Litigation – Attorney Evan Brown

April 22, 2024 Artificial Intelligence, Litigation

Footnote in opinion warns counsel not to cite AI-generated fake cases again

A federal judge in Wisconsin suspected that one of the parties appearing before the court had used generative AI to write a brief, which resulted in a hallucinated case. The judge issued an opinion with this footnote:

Although it does not ultimately affect the Court’s analysis or disposition, Plaintiffs in their reply cite to a case that none of the Court’s staff were able to locate. ECF No. 32 at 5 (“Caserage Tech Corp. v. Caserage Labs, Inc., 972 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 1992) (The District Court correctly found the parties agreed to permit shareholder rights when one party stated to the other its understanding that a settlement agreement included shareholder rights, and the other party did not say anything to repudiate that understanding.).”). The citation goes to a case of a different name, from a different year, and from a different circuit. Court staff also could not locate the case by searching, either on Google or in legal databases, the case name provided in conjunction with the purported publication year. If this is, as the Court suspects, an instance of provision of falsified case authority derived from artificial intelligence, Plaintiffs’ counsel is on notice that any future instance of the presentation of nonexistent case authority will result in sanctions.

One must hope this friendly warning will be taken seriously.

Plumbers & Gasfitters Union Local No. 75 Health Fund v. Morris Plumbing, LLC, 2024 WL 1675010 (E.D. Wisconsin April 18, 2024)

March 25, 2024 Artificial Intelligence, Litigation

New Jersey judiciary taking steps to better understand Generative AI in the practice of law

We are seeing the state of New Jersey take strides to make “safe and effective use of Generative AI” in the practice of law. The state’s judiciary’s Acting Administrative Director recently sent an email to New Jersey attorneys acknowledging the growth of Generative AI in the practice of law, recognizing its positive and negative uses.

The correspondence included a link to a 23-question online survey designed to gauge New Jersey attorneys’ knowledge about and attitudes toward Generative AI, with the aim of designing seminars and other training.

The questions seek to gather information on topics including the age and experience of the attorneys responding, attitudes toward Generative AI both in the and out of the practice of law, the levels of experience in using Generative AI, and whether Generative AI should be a part of the future of the practice of law.

This initiative signals the state may be taking a proactive approach toward attorneys’ adoption of these newly-available technologies.

See also:

February 23, 2024 Artificial Intelligence, Litigation

ChatGPT was “utterly and unusually unpersuasive” in case involving recovery of attorney’s fees

chatgpt billing

In a recent federal case in New York under the Individuals with Disabilities Act, plaintiff prevailed on her claims and sought an award of attorney’s fees under the statute. Though the court ended up awarding plaintiff’s attorneys some of their requested fees, the court lambasted counsel in the process for using information obtained from ChatGPT to support the claim of the attorneys’ hourly rates.

Plaintiff’s firm used ChatGPT-4 as a “cross-check” against other sources in confirming what should be a reasonably hourly rate for the attorneys on the case. The court found this reliance on ChatGPT-4 to be “utterly and unusually unpersuasive” for determining reasonable billing rates for legal services. The court criticized the firm’s use of ChatGPT-4 for not adequately considering the complexity and specificity required in legal billing, especially given the tool’s inability to discern between real and fictitious legal citations, as demonstrated in recent past cases within the Second Circuit.

In Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 2023 WL 4114965 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2023) the district court judge sanctioned lawyers for submitting fictitious judicial opinions generated by ChatGPT, and in Park v. Kim, — F.4th —, 2024 WL 332478 (2d Cir. January 30, 2024) an attorney was referred to the Circuit’s Grievance Panel for citing non-existent authority from ChatGPT in a brief. These examples highlighted the tool’s limitations in legal contexts, particularly its inability to differentiate between real and fabricated legal citations, raising concerns about its reliability and appropriateness for legal tasks.

J.G. v. New York City Dept. of Education, 2024 WL 728626 (February 22, 2024)

DMCA subpoena to “mere conduit” ISP was improper

DMCA defamatory

Because ISP acted as a conduit for the transmission of material that allegedly infringed copyright, it fell under the DMCA safe harbor in 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), and therefore § 512(h) did not authorize the subpoena issued in the case.

