Snapchat not liable for enabling teacher to groom minor student

A high school science teacher used Snapchat to send sexually explicit content to one of her students, whom she eventually assaulted. Authorities uncovered this abuse after the student overdosed on drugs. The student (as John Doe) sued the teacher, the school district and Snapchat. The lower court threw out the case against Snapchat on the basis of the federal Communications Decency Act at 47 USC § 230. The student sought review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed.

Relying on Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), the court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the student’s claims against Snapchat were based on the teacher’s messages. Accordingly, Snapchat was immune from liability because this provision of federal law – under the doctrine of the MySpace case – provides “immunity … to Web-based service providers for all claims stemming from their publication of information created by third parties.”

Doe v. Snap, Inc., 2023 WL 4174061 (5th Cir. June 26, 2023)

Facebook scores Section 230 win over claims brought by Russian page accused of meddling in 2016 U.S. presidential election

Plaintiffs owned and operated a Facebook page that Facebook shut down in 2018 because of concerns the page was associated with Russian interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. After getting shut down, plaintiffs sued Facebook alleging a number of claims, including:

  • damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for deprivation of a constitutional right by one acting under color of state law;
  • civil rights violations under California law;
  • breach of contract; and
  • breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Facebook moved to dismiss these claims under the Communications Decency Act at 47 U.S.C. §230. The court granted the motion to dismiss.

Section 230 immunizes defendants from liability if:

  • defendant is a provider or user of an interactive computer service;
  • the information for which plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable is information provided by another information content provider; and
  • plaintiff’s claim seeks to hold defendant liable as the publisher or speaker of that information.

In this case, there was no dispute Facebook met the first two elements, i.e., it is a provider of an interactive computer service and the information (namely, the content of plaintiffs’ page) was provided by a party other than Facebook. The real dispute came under the third element.

Plaintiffs argued that Section 230 should not immunize Facebook because this case did not concern obscenity or any other form of unprotected speech. Instead, plaintiffs argued, the case concerned political speech that strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. The court rejected this argument, holding that immunity under the Communications Decency Act does not contain a political speech exception. The statutory text provides that no “provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. (Emphasis added). No distinction is made between political speech and non-political speech.

Plaintiff also argued that granting Facebook immunity would be counter to congressional intent behind the Communications Decency Act. But the court borrowed language from Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) on this point: “Both parties make a lot of sound and fury on the congressional intent of the immunity under section 230, but such noise ultimately signifies nothing. It is the language of the statute that defines and enacts the concerns and aims of Congress; a particular concern does not rewrite the language.” Looking to Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), the court noted that Ninth Circuit case law interpreting the language of the Communications Decency Act has held that “activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.”

Federal Agency of News LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 2019 WL 3254208 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2019)

Newspaper not liable for alleged defamatory letter to editor published online

The Appellate Court of Illinois has sided in favor of a local newspaper in a defamation lawsuit brought against the paper over a reader’s allegedly defamatory letter to the editor. The court held that the Communciations Decency Act (at 47 U.S.C. 230) “absolved” the newspaper of liability over this appearance of third party content on the newspaper’s website.

Plaintiff — a lawyer and self-identified civil rights advocate — sent several letters to local businesses claiming those businesses did not have enough handicapped parking spaces. Instead of merely asking the businesses to create those parking spaces, he demanded each one pay him $5,000 or face a lawsuit.

One local resident thought plaintiff’s demands were greedy and extortionate, and wrote a letter to the editor of the local newspaper covering the story. The newspaper posted the letter online. Both the newspaper and the letter’s author found themselves as defendants in plaintiff’s defamation lawsuit.

The letter-writer settled with plaintiff, but the newspaper stayed in as a defendant and moved to dismiss, arguing that federal law immunized it from liability for content provided by the third party letter-writer.

The lower court dismissed the defamation claim against the newspaper, holding that the Communications Decency Act (at 47 U.S.C. §230) protected the newspaper from liability for the third party letter-writer’s comments posted on the newspaper’s website.

Plaintiff sought review with the Appellate Court of Illinois. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal.

The Communications Decency Act (at 47 U.S.C §230(c)(1)) says that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” The appellate court found that the leter-writer was another information content provider that placed comments on the newspaper’s website. Therefore, it held that the Communications Decency Act “absolved” the newspaper from responsibility.

