Section 230 – Page 6 – Attorney Evan Brown

March 23, 2011 Spam

Yahoo not liable for blocking marketing email

Section 230 of Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. 230) shields Yahoo’s spam filtering efforts

Holomaxx v. Yahoo, 2011 WL 865794 (N.D.Cal. March 11, 2011)

Plaintiff provides email marketing services for its clients. It sends out millions of emails a day, many of those to recipients having Yahoo email addresses. Yahoo used its spam filtering technology to block many of the messages plaintiff was trying to send to Yahoo account users. So plaintiff sued Yahoo, alleging various causes of action such as intentional interference with prospective business advantage.

Yahoo moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that it was immune from liability under Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss.

Section 230(c)(2) provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of … any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”

Plaintiff argued that immunity should not apply here because Yahoo acted in bad faith by using “faulty filtering technology and techniques,” motivated “by profit derived from blocking both good and bad e-mails.” But the court found no factual basis to support plaintiff’s allegations that Yahoo used “cheap and ineffective technologies to avoid the expense of appropriately tracking and eliminating only spam email.”

The court rejected another of plaintiff’s arguments against applying Section 230, namely, that Yahoo should not be afforded blanket immunity for blocking legitimate business emails. Looking to the cases of Goddard v. Google and National Numismatic Certification v. eBay, plaintiff argued that the court should apply the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis to find that legitimate business email should not be treated the same as the more nefarious types of content enumerated in Section 230(c)(2). (Content that is, for example, obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing).

On this point the court looked to the sheer volume of the purported spam to conclude Yahoo was within Section 230’s protection to block the messages — plaintiff acknowledged that it sent approximately six million emails per day through Yahoo’s servers and that at least .1% of those emails either were sent to invalid addresses or resulted in user opt-out. On an annual basis, that amounted to more than two million invalid or unwanted emails.

October 2, 2010 Anonymity, Defamation, Section 230

Section 230 shields Google from liability for anonymous defamation

Black v. Google Inc., 2010 WL 3746474 (N.D.Cal. September 20, 2010)

Back in August, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a lawsuit against Google brought by two pro se plaintiffs, holding that the action was barred under the immunity provisions of 47 USC 230. That section says that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Plaintiffs had complained about a comment on Google (probably a review) disparaging their roofing business.

Plaintiffs filed and “objection” to the dismissal, which the court read as a motion to alter or amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion.

In their “objection,” plaintiffs claimed — apparently without much support — that Congress did not intend Section 230 to apply in situations involving anonymous speech. The court did not buy this argument.

The court looked to the Ninth Circuit case of Carafano v. Metrosplash as an example of a website operator protected under Section 230 from liability for anonymous content: “To be sure, the website [in Carafano] provided neutral tools, which the anonymous dastard used to publish the libel, but the website did absolutely nothing to encourage the posting of defamatory content.” As in Carafano, Google was a passive conduit and could not be liable for failing to detect and remove the allegedly defamatory content.

August 5, 2010 Defamation, Section 230

Communications Decency Act immunizes hosting provider from defamation liability

Johnson v. Arden, — F.3d —, 2010 WL 3023660 (8th Cir. August 4, 2010)

The Johnsons sell exotic cats. They filed a defamation lawsuit after discovering that some other cat-fanciers said mean things about them on Complaintsboard.com. Among the defendants was the company that hosted Complaintsboard.com – InMotion Hosting.

Sassy is my parents' cat. She hisses whenever I'm around, though they say she's a nice cat otherwise.

The district court dismissed the case against the hosting company, finding that the Communications Decency Act at 47 U.S.C. §230 (“Section 230”) immunized the hosting provider from liability. The Johnsons sought review with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal.

Though Section 230 immunity has been around since 1996, this was the first time the Eighth Circuit had been presented with the question.

Section 230 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” It also says that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”

The Johnsons argued that Section 230 did not immunize the hosting company. Instead, they argued, it did just what it says – provides that a party in the position of the hosting company should not be treated as a publisher or speaker of information provided by third parties. The Johnsons argued that the host should be liable in this case regardless of Section 230, because under Missouri law, defendants can be jointly liable when they commit a wrong by concert of action and with common intent and purpose.

The court rejected the Johnsons’ argument, holding that Section 230 bars plaintiffs from making providers legally responsible for information that third parties created and developed. Adopting the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Nemet Chevrolet v. Consumeraffiars.com, the court held that “Congress thus established a general rule that providers of interactive computer services are liable only for speech that is properly attributable to them.”