Some copyright owners needed to find out who was anonymously infringing their works, so they issued a subpoena to the users’ internet service provider (Cox Communications) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (“DMCA”) at 17 U.S.C. § 512(h). After the ISP notified one of the anonymous users – referred to as John Doe in the case – of the subpoena, Doe filed a motion to quash. The magistrate judge recommended the subpoena be quashed, and the district judge accepted such recommendation.

Contours of the Safe Harbor

The court explained how the DMCA enables copyright owners to send subpoenas for the identification of alleged infringers, contingent upon providing a notification that meets specific criteria outlined in the DMCA. However, the DMCA also establishes safe harbors for Internet Service Providers (ISPs), notably exempting those acting as “mere conduits” of information, like in peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing, from liability and thus from the obligations of the notice and takedown provisions found in other parts of the DMCA. This distinction has led courts, including the Eighth and D.C. Circuits, to conclude that subpoenas under § 512(h) cannot be used to compel ISPs, which do not store or directly handle the infringing material but merely transmit it, to reveal the identities of P2P infringers.

Who is in?

The copyright owners raised a number of objections to quashing the subpoena. Their primary concerns were with the court’s interpretation of the ISP’s role as merely a “conduit” in the alleged infringement, arguing that the ISP’s assignment of IP addresses constituted a form of linking to infringing material, thus meeting the DMCA’s notice requirements. They also disputed the court’s conclusion that the material in question could not be removed or access disabled by the ISP due to its nature of transmission, and they took issue with certain factual conclusions drawn without input from the parties involved. Additionally, the petitioners objected to the directive to return or destroy any information obtained through the subpoena, requesting that such measures apply only to the information related to the specific subscriber John Doe.

Conduits are.

Notwithstanding these various arguments, the court upheld the magistrate judge’s recommendation, agreeing that the subpoena issued to the ISP was invalid due to non-compliance with the notice provisions required by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A). The petitioners’ arguments, suggesting that the ISP’s assignment of IP addresses to users constituted a form of linking to infringing material under § 512(d), were rejected. The court clarified that in the context of P2P file sharing, IP addresses do not serve as “information location tools” as defined under § 512(d) and that the ISP’s role was limited to providing internet connectivity, aligning with the “mere conduit” provision under § 512(a). The court also dismissed the petitioners’ suggestion that the ISP could disable access to infringing material by null routing, emphasizing the distinction between disabling access to material and terminating a subscriber’s account, with the latter being a more severe action than what the DMCA authorizes. The court suggested that the petitioners could pursue the infringer’s identity through other legal avenues, such as a John Doe lawsuit, despite potential challenges highlighted by the petitioners.

In re: Subpoena of Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC and Coxcom LLC, 2024 WL 341069 (D. Hawaii, January 30, 2024)

January 30, 2024 Artificial Intelligence, Litigation

ChatGPT providing fake case citations again – this time at the Second Circuit

Plaintiff sued defendant in federal court but the court eventually dismissed the case because plaintiff continued to fail to properly respond to defendant’s discovery requests. So plaintiff sought review with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal, finding that plaintiff’s noncompliance in the lower court amounted to “sustained and willful intransigence in the face of repeated and explicit warnings from the court that the refusal to comply with court orders … would result in the dismissal of [the] action.”

But that was not the most intriguing or provocative part of the court’s opinion. The court also addressed the conduct of plaintiff’s lawyer, who admitted to using ChatGPT to help her write a brief before the appellate court. The AI assistance betrayed itself when the court noticed that the brief contained a non-existent case. Here’s the mythical citation: Matter of Bourguignon v. Coordinated Behavioral Health Servs., Inc., 114 A.D.3d 947 (3d Dep’t 2014).

When the court called her out on the legal hallucination, plaintiff’s attorney admitted to using ChatGPT, to which she was a “suscribed and paying member” but emphasized that she “did not cite any specific reasoning or decision from [the Bourguignon] case.” Unfortunately, counsel’s assertions did not blunt the court’s wrath.