Straw v. Streamwood Chamber of Commerce, 2015 IL App (1st) 143094-U (September 29, 2015)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago helping clients manage issues involving technology and new media.

Third Circuit upholds Communications Decency Act immunity for Google, Yahoo and others

Plaintiff filed suit against Google, Yahoo and some unknown (John Doe) defendants for defamation, tortious interference with contract, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on various online postings. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. §230) provided immunity to defendants over the third party content giving rise to the complaint. Section 230 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Because defendants were not the creators of the information, and the claims attempted to treat them as the publisher or speaker of that content, Section 230 barred the claims.

Kabbaj v. Google, Inc., 2015 WL 534864 (3rd Cir. Feb. 10, 2015)

About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.

Amazon and other booksellers off the hook for sale of Obama drug use book

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shields Amazon, Barnes & Noble and Books-A-Million from some, but not all claims brought over promotion and sale of scandalous book about presidential candidate.

Parisi v. Sinclair, — F.Supp.2d —, 2011 WL 1206193 (D.D.C. March 31, 2011)

In 2008, Larry Sinclair made the ultra-scandalous claim that he had done drugs and engaged in sexual activity with then-presidential candidate Barack Obama. Daniel Parisi, owner of the infamous Whitehouse.com website, challenged Sinclair to take a polygraph test.

Not satisfied with the attention his outlandish claims had garnered, Sinclair self-published a book detailing his alleged misadventures. The book was available through print-on-demand provider Lightening Source.

Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and Books-A-Million (“BAM”) each offered Sinclair’s book for sale through their respective websites. (Barnes & Noble and BAM did not sell the book at their brick and mortar stores.) Each company’s website promoted the book using the following sentence:

You’ll read how the Obama campaign used internet porn king Dan Parisi and Ph.D. fraud Edward I. Gelb to conduct a rigged polygraph exam in an attempt to make the Sinclair story go away.

Parisi and his Whitehouse Network sued for, among other things, defamation and false light invasion of privacy. BAM moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) while Amazon and Barnes & Noble moved for summary judgment. The court granted the booksellers’ motions.

Section 230 applied because booksellers were not information content providers

The booksellers’ primary argument was that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shielded them from liability for plaintiffs’ claims concerning the promotional sentence. The court found in defendants’ favor on this point.

Section 230 provides in relevant part that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” The major issue in this case was whether the online booksellers had provided the information comprising the promotional sentence. The court found that the pleadings (as to BAM) and the evidence (as to Amazon and Barnes & Noble) did not credibly dispute that the booksellers did not create and develop the promotional sentence.

But not so fast, Section 230, on some of those other claims!

The court’s treatment of Section 230 in relation to plaintiffs’ false light claim and the claims relating to the actual sale of the book were even more intriguing.

Plaintiffs argued that their false light claim was essentially a right of publicity claim. And Section 230(e)(2) says that immunity does not apply to claims pertaining to intellectual property. There is some confusion as to whether this exception to immunity applies only to federal intellectual property claims or to both federal and state IP claims. On one hand, Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill says that only federal intellectual property claims are excepted from immunity (which would mean that state law IP claims would be barred by Section 230). On the other hand, cases like Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Doe v. Friendfinder Network and Universal Communication System v. Lycos suggest that both state and federal IP claims should withstand a Section 230 challenge.

In this case, the court indicated that it would have sided with the cases that provide for both federal and state claims making it past Section 230: “I am not inclined to extend the scope of the CDA immunity as far as the Ninth Circuit. . . . ”

But ultimately the court did not need to take sides as to the scope of Section 230(e)(2), as it found the use of plaintiff Parisi’s name fit into the newsworthiness privilege. One cannot successfully assert a misappropriation claim when his name or likeness is used in a newsworthy publication unless the use has “no real relationship” to the subject matter of the publication.

The court also seemed to constrain Section 230 immunity as it related to the online booksellers’ liability for selling the actual book. (Remember, the discussion above, in which the court found immunity to apply, dealt with the promotional sentence.) The court rejected defendants’ arguments that the reasoning of Gentry v. eBay should protect them. In Gentry, eBay was afforded immunity from violation of a warranty statute. But it merely provided the forum for the sale of goods, unlike the online booksellers in this case, which were the distributors of the actual allegedly defamatory book.