No evidence in the record showed how the offending posts could be attributed to the hosting provider. It was undisputed that the host did not originate the material that the Johnsons deemed damaging.

Given this failure to show the content originated with the provider, the court found in favor of robust immunity, joining with the majority of other federal circuits that have addressed intermediary liability in the context of Section 230.

January 12, 2010 Defamation, Section 230

How Section 230 is like arson laws when it comes to enjoining website operators

The case of Blockowicz v. Williams, — F.Supp.2d —, 2009 WL 4929111 (N.D. Ill. December 21, 2009), which I posted on last week is worthy of discussion in that it raises the question of whether website operators like Ripoff Report could get off too easily when they knowingly host harmful third party content. Immunity under 47 U.S.C. 230 is often criticized for going too far in shielding operators. Under Section 230, sites cannot be treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by third party information content providers. This means that even when the site operator is put on notice of the content, it cannot face, for example, defamation liability for the continued availability of that content.

Don’t get me wrong — the Blockowicz case had nothing to do with Section 230. Although Ben Sheffner is routinely sharp in his legal analysis, I disagree with his assessment that Section 230 was the reason for the court’s decision. In the comments to Ben’s post that I just linked to, Ben gets into conversation with Ripoff Report’s general counsel, whom I believe correctly notes that the decision was not based on Section 230. Ben argues that had Section 230 not provided immunity, the plaintiffs would have been able to go after Ripoff Report directly, and therefore Section 230 is to blame. That’s kind of like saying if arson were legal, plaintiffs could just go burn down Ripoff Report’s datacenter. But you don’t hear anyone blaming arson laws for this decision.

Even though Section 230 didn’t form the basis of the court’s decision in favor of Ripoff Report, the notion of a website operator “acting in concert” with its users is intriguing. Clearly the policy of Section 230 is to place some distance, legally speaking, between site operator and producer of user-generated content. And the whole idea behind the requirement in copyright law that infringement must arise from a volitional act and not an automatic action of the system is a first cousin to this issue. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom, 907 F.Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“[T]here should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party”).

For the web to continue to develop, we are going to need this continued protection of the intermediary. We’re going to see functions of the semantic web appear with more frequency in our everyday online lives. From a practical perspective, there will be even more distance — a continuing divergence between a provider’s will and the nature of the content. So as we get into the technologies that will make the web smarter, and our experience of it more robust and helpful, we’ll need notions of intermediary immunity more and not less.

That notion of an increasing need for intermediary immunity underscores how important it is that intermediaries act responsibly. No doubt people misunderstand the holdings of cases like this one. By refusing to voluntarily take down obviously defamatory material, and challenging a court order to do so, Ripoff Report puts a bad taste in everyone’s mouth. Sure there’s the First Amendment and all that, but where’s a sense of reasonable decency? Sure there’s the idea that free flowing information supports democracy and all that, but has anyone stopped to think what could happen when the politicians get involved again?

Do not taunt Happy Fun Ball

We are fortunate that Congress was as equinamimous and future-minded as it was in 1996 when it enacted the immunity provisions of Section 230. But results like the one in the Blockowicz case are going to be misunderstood. There’s a hue and cry already about this decision, in that it appears to leave no recourse. Section 230 wasn’t involved, but it still got the blame. Even the judge was “sympathetic to the [plaintiffs’] plight.”

So maybe we need, real quickly, another decision like the Roommates.com case, that reminds us that website operators don’t always get a free ride.

January 7, 2010 Defamation, Section 230

Injunction against defamatory content could not reach website owner

Blockowicz v. Williams, — F.Supp.2d —, 2009 WL 4929111 (N.D. Ill. December 21, 2009)

(This is a case from last month that has already gotten some attention in the legal blogosphere, and is worth reporting on here in spite of the already-existing commentary.)

Plaintiffs sued two individual defendants for defamation over content those defendants posted online. The court entered an order of default after the defendants didn’t answer the complaint. The court also issued an injunction against the defendants, requiring them to take down the defamatory material.

grasping

When plaintiffs were unable to reach the defendants directly, they asked the websites on which the content was posted — MySpace, Facebook, Complaints Board and Ripoff Report — to remove the material.