“All counsel that appear before this Court are bound to exercise professional judgment and responsibility, and to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” read the court’s opinion as it began its rebuke. It reminded counsel that the rules of procedure impose a duty on attorneys to certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed with the court are legally tenable. “At the very least,” the court continued, attorneys must “read, and thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which they rely.” Citing to a recent case involving a similar controversy, the court observed that “[a] fake opinion is not ‘existing law’ and citation to a fake opinion does not provide a non-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law. An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system.”

The court considered the matter so severe that it referred the attorney to the court’s Grievance Panel, for that panel to consider whether to refer the situation to the court’s Committee on Admissions and Grievances, which would have the power to revoke the attorney’s admission to practice before that court.

Park v. Kim, — F.4th —, 2024 WL 332478 (2d Cir. January 30, 2024)

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January 18, 2022 Litigation, Trademarks, Unfair Competition

Old social media posts violated trade dress infringement injunction

The parties in the case of H.I.S.C., Inc. v. Franmar are competitors, each making garden broom products. In earlier litigation, the defendant filed a counterclaim against plaintiff for trade dress infringement, and successfully obtained an injunction against plaintiff, prohibiting plaintiff from advertising brooms designed in a certain way. Defendant asked the court to find plaintiff in contempt for, among other reasons, certain social media posts that plaintiff posted before the injunction, but that still remained after the injunction was entered. The court agreed that the continuing existence of such posts was improper and found plaintiff in contempt for having violated the injunction.

The court noted that the injunction prohibited “[a]dvertising, soliciting, marketing, selling, offering for sale or otherwise using in the United States the [applicable product trade dress] in connection with any garden broom products.” It observed that “[o]n the Internet and in social media, a post from days, weeks, months, or even years ago can still serve to advertise a product today.” The court cited to Ariix, LLC v. NutriSearch Corp., 985 F.3d 1107, 1116 n.5, in which that court noted that one prominent influencer receives $300,000 to $500,000 for a single Instagram post endorsing a company’s product – a sum surely including both the post itself and an agreement to continue allowing the post to be visible to consumers for a substantial duration of time. Interestingly, the court found that the nature of a social media post may be different from a television or radio advertisement that has a fixed air date and time. Accordingly, the court found that it was inappropriate for social media posts published before the injunction to stay online.

H.I.S.C., Inc. v. Franmar Int’l Importers, Ltd., 2022 WL 104730 (S.D. Cal. January 11, 2022)

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April 1, 2020 Copyright, Litigation

Copyright registration certificate was invalid because of inaccurate information provided to Copyright Office

Although the author of a work owns the copyright the moment that work is created, Section 411 of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. 411) provides that the copyright owner must register the copyright before the owner can bring suit for infringement. If there is no valid registration certificate, the lawsuit cannot move forward. A copyright registration certificate that is invalid can cause problems.

In a recent case from the Ninth Circuit, the defendant challenged the validity of the plaintiff’s registration certificate, and the lower court dismissed the matter on summary judgment. Plaintiff sought review with the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment.

The appellate court agreed with the district court that plaintiff’s certificate of registration was invalid because:

There was no genuine dispute that plaintiff knew that it included inaccurate information in its copyright application. Plaintiff falsely represented that the copy of its website it submitted was not how it looked on the publication date listed in the application.

The Register of Copyrights told the court that it would have refused registration had it known about the inaccurate information.

Because Plaintiff’s certificate of registration was invalid, plaintiff failed to satisfy the registration precondition under Section 411 to bring a copyright infringement claim.

SellPoolSuppliesonline.com, LLC v. Ugly Pools Arizona, Inc., 2020 WL 1527774 (9th Cir. March 31, 2020)

April 9, 2019 Copyright

Fact that others had access to defendant’s wi-fi was no reason to quash subpoena in copyright case

In a suit against John Doe defendant for copyright infringement arising from defendant’s alleged distribution of plaintiff’s movies via BitTorrent, plaintiff sent a subpoena to Comcast – defendant’s ISP – seeking defendant’s identify.

Defendant moved to quash the subpoena, contending that being the target of the civil action was an undue burden, because there was a substantial likelihood that plaintiff would be unable to establish that defendant was actually the person responsible for the alleged infringement. Defendant also included a letter from his neighbor describing how that neighbor and others had used defendant’s wireless network.