Even though Section 230 did not serve to protect BAM, Barnes & Noble and Amazon from liability for defamation arising from sales of the book, the court dismissed the defamation claim because of the lack of a showing that the booksellers acted with actual malice. It was undisputed that the plaintiffs were limited-purpose public figures. Persons with that status must show that the defendant acted with actual malice. That standard was not met here.

Yahoo not liable for blocking marketing email

Section 230 of Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. 230) shields Yahoo’s spam filtering efforts

Holomaxx v. Yahoo, 2011 WL 865794 (N.D.Cal. March 11, 2011)

Plaintiff provides email marketing services for its clients. It sends out millions of emails a day, many of those to recipients having Yahoo email addresses. Yahoo used its spam filtering technology to block many of the messages plaintiff was trying to send to Yahoo account users. So plaintiff sued Yahoo, alleging various causes of action such as intentional interference with prospective business advantage.

Yahoo moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that it was immune from liability under Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss.

Section 230(c)(2) provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of … any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”

Plaintiff argued that immunity should not apply here because Yahoo acted in bad faith by using “faulty filtering technology and techniques,” motivated “by profit derived from blocking both good and bad e-mails.” But the court found no factual basis to support plaintiff’s allegations that Yahoo used “cheap and ineffective technologies to avoid the expense of appropriately tracking and eliminating only spam email.”

The court rejected another of plaintiff’s arguments against applying Section 230, namely, that Yahoo should not be afforded blanket immunity for blocking legitimate business emails. Looking to the cases of Goddard v. Google and National Numismatic Certification v. eBay, plaintiff argued that the court should apply the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis to find that legitimate business email should not be treated the same as the more nefarious types of content enumerated in Section 230(c)(2). (Content that is, for example, obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing).

On this point the court looked to the sheer volume of the purported spam to conclude Yahoo was within Section 230’s protection to block the messages — plaintiff acknowledged that it sent approximately six million emails per day through Yahoo’s servers and that at least .1% of those emails either were sent to invalid addresses or resulted in user opt-out. On an annual basis, that amounted to more than two million invalid or unwanted emails.

Section 230 shields Google from liability for anonymous defamation

Black v. Google Inc., 2010 WL 3746474 (N.D.Cal. September 20, 2010)

Back in August, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a lawsuit against Google brought by two pro se plaintiffs, holding that the action was barred under the immunity provisions of 47 USC 230. That section says that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Plaintiffs had complained about a comment on Google (probably a review) disparaging their roofing business.

Plaintiffs filed and “objection” to the dismissal, which the court read as a motion to alter or amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion.

In their “objection,” plaintiffs claimed — apparently without much support — that Congress did not intend Section 230 to apply in situations involving anonymous speech. The court did not buy this argument.

The court looked to the Ninth Circuit case of Carafano v. Metrosplash as an example of a website operator protected under Section 230 from liability for anonymous content: “To be sure, the website [in Carafano] provided neutral tools, which the anonymous dastard used to publish the libel, but the website did absolutely nothing to encourage the posting of defamatory content.” As in Carafano, Google was a passive conduit and could not be liable for failing to detect and remove the allegedly defamatory content.

Communications Decency Act shields web host as “distributor” of defamatory content

Plaintiff Austin, the owner of a travel-related business, accused the owner of one of his business’s competitors of posting defamatory content on the competitor’s website. Austin filed a defamation lawsuit against the company that hosted the website, claiming that it was liable for refusing to take down the alleged defamatory statements.

The web hosting company successfully moved for summary judgment, citing to 47 U.S.C. §230, a portion of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 which provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Austin sought review of the trial court’s decision.

Austin argued that the plain language of §230 provides a shield only for liability that would result from being a publisher of defamatory material. Because the web hosting company was a distributor of defamatory content, Austin argued, §230 should not apply, and thus the lower court erred in granting summary judgment on that basis.

The appellate court rejected Austin’s argument, relying heavily on the decision of Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir., 1997). As in Zeran, the court found that Congress had spoken directly to the issue by “employing the legally significant term ‘publisher,’ which has traditionally encompassed distributors and original publishers alike.” The court held that because distributor liability is a subset of publisher liability, it is therefore specifically foreclosed by § 230.

Austin v. CrystalTech Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389, 2005 WL 3489249 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, December 22, 2005).

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