Cal. App. 1st June 19, 2014)

October 27, 2010 Contracts

Customer violated software license by letting attorneys use application

The Compliance Store v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, — F.3d —, 2010 WL 4056112 (5th Cir. October 18, 2010)

A federal court in Texas has decided a case that could have notable implications for both providers and users of software. The court took a narrow view of the rights that licensees of software have to authorize third parties (i.e., independent contractors) to use software on behalf of the licensee.

Plaintiff software provider sued its customer for breach of the software license agreement after plaintiff learned that the customer allowed its attorneys to input data using the software. Plaintiff claimed that the use was not permitted by the terms of the license agreement.

Customer moved for summary judgment on the breach of software license claim and the district court granted the motion. Plaintiff software provider sought review with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court reversed.

The appellate court held that the license agreement should not be read to permit use of the software by a third party not expressly provided for in the agreement, even though such third party’s use of the software was on behalf of or for the benefit of the licensee.

The district court had relied on two earlier Fifth Circuit cases — Geoscan v. Geotrace Technologies and Hogan Systems v. Cybresource International — to look beyond the express language of the license agreement and hold that use of the software by defendant’s attorneys was permitted. The district court found such use to be permitted because it was done on behalf of or for the benefit of defendant.

But the appellate court distinguished Geoscan and Hogan Systems, finding that neither case stands for such an expansive proposition. Unlike the agreements in those cases, the license in this case contained no provision that permitted use by third parties on behalf of the licensee. Moreover, among other things, defendant was expressly prohibited from transferring or sublicensing the technology and was prohibited from assigning its rights under the license agreement. The software license agreement also contained a provision that served to excluse all third party beneficiaries to the agreement.

Photo courtesy Flickr user coiax under this Creative Commons license.

September 10, 2010 Uncategorized

Vernor v. Autodesk: does it matter in an age of cloud computing?

Today the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in the case of Vernor v. Autodesk [PDF], making an important ruling about copyright, software and the first sale doctrine. At a fundamental level, however, one could wonder whether the case is all that big a deal, since the first sale doctrine concerns rights that the owner of a physical copy of a work has. For software — especially these days when an increasing amount of software is either distributed over the internet or provided in the cloud — questions about the rights associated with physical copies are becoming increasingly irrelevant.

No doubt the distribution of physical copies of software is less important than it was in the past. But the Vernor case is worth looking at inasmuch as the ruling could translate into some potentially wacky arrangements depending on the desires of copyright owners and the accompanying restrictions they may put on the uses of their works. The holding of the case is not limited to software, but to any copyrighted work capable of being distributed in physical form. As Vernor’s attorney Greg Beck has written, “there is no obvious reason why other publishing industries couldn’t begin imposing the same terms. If they do, it may be the end of ownership of books and music.” (I’m proud to mention that Beck has been a guest blogger here at Internet Cases.)

What the case was about

Vernor bought several used copies of AutoCAD software from a customer of Autodesk, which is the software’s original distributor and copyright owner. Vernor then tried to sell those copies on eBay. Autodesk asserted that this sale of the copies violated Autodesk’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act to distribute the software. So Vernor filed suit to ask the court to declare that such sales were not infringing. (Cases like these, where the accused goes on a preemptive offensive, are called declaratory judgment actions.)

The trial court found in Vernor’s favor. Autodesk sought review with the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the court reversed, holding that Vernor could not rightly assert that his conduct was protected under copyright law’s first sale doctrine, and that Vernor’s customers’ installation of the software was not protected by the essential step defense.

These defenses failed because the court found that Vernor (and his customers) were merely licensees of the software, not owners.

The Software License Agreement

When Autodesk sold the software to CTA (the company from whom Vernor bought the discs before trying to sell them on eBay), it included a shrinkwrap license agreement, as well as a screen containing the same terms that appeared during the installation agreement.

The agreement provided, among other things, that the software was being provided under a limited license and that Autodesk retained ownership of the copyright in the software. It also placed onerous restrictions on the use and transfer of the software, e.g., the user could not rent, lease or transfer it to other users, or transfer it out of the Western Hemisphere, either physically or electronically.

The first sale doctrine

In general, the owner of a copyright in a work has the exclusive right to determine how copies of the work are distributed. The century-old first sale doctrine, however, is an exception to this general rule.

Under Section 109 of the Copyright Act (17 USC 109), the “owner of a particular copy” of a work may sell or dispose of his or her copy without the copyright owner’s authorization. Selling the copy of a painting you by at an art auction, for example, should not subject you to copyright infringement.

The essential step defense

The Copyright Act also provides that the owner of the copyright in a work has the exclusive right to make copies of the work. But there’s an exception to that exclusivity when it comes to software — the RAM copy made when the software is being used, according to Section 117 of the Copyright Act, cannot give rise to an infringement if that copying is being done by the “owner of a copy” of the software as an “essential step” in using the program.

The lower court’s decision

Vernor won at the lower court level because the court held that he was the “owner” of the copies of software he had bought, and therefore was protected by the first sale doctrine. His customers, also as owners, would be protected by the essential step defense.

Why these defenses failed

The court of appeals held otherwise, namely, that Vernor (as well as the company from whom he had bought the copies, and his customers) were merely licensees and not owners of the software. Only “owners” can claim protection under the first sale doctrine and the essential step defense.

The court looked to the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the software, and formulated the following test to determine that a software user is merely a licensee when the copyright owner: (1) specifies that the user is granted a license, (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software, and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.

In this case, all these criteria were met. Since neither Vernor nor the company he bought the software from were “owners,” these defenses were not available.

Room for criticism

The decision is subject to criticism in a number of ways. First, it might go against the sensibilities of many ordinary folks who think, quite naturally, that when you buy something (like a CD containing software), you own it. This case confirms that that is not always the case.

A second possible criticism is how the case makes possible some strange situations not involving software. What’s to stop hard copy book publishers from entering into shrinkwrap agreements with people who buy the books, purporting to retain ownership and calling the arrangement a license, while placing restrictions on use and transfer? Under the test in this case, it could be an infringement to lend or sell or otherwise distribute that book. Seems like a dangerous way to lock up information. But I guess it’s better than including curses as DRM.

Finally, the case lends itself to criticism in the way it gives great power to the software companies to really tie up tangible media to the detriment of consumers. Once an application has been sold once, where’s the harm to the software company if it’s transferred to someone else? The company has already been paid once, why must it insist on getting paid again? This grabbiness is really no surprise, though, especially when one sees that the likes of the Business Software Alliance joined as amici on the side of Autodesk.

In any event, tangible media for software is becoming a thing of the past. To the extent this case allows some negative consequences, the move to the cloud will mitigate that negativity.