The court denied the motion to quash. It held that even though defendant may turn out to be innocent, at this stage plaintiff was merely seeking to uncover his identity. The fact that other people had access to defendant’s unsecured wi-fi was immaterial.

Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 2019 WL 1865919 (N.D.Cal. April 25, 2019)

December 7, 2018 Litigation, Uncategorized

Attorney-client privilege protected defendants’ lawyers’ communications with PR firm hired to combat negative online treatment

In defending intellectual property claims over video games, defendants’ law firm hired a public relations firm to assist it with “input on legal strategy, including regarding initial pleadings and communications about the case to counteract [plaintiff’s] false and negative statement.” Defendants were allegedly being targeted by negative online attacks by the plaintiff.

During discovery, plaintiff served a subpoena on the hired PR firm, seeking, among other things, all documents relating to the communciations between the PR firm and defendants’ counsel.

Defendants sought to quash the subpoena, arguing the information was protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. The court quashed the subpoena.

It found that because defendants’ counsel (and not defendants themselves) hired the PR firm to provide PR counseling specifically for the purposes of litigation strategy, the attorney-client privilege extended to the communications between the PR firm and defendants’ counsel pertaining to “giving and receiving legal advice about the appropriate response to the lawsuit and making related public statements.”

Specifically, these communications were

confidential communications made
between lawyers and public relation consultants
hired by the lawyers to assist them in dealing with the media in cases or litigation
that were made for the purpose of giving or receiving advice
directed at handling the client’s legal problems that were undeniably protected by the attorney client privilege.

The court similarly found that the attorney work product doctrine extended to the communications exchanged between the PR firm and defendants’ counsel. As could be seen by the privilege log, documents such as a “draft Answer and Counterclaim” and a “draft press release” would contain “the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.” Moreover, documents such as a “draft Answer and Counterclaim” and a “draft press release” were “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.” Defendants’ counsel also did not waive their work-product protection when they shared otherwise valid work product (e.g. draft Answers or Counterclaims) with the PR firm for assistance because the communications were intended to be confidential.

Stardock Systems, Inc. v. Reiche, 2018 WL 6259536 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 30, 2018)

November 3, 2017 Litigation, Section 230

Google can, at least for now, disregard Canadian court order requiring deindexing worldwide

U.S. federal court issues preliminary injunction, holding that enforcement of Canadian order requiring Google to remove search results would run afoul of the Communications Decency Act (at 47 U.S.C. 230)

canada-us
Canadian company Equustek prevailed in litigation in Canada against rival Datalink on claims relating to trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition. After the litigation, Equustek asked Google to remove Datalink search results worldwide. Google initially refused altogether, but after a Canadian court entered an injunction against Datalink, Google removed Datalink results from google.ca. Then a Canadian court ordered Google to delist worldwide, and Google complied. Google objected to the order requiring worldwide delisting, and took the case all the way up to the Canadian Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower courts’ orders requiring worldwide delisting.

So Google filed suit in federal court in the United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that being required to abide by the Canadian order would, among other things, be contrary to the protections afforded to interactive computer service providers under the Communications Decency Act, at 47 U.S.C. 230.

The court entered the preliminary injunction (i.e., it found in favor of Google pending a final trial on the merits), holding that (1) Google would likely succeed on its claim under the Communications Decency Act, (2) it would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities weighed in its favor, and (4) an injunction was in the public interest.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties. It states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” [More info about Section 230]

The court found that there was no question Google is a “provider” of an “interactive computer service.” Also, it found that Datalink—not Google—“provided” the information at issue. And finally, it found that the Canadian order would hold Google liable as the “publisher or speaker” of the information on Datalink’s websites. So the Canadian order treated Google as a publisher, and would impose liability for failing to remove third-party content from its search results. For these reasons, Section 230 applied.

Summarizing the holding, the court observed that:

The Canadian order would eliminate Section 230 immunity for service providers that link to third-party websites. By forcing intermediaries to remove links to third-party material, the Canadian order undermines the policy goals of Section 230 and threatens free speech on the global internet.

The case provides key insight into the evolving legal issues around global enforcement and governance.

Google, Inc. v. Equustek Solutions, Inc., 2017 WL 5000834 (N.D. Cal. November 2, 2017)