What is a copyright license and why do you need one?

copyright social media

 

A copyright license is a formal agreement that allows another party to exercise rights in a copyright-protected work legally, which would otherwise infringe on the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. This agreement can be limited or extensive, temporary or perpetual, depending on the terms upon which the parties agree. A license does not transfer the copyright ownership; it simply grants specific permissions to the licensee. Features of a copyright license often include:

  • The scope of use: This sets forth which rights the licensee may exercise. It could specify whether the licensee can reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, display, or create derivative works from the copyrighted material.
  • Geographic location: The license might provide where the copyrighted material can be used.
  • Duration: This sets forth how long the licensee can exercise rights in the copyrighted material.
  • Exclusivity: It indicates whether the copyright owner can grant similar licenses to others.

Absent certain limited situations such as fair use, need a copyright license to legally exercise rights in someone else’s copyrighted work. Infringing on a copyright – using it without permission – can lead to legal consequences, including liability in court and the obligation to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees. For businesses, obtaining a copyright license can help them use, incorporate, and benefit from a copyrighted work, such as software, a piece of music, or a photograph, while respecting the legal rights of the copyright owner.

The licensing process also facilitates economic growth and cultural exchange by providing a legal framework for creators to monetize their work and for users to access and incorporate it into their own creations. For the creator, licensing can provide a source of income and allows it to control how and where its work is used. For the user, the license offers a way to legally and ethically utilize a work that adds value to its  own product, service, or project.

See also:

Intellectual property issues in a speaker’s agreement

Do you have to register your copyright?

copyright social media

When it comes to protecting your creative work, one question that often comes up is whether you need to register your copyright. The short answer is that you don’t have to, but it’s generally a good idea to do so.

As soon as you create a work and fix it in a tangible form, such as by writing it down or recording it, you automatically have copyright protection. This means that you have exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, perform, and display your work, and to create derivative works based on it. However, simply having copyright protection doesn’t necessarily give you the tools you need to enforce it.

That’s where copyright registration comes in. By registering your work with the Copyright Office in the United States (or a similar organization in other countries), you gain several important benefits. One of the most significant is the ability to sue for infringement in federal court. If someone is using your work without your permission and you haven’t registered your copyright, the court will not hear your case. But if you have registered your copyright within a certain time period, you can pursue your case and, also seek statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. These can be substantial, even if you can’t prove that you actually suffered any damages.

Another benefit of registration is that it can be used as evidence of the validity of your copyright in court. For example, if someone is accused of infringing your copyright and they claim that your work is not original or that you don’t own the rights to it, having a registration certificate can help to prove that your work is valid and that you are the rightful copyright holder.

In summary, while copyright registration is not mandatory, it’s a good idea to register your work because it provides a means to enforce the rights of copyright holders if someone is using it without permission and also can be used as evidence in court if any infringement claim arises.

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. Follow him on Twitter at @internetcases.

 

Company successfully defends against trade dress and copyright infringement claims over online software tool

trade dress

A federal court in Delaware dismissed most of the intellectual property infringement claims concerning a competing online room-planning software tool. The court held that plaintiff’s trade dress infringement and breach of contract claims failed, and that its copyright infringement claims failed, except for those allegations relating to the copying of computer code.

No trade dress protection where look and feel was functional

On the trade dress claim, plaintiff had identified fifteen elements that formed a cohesive “look and feel” of its software. And the court found – based on extensive use, wide advertisement and appearance in industry publications – that the trade dress had acquired secondary meaning. But the court found that the look and feel was merely functional and not subject to trade dress protection.

Copyright infringement – mixed bag

Similarly, the court dismissed the copyright infringement claim regarding the selection, arrangement and coordination of visual elements of the program. In the court’s view, these elements were merely functional and thus not subject to copyright protection. The court dismissed the copyright infringement claim as well concerning the tool’s graphics. On this point the court was even more bold – it found after a visual comparison of the works that they simply were not similar.

The court allowed the copyright infringement claim concerning the program’s code to move forward. It found that plaintiff had alleged both access and similarity. Plaintiff had also alleged that defendant repeatedly accessed the program to stress test the design, and that there were extensive similarities in the tools’ mechanics. These allegations were enough to survive a motion to dismiss.

