Section 230 protects Snapchat against lawsuit brought by assault victim

section 230

A young girl named C.O. found much misfortune using Snapchat. Her parents (the plaintiffs in this lawsuit) alleged that the app’s features caused her to become addicted to the app, to be exposed to sexual content, and to eventually be victimized on two occasions, including once by a registered sex offender.

Suing Snapchat

Plaintiffs sued Snap and related entities, asserting claims including strict product liability, negligence, and invasion of privacy, emphasizing the platform’s failure to protect minors and address reported abuses. Defendants moved to strike the complaint.

The court granted the motion to strike. It held that the allegations of the complaint fell squarely within the ambit of immunity afforded under Section 230 to “an interactive computer service” that acts as as a “publisher or speaker” of information provided by another “information content provider.” Plaintiffs “clearly allege[d] that the defendants failed to regulate content provided by third parties” when such third parties used Snapchat to harm plaintiff.

Publisher or speaker? How about those algorithms!

Plaintiffs had argued that their claims did not seek to treat defendants as publishers or speakers, and therefore Section 230 immunity did not apply. Instead, plaintiffs argued, they were asserting claims that defendants breached their duty as manufacturers to design a reasonably safe product.

Of particular interest was the plaintiffs’ claim concerning Snapchat’s algorithms which recommended connections and which allegedly caused children to become addicted. But in line with the case of Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2nd Cir. 2019), the court refused to find that use of algorithms in this way was outside the traditional role of a publisher. It was careful to distinguish the case from Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir 2021), in which that court held Section 230 did not immunize Snapchat from products liability claims. In that case, the harm to plaintiffs did not result from third party content but rather from the design of the platform which tempted the users to drive fast. In this case, the harm to plaintiffs was the result of particular actions of third parties who had transmitted content using Snapchat, to lure C.O.

Sad facts, sad result

The court seemed to express some trepidation about its result, using the same language the First Circuit Court of Appeals used in Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2016): “This is a hard case-hard not in the sense that the legal issues defy resolution, but hard in the sense that the law requires that [the court] … deny relief to plaintiffs whose circumstances evoke outrage.” And citing from Vazquez v. Buhl, 90 A.3d 331 (2014), the court observed that “[w]ithout further legislative action, however, there is little [this court can] do in [its] limited role but join with other courts and commentators in expressing [its] concern with the statute’s broad scope.”

V.V. v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al., 2024 WL 678248 (Conn. Super. Ct., February 16, 2024)

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Online marketplace not liable for causing murder committed by criminal seller

online marketplace liable

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Colorado upheld the dismissal of a tort case brought against the operator of the website Letgo. The court held that the website was not negligent and did not commit fraud in facilitating the purported transaction that resulted in the murder of a married couple.

The tragic story

At 11 PM on August 14, 2020, Mr. and Mrs. Roland met an execrable miscreant named  Brown at a PETCO parking lot, intending to buy a car that Brown had placed for sale on the online marketplace Letgo. Claiming to not have the right title for the car (it turns out the car was stolen), Brown led the couple to a second location under the pretense of retrieving the correct vehicle title. But Brown ambushed the Rolands with a handgun, resulting in a struggle that led to the tragic deaths of both Mr. and Mrs. Roland, who left behind five minor children. Brown was later convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder.

The estate sued

The Rolands’ estate sued Letgo under Colorado law, alleging a number of claims, including negligence, fraud and negligent misrepresentation. The lower court dismissed the claims. So the estate sought review with the Tenth Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal.

To act or not to act

The court’s negligence analysis turned on whether plaintiffs’ claim was one of misfeasance (active conduct causing injury) or nonfeasance (a failure to take positive steps to protect others from harm). The plaintiffs contended that Letgo’s claims of collaboration with law enforcement, use of technology to block stolen goods, and a user verification system created a false sense of security – that the negligence was based on misfeasance. But the court was not persuaded, emphasizing that the representations, when viewed in context, did not constitute misfeasance or active misconduct.

Instead, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ allegations were more indicative of nonfeasance, or Letgo’s failure to act, which required a special relationship between the parties for a duty of care to be established – a condition the plaintiffs could not satisfy. And in the court’s mind, even if Letgo’s actions were misfeasance, the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead that these actions were a substantial factor in the Rolands’ deaths, as the decisions made by the Rolands to pursue the transaction, and the decision of the perpetrator to commit murder, were more significant factors in the tragic outcome than the provision of the online platform.

No fraud or negligent misrepresentation either

Colorado law required plaintiffs to demonstrate a series of stringent criteria: Letgo must have made a false representation of a material fact, known to be false, with the intention that the Rolands would rely upon it, leading to damages as a result of this reliance. Negligent misrepresentation, while similar, necessitates showing that Letgo, within its professional capacity, made a careless misstatement of a crucial fact intended for the guidance of others in their business dealings, which the Rolands justifiably relied upon to their detriment.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) sets a higher bar for fraud claims, requiring plaintiffs to specify the circumstances of the alleged fraud with particularity, including the time, place, and content of the false representations, as well as the identity of those making them and the resultant consequences. This rule aims to provide defendants with fair notice of the claims against them and the factual basis for these claims. In certain cases, this standard may also extend to claims of negligent misrepresentation if they closely resemble allegations of fraud, highlighting the necessity for precise and detailed pleadings in such legal matters.

In this case, plaintiffs contended that Letgo’s assurances regarding safety and user verification —such as collaboration with law enforcement, technology to identify stolen goods, and “verified” user statuses — were misleading, constituting either fraud or negligent misrepresentation. However, the court found that plaintiffs failed to plausibly link the alleged misrepresentations to the tragic outcome, failing to provide sufficient factual content to demonstrate causation between Letgo’s actions and the Rolands’ deaths.

Roland v. Letgo, Inc., 2024 WL 372218 (10th Cir., February 1, 2024)

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