All of the sites except Ripoff Report took down the defamatory content. Plaintiffs filed a motion with the court to get Ripoff Report to remove the material. Ripoff Report opposed the motion, arguing that Rule 65 (the federal rule pertaining to injunctions) did not give the court authority to bind Ripoff Report as a non-party. The court sided with Ripoff Report and denied the motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 states that injunctions bind the parties against whom they are issued as well as “other persons who are in active concert or participation with” those parties. In this case, the court looked to the Seventh Circuit opinion of S.E.C. v. Homa, 514 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2008) for guidance on the contours of Rule 65’s scope. Under Homa, a non-party can be bound by an injunction if it is “acting in concert” or is “legally identified” (like as an agent or employee) with the enjoined party.

Plaintiffs argued that Ripoff Report was acting in concert with the defamers. Plaintiffs looked to Ripoff Report’s terms of service, by which posters to the site give an exclusive copyright license to and agree to indemnify Ripoff Report. Those terms also state that Ripoff Report will not remove any content for any reason. Plaintiffs read this combination of terms to stand for some sort of arrangement whereby Ripoff Report agreed to be a safe haven for defamatory material.

The court rejected this argument, finding there was no evidence in the record that Ripoff Report intended to protect defamers. Moreover, there was no evidence that Ripoff Report had communicated with the defendants in any way since the entry of a permanent injunction, or otherwise worked to violate the earlier court order requiring defendants to remove the materials.

Other commentary on this case:

Grasping photo courtesy Flickr user Filmnut under this Creative Commons license.

December 31, 2009 Section 230

Website drives off with Section 230 win over Chevy dealer

Nemet Chevrolet sued the website Consumeraffairs.com over some posts on that website which Nemet thought were defamatory and interfered with Nemet’s business expectancy. The website moved to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming that the Communications Decency Act at 47 U.S.C. 230 immunized the website from the lawsuit.

But when we're driving in my Malibu, it's easy to get right next to you. . . . "

The court dismissed the action on Section 230 grounds and Nemet sought review of the dismissal with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal.

Section 230 precludes tort plaintiffs from holding interactive computer services (like website operators) liable for the publication of information created and developed by others. Most courts (like the Fourth Circuit) consider Section 230’s protection to be a form of immunity for website operators from lawsuits arising over third party content.

But that immunity disappears if the content giving rise to the dispute was actually created or developed by the operator and not by a third party. In those circumstances the operator also becomes an information content provider. And there is no Section 230 immunity for information content providers.

That’s where Nemet steered its argument. It alleged that the website was a non-immune information content provider that created and developed the offending content.

Nemet raised two general points in its argument. It claimed that the website’s structure and design elicited unlawful content, and that the site operator contacted individual posters to assist in revisions to the content. It also claimed that the site operator simply fabricated a number of the offending posts.

Applying the pleading standards on which the Supreme Court recently elaborated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court found Nemet’s claims that the site operator was actually an information content provider to be implausible.

As for the structure and design argument, the court differentiated the present facts from the situation in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates. com. In Roommates.com, the court found that the website was designed to elicit information that would violate the Fair Housing Act. In this case, however, there was nothing unlawful in inviting commentary on goods or services, even if it was for the purposes of drumming up business for plaintiffs’ class action lawyers.

As for the other arguments, the court simply found that the allegations did not nudge the claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” The court found the argument that the website fabricated the posts to be particularly not creditable, in that Nemet’s allegations relied mainly on an absence of information in its own records that would connect the post to an actual customer.

On balance, this decision from the Fourth Circuit shows that Section 230 immunity is as alive and well at the end of the “oughts” as it was a dozen years before when the Fourth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to consider the scope of the section’s immunity. That 1997 decision in the case of Zeran v. AOL remains a watershed pronouncement of Section 230’s immunity.

Congratulations to my friend and fellow blogger Jonathan Frieden’s impressive win in this case.

And Happy New Year to all the readers of Internet Cases. Thanks for your continued loyal support.

Chevy Malibu photo courtesy Flickr user bea-t under this Creative Commons license.

May 8, 2009 Section 230

Has Section 230 immunity passed its apex?

Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 05-36189, 9th Cir. May 7, 2009

Yesterday’s decision from the Ninth Circuit in Barnes v. Yahoo is kind of a big deal. Jeff Neuberger observes that Section 230 took a hit. Characterizing it differently, Thomas O’Toole called it a nice win for online publishers. I’m thinking that the halcyon days of robust Section 230 immunity may be on the wane.

Barnes alleged that her ex-boyfriend did some pretty rotten things using various Yahoo services. Since I think my mom reads my blog I won’t elaborate on Prince Charming’s shenanigans. But if the allegations are true, one can understand why Barnes would be mad. Simply stated, they involved nude photos and men looking to cavort showing up where Barnes worked.