Browsewrap not enough

Finally, the breach of contract claim failed, not on the basis of preemption as one might expect, but because the court found plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that a contract had been formed. Plaintiff asserted that its website’s terms of service prohibited copying of the software, and that defendant’s employees should have been aware of those terms on a browsewrap theory – there was a link to the terms at the bottom of the page. But the court would not find that plaintiff alleged enough facts to plausibly allege that  defendant’s employees manifested assent to those browsewrap terms.

Design With Friends, Inc. v. Target Corporation, 2022 WL 4448197 (D. Delaware, September 23, 2022)

See also:

Company president may be liable for vicarious copyright infringement

vicarious liability copyright

Plaintiff sued a company and its president for copyright infringement, over some photos that the company published online. The individual defendant moved to dismiss the claim against him, arguing that the complaint (1) did not plead any facts concerning action that he took, (2) did not try to pierce the company’s corporate veil, and (3) contained no facts to establish that the company is the alter ego of the individual defendant. Plaintiff conceded it was neither pursuing an alter-ego theory nor seeking to pierce the corporate veil. Instead, plaintiff argued that the individual defendant was vicariously liable for the company’s infringement. The court denied the motion to dismiss.

The court looked first to Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), which provides that one infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it. But then it cited to later Tenth Circuit cases (e.g., Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013)) which state the test for vicarious liability a bit differently. Under  Diversey, “[v]icarious liability attaches when the defendant ‘has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity’ and ‘has a direct financial interest in such activities.” There is no mention of declining to exercise the right to stop or limit the infringement under this test, as there is in Grokster.

The court found that the plaintiff’s claims for vicarious liability against the individual defendant survive because the complaint alleged that defendant was the owner and president of the company, had the ability to supervise and control content on the website, and received a financial benefit from the operation of the website. It rejected the individual defendant’s argument that the claim should fail because there were no allegations that he declined to exercise the right to stop or limit the infringement.

Great Bowery v. Best Little Sites, 2022 WL 2074253 (D. Utah June 9, 2022)

See also:

Can you sue a platform for not following DMCA takedown procedures?

platform DMCA takedown

Plaintiff sued YouTube after the platform took down one of plaintiff’s videos in response to a DMCA takedown notice. She claimed YouTube failed to follow the procedures in 17 U.S.C. §512 by, for example, not providing her with a physical signature of the copyright owner and otherwise not following the “exact course of the DMCA guidelines.” YouTube moved to dismiss and the court granted the motion.

It held that §512 serves to provide safe harbor protections from copyright infringement liability to platforms. Section 512 does not,  however, give rise to a standalone basis to sue a platform.

When a copyright owner sends a DMCA takedown notice to a platform, it must include substantially the following:

  • A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
  • Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
  • Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.
  • Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
  • A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
  • A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.

If the notification does not include substantially these items, then if the platform leaves the content up, the insufficient notification will not be considered to have placed the platform on notice of the alleged infringing activity. So if the copyright holder sues the platform for copyright infringement, it will have to plead other facts showing that the platform is liable for infringement. Relatedly, if the platform acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to allegedly infringing content when it gets knowledge via a valid takedown notice, it will have an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement.

In this case, the court confirmed the notion that the DMCA provides this safe harbor to the platform but does not give the person whose content has been taken down the right to sue the platform. The court does not mention – but it remains relevant – that one whose content has been taken down can seek a remedy under 17 U.S.C. §512(f) against a party who sends a takedown notice while knowingly materially misrepresenting that the content is infringing. But that is not the course plaintiff in this case took – she sued YouTube for not following the requirements that apply to copyright holders. And she lost.

Finley v. YouTube, 2022 WL 704835 (N.D. Cal., March 9, 2022)

See also: Is it defamation to accuse someone of sending a bogus DMCA takedown notice?

 

In copyright infringement case, artist’s social media popularity supported claim that retail chain copied artwork

copyright social media

Plaintiff is an artist who designs macabre items, including a bat-themed mug. Defendant (Michaels, the well-known retail craft store) started selling a vase that plaintiff claimed infringed its bat mug copyright. So he sued for copyright infringement. Michaels moved to dismiss, arguing there was no substantial similarity between the works. And even if there were substantial similarity, according to Michaels, plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that Michaels actually copied the work. The court rejected Michaels’ arguments and denied the motion to dismiss.

Actual copying can be shown by indirect evidence. To adequately plead indirect evidence of actual copying, one must allege, among other things, that the accused infringer could reasonably access the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.

In this case, the artist alleged facts sufficient to establish that Michaels could reasonably access the vampire bat mug. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that it advertised its products, including the vampire bat mug, on various social media platforms, such as Facebook, Pinterest, Instagram, and Tumblr. Through these social media accounts, plaintiff had allegedly reached at least 30,000 followers. In addition to its social media presence, plaintiff alleged it advertised the mug on the internet more generally, and sold it through online retailers, including Etsy, eBay, and Amazon. The court credited plaintiff’s allegations that plaintiff’s reach over the internet extended to customers all over the world, in particular customers in China, where designers and advertisers purportedly saw the mug. These allegations were sufficient to show that defendant could have reasonably accessed plaintiff’s work.

Dellamorte, LLC v. The Michaels Companies, 2022 WL 254427 (D. New Jersey, January 27, 2022)

See also:

Copyright ownership transfers must be in writing

copyright

If you are hiring an independent contractor to create copyrightable subject matter, and you want to own the copyright in the resulting work product, be sure to have that contractor sign a written contract that specifically states that copyright ownership is being transferred. Even if you have paid the contractor for the work, and you both intend that ownership be transferred, the contractor will still own the copyright in the deliverables unless there is a writing, signed by the contractor, to the contrary. This is a key concern if your contractor has created subject matter that will be critical to your business – software, graphics, text, photos, any kind of protectable digital asset. If you do not secure ownership, the contractor may later object to how you are using the works differently than intended at the time of the contract, and claim infringement. Or the contractor could grant a license in the same work to another party, even one of your competitors.

The Copyright Act contains a couple of provisions that relate to this issue. The first one pertains to the definition of “work made for hire”. If an employee creates copyrightable subject matter within the scope of his or her employment, that is a work made for hire, and the employer owns the copyright. But note how that relates to employers and employees. Contractors are in a different category. There are other kinds of works that are “ordered or commissioned” that can be considered works made for hire, even if created by an independent contractor. But in any event, the Copyright Act says that these are works made for hire only “if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”

Let’s say you have not established that the contractor’s work is a “work made for hire”. You could still have the contractor assign his or her rights in the deliverables. Again, the Copyright Act requires this to be in writing. You cannot just agree on a handshake that ownership of copyright has been transferred. The statute provides that “[a] transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.” Note that the contractor – the one making the assignment – has to sign the written document.

Paying attention to these issues on the front end of hiring an independent contractor will help ensure clear rights in the future, avoid future tangles and disagreements, and ultimately save time and money by avoiding costly dispute resolution.

Evan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. Twitter: @internetcases

DMCA anticircumvention case over copied YouTube videos moves forward

Defendant fired plaintiff over two videos advocating for COVID-19 workplace protections that plaintiff posted on YouTube. Around the time of the termination, the employer allegedly used a smartphone to record the videos in question while they were being played on a computer screen. Defendant then allegedly further copied, distributed and performed these videos in connection with legal proceedings involving plaintiff, without plaintiff’s consent.

DMCA anticircumvention

Plaintiff sued his former employer for copyright infringement. And because YouTube technology provides technological protection measures to prevent unauthorized copying of videos, plaintiff sued under Section 1201 of the Copyright Act – one of the anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).

No fair use (yet)

Defendant argued its conduct was fair use of the videos. It asserted it submitted the videos in response to plaintiff’s OSHA complaint and in support of a no-trespass order. But the court refused to make a fair use determination at the motion to dismiss stage, since no facts supporting fair use could be found in the complaint.

DMCA circumvention

The court also allowed plaintiff’s DMCA circumvention claim to move forward.

Section 1201(a)(1)(A) of the DMCA states “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act].” “Circumvent,” as used in §1201, “means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the authority of the copyright owner[.]” §1201(a)(3)(A). “[A] technological measure ‘effectively controls access to a work’ if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.” §1201(a)(3)(B).

Defendant argued the court should throw out the DMCA circumvention claim because plaintiff did not identify a specific technological measure that defendant allegedly circumvented. The court rejected that argument, however, saying that that much specificity was not required to survive a motion to dismiss.

Defendant also argued the DMCA claim should fail because the statute prohibits “circumvention,” which is different from copying, and the complained-of conduct was simply copying. The court viewed the law differently, however, citing Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004), where the court held that while infringement and circumvention are distinct, an act of infringement can also involve an act of an authorized circumvention.