Barnes contacted Yahoo and asked it to take the offending content down. Folks there said they would. Months later, when the content remained online, Barnes sued Yahoo for negligent undertaking and promissory estoppel.

The district court dismissed Barnes’ claims, holding that 47 U.S.C. 230 protected Yahoo because, according to that section, “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”

It’s no big surprise that the appeallate court affirmed the lower court on the question of negligent undertaking. Barnes’ claim was that Yahoo was negligent in undertaking to remove the content. Since the removal of content is one of the quintessential functions of a publisher, it would contravene Section 230 to hold Yahoo liable for that.

The more intriguing part of the case comes from the court’s reversal on the question of promissory estoppel. Yahoo’s breach of an alleged promise to remove the content was of a different nature than the act of removing the content. “Promising is different because it is not synonymous with the performance of the action promised.” Liability arising from failing to live up to that promise was outside the scope of Section 230. In other words, pursuing Yahoo for breaking its promise to take down the offending content did not treat it as the publisher or speaker of that content.

This holding seems to be another chip away at Section 230 immunity. Smart intermediaries (e.g. website operators) are likely to communicate less now with individuals who feel aggrieved, because the intermediary may fear that anything it says could be construed as a breakable promise putting it at risk for liability.

March 5, 2009 Section 230

Made in onto ABC World News Tonight

The Sheriff of Cook County (that means Chicago) has sued Craigslist claiming that the site is a public nuisance. [Here’s the Complaint. ABC News interviewed me this afternoon to get my comments on the case. I enjoyed talking about it for about 20 minutes on camera. As these things usually go, most of my ~~flashes of insight~~ comments ended up on the proverbial cutting room floor, but one complete sentence made it onto ABC World News tonight. Click here to see the segment.

Professor Goldman has this rundown of the case.

August 20, 2008 Section 230

Google doesn’t have to pay $50 billion to defamation plaintiff

Steele v. Mengelkoch, 2008 WL 2966529 (Minn.App. August 5, 2008).

Pro se plaintiff Steele sued Google in Minnesota state court for $50 billion because Google indexed an article which Steele though defamed him. Google moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and the lower court granted the motion. Steele sought review with the Court of Appeals of Minnesota. On appeal, the court affirmed.

The court held that 47 U.S.C. §230, by its plain language, creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make Google – as the provider of an interactive computer service – liable for information originating with a third party user of the service.

In the court’s language, §230(c)(1) “precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.” So a lawsuit seeking to place responsibility on Google to exercise traditional roles of the publisher – e.g., deciding to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content – was not legally sufficient to survive.

Other coverage:
Techdirt
Professor Goldman

June 10, 2008 Section 230

A look back at Doe v. MySpace

Court of Appeals upholds Section 230 immunity for MySpace. Social networking provider not subject to suit for negligence for failing to implement technological measures to weed out underage users.

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2008 WL 2068064 (5th Cir. May 16, 2008).

I’ve been pretty busy the past few weeks with work and speaking engagements, and I also slipped in a little vacation awhile back. So I’m doing some catching up, looking over a number of interesting decisions from the past few weeks. While I was on the beach in Florida with my family, the Fifth Circuit issued this intriguing opinion in a case that has gotten quite a bit of publicity since it was filed back in 2006. Here’s the story.

When Julie Doe was 13, she lied about her age and set up a profile on MySpace. A year later, she met — first online, then offline — a 19 year-old named Solis. That Solis allegedly assaulted Doe.

MySpace Section 230 graphic

Julie and her mother filed suit against MySpace alleging, among other things, negligence. The plaintiffs claimed that MySpace should have done more to prevent Doe and Solis from meeting.

The case bounced around Texas and New York state court, then to New York federal court, then back to Texas where it ended up in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Last year, the district court dismissed the case, holding that the Communications Decency Act at 47 U.S.C. 230 immunized MySpace from liability.

The Does sought review with the Fifth Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed.

Section 230 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” The Does had argued that Section 230 should not bar the negligence claim, as the allegations dealt not with MySpace’s publication of information, but with the site’s failure to implement appropriate security.

Agreeing with the lower court, the appellate court rejected what it called disingenuous artful pleading by the plaintiffs. It found that the allegations were “merely another way of claiming that MySpace was liable for publishing the communications and they [spoke] to MySpace’s role as a publisher of online third-party-generated content.”