The facts of this case may cause one to consider cases such as R. Christopher Goodwin & Assoc., Inc. v. Search, Inc., 2019 WL 5576834 (E.D. Louisiana October 29, 2019) and wonder whether circumvention has really occurred. It does not appear defendant in this case did anything to disable measures that would have prevented it from viewing the videos. Presumably the streamed videos were available to anyone who could visit YouTube. And the act of creating the copies did not even touch on any of the protection measures YouTube put in place. There was no cracking or descrambling – just the capturing of video as it passed through the air (at that moment being analog) from the computer screen to the camera of the smart phone. Perhaps there is an analog hole defense here?

Edland v. Basin Electric Power Cooperative, 2021 WL 3080225 (D.S.D. July 21, 2021)

Intellectual property issues in a speaker’s agreement

Let’s say you’re going to host a conference — these days that would be an online conference — and you want to invite people to give presentations. You will want to enter into a contract with those presenters to cover some of the obvious logistical items: the presenter is obligated to show up, the presentation will be on a certain topic, it will last for a certain amount of time, and there may be payment. And there are some important intellectual property issues that the speaker’s agreement should also address.

Marketing and promotion of the event

One important intellectual property issue in a speaker’s agreement has to do with the marketing and promotion of the event. This involves primarily the right of publicity. You are likely going to want to generate materials, such as social media posts, that have the name and the image of the presenter. You will want to seek to get a release from the presenter that authorizes you to use his or her name and image in connection with the marketing and promotion of the event.

Handout materials

A second issue that you will need to deal with has to do with handout materials or other accompanying documentation for the presentation. You will want to make sure that you have the appropriate copyright license from the presenter allowing you to copy and distribute those materials. You should also consider getting assurances from the presenter that those materials will not infringe any third party intellectual property rights. And you may want to have the agreement say that the presenter will indemnify you and pay the cost of the defense if you get sued by a third party because the handout materials infringe.

Video or audio of the presentation

A third intellectual property issue that you will want to think about in connection with a speaker’s agreement has to do with any content that you generate at the event. Say, for example, you film the presentation and you want to make the video available to the world so it can see what the event was like. On this point we are back to the discussion of the right of publicity. Obviously the presenter’s name and image is going to be in that content. So you want to make sure that you have a release for that.

As the host of the event, you will likely want to own the copyright in the video. The presenter may ask for a carveout — that is, clarification that though you own the copyright in the video, the presenter retains ownership of the underlying content presented.

Need help with intellectual property issues in a speaker’s agreement?

Please feel free to give me a call or send an email. Dial (630) 362-7237, or email ebrown@internetcases.com.

Why get a copyright registration?

A work of authorship is protected by copyright at the moment it is created. If you take a photo or write some software or draft some text, copyright law protects that work the moment it becomes fixed in a tangible medium of expression for more than a transitory duration. You do not need a registration to own a copyright. It exists automatically. But there are certain benefits conferred by registering a copyright.

Copyright registration allows the holder to sue for infringement.

One benefit from having a registration is that the holder of the copyright can sue for infringement. This is a requirement for litigation – a court will not let a copyright infringement case go forward unless the plaintiff shows that it has a registration certificate. And that registration certificate needs to be in hand — it is not enough for the plaintiff to have just applied to register the copyright. It actually needs to have the registration issued.

Better evidence.

A second benefit of having a copyright registration certificate is the evidentiary weight that it carries in court. If the registration is obtained in the five years following the first publication of the work, the judge will look at that registration certificate and give it great importance in ascertaining whether the plaintiff has a valid copyright in the work.

Statutory damages and attorney’s fees.

A third benefit of having a registration is that in certain circumstances the plaintiff can recover its costs and attorneys fees, and be entitled to recover statutory damages. These damages can range anywhere from $750 all the way up to $150,000 per work infringed.

To be entitled to these things the plaintiff must have obtained a timely copyright registration. To be timely, it has to either have been obtained before the infringement began, or if it was obtained after the infringement began, it was obtained within the first three months following the first publication of the work. The key is that timing matters — it is generally advisable to register a work within the first three months following first publication.

Need help with a copyright registration?

Please feel free to give me a call at (630) 362-7237, or send email to ebrown@internetcases.com.

About the author:

Evan Brown, nondisclosure agreementsEvan Brown is a technology and intellectual property attorney in Chicago. This content originally appeared on evan.law.

See also:

No statutory damages in online copyright case where infringement continued after copyright registration

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