Plaintiff sued defendant gaming company alleging violation of Washington state laws addressing gambling and consumer protection. Plaintiff claimed that after starting with free chips in defendant’s online casino games, users had to buy more chips to keep playing. Plaintiff had spent money on the games and argued that defendant’s practices were unfair.
Defendant moved to dismiss the case and asked the court to compel arbitration. Defendant argued that plaintiff had agreed to defendant’s terms of service, which included an arbitration clause. The company claimed that by playing the games, plaintiff was bound to these terms, even though plaintiff did not explicitly sign a contract.
The court denied the motion to dismiss. It found that defendant did not provide enough information to show that plaintiff had been given proper notice of the terms of service or that he agreed to them. The notice on the game’s homepage was not clear or conspicuous enough for a reasonable person to understand that they were agreeing to the terms, including arbitration, just by playing the games.
Three reasons why this case matters:
Consumer Protection: It highlights the importance of businesses providing clear and understandable terms to consumers.
Online Contracts: The case shows that courts are careful when it comes to online agreements, requiring companies to ensure consumers are fully aware of the terms.
Arbitration Clauses: This case reinforces that arbitration clauses must be clearly presented and agreed upon to be enforceable.
Kuhk v. Playstudios, Inc., 2024 WL 4529263 (W.D. Washington, October 18, 2024)
Plaintiff sued defendant Urban Outfitters under California law over the way that the retailer routed messages sent using the company’s website. Defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the terms and conditions on defendant’s website required plaintiff to submit to arbitration instead of going to court. The court denied the motion.
The key issue in the case was whether plaintiff, by completing her purchases on defendant’s website, was sufficiently notified of and thus agreed to the arbitration agreement embedded via hyperlinks on the checkout page. Defendant maintained that the language and placement of the hyperlinks on the order page were adequate to inform plaintiff of the arbitration terms, which she implicitly agreed to by finalizing her purchases. Plaintiff argued that the hyperlinks were not conspicuous enough to alert her to the arbitration terms, thus negating her consent to them.
The court looked at the nature of the online agreement and whether plaintiff had adequate notice of the arbitration agreement, thereby consenting to its terms. The court’s discussion touched upon the differences between “clickwrap” and “browsewrap” agreements, emphasizing that the latter, which defendant’s website purportedly used, often fails to meet the threshold for constructive notice due to the lack of explicit acknowledgment required from the user.
The court examined the specifics of what constitutes sufficient notice, pointing out that for a user to be on inquiry notice, the terms must be presented in a way that a reasonable person would notice and understand that their actions (such as clicking a button) indicate agreement to those terms. The court found that defendant’s method of presenting the arbitration terms – through hyperlinks in small, grey font that were not sufficiently set apart from surrounding text – did not meet this standard.
Rocha v. Urban Outfitters, 2024 WL 393486 (N.D. Cal., February 1, 2024)
Plaintiffs sued their bank alleging various claims under state law. The bank moved to compel arbitration based on various online clickwrap agreements plaintiffs had entered into.
One of the clickwrap agreements required plaintiffs to scroll through the entire agreement and then click an “Acknowledge” button before continuing to the next step. Citing to the case of Meyer v. Uber, 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017), the court observed that “[c]ourts routinely uphold clickwrap agreements for the principal reason that the user has affirmatively assented to the terms of agreement by clicking ‘I agree.'”
Similarly, for the other relevant agreements, plaintiffs were required to click a box acknowledging that they agreed to those agreements before they could obtain access to digital products. Again, citing to the Meyer case: “A reasonable user would know that by clicking the registration button, he was agreeing to the terms and conditions accessible via the hyperlink, whether he clicked on the hyperlink or not.” By affirmatively clicking the acknowledgement, plaintiffs manifested their assent to the terms of the these agreements.
Curtis v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2024 WL 283474 (S.D.N.Y., January 25, 2024)
Plaintiff was bound by forum selection clause found in online terms and conditions.
Plaintiff sued TripAdvisor and some related defendants (including Viator, a company that TripAdvisor acquired) for a number of torts arising from an ATV accident that plaintiff had while on a tour in Mexico that she had booked online through defendants’ website. Defendants moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, to transfer the matter to federal court in Massachusetts based on the forum selection clause found in the Terms and Conditions that plaintiff agreed to when she booked the tour. The court granted the motion to transfer.
To purchase the tour, plaintiff was required to click on a “Book Now” icon, directly under which the following message was located: “[b]y clicking Book Now and making a reservation, I acknowledge that I have read and agree to be bound by Viator’s Terms and Conditions and Privacy Statement.” The phrase “Viator’s Terms and Conditions” appeared in blue underlined text, in the form of a hyperlink, which directed the consumer to the website’s Terms and Conditions.
Viator’s Terms and Conditions included a forum selection clause, which, in relevant part, provided:
[T]his agreement is governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, USA. You hereby consent to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of courts in Boston, Massachusetts, USA and stipulate to the fairness and convenience of proceedings in such courts for all disputes arising out of or relating to the use of this Website. You agree that all claims you may have against Viator, Inc. arising from or relating to this Website must be heard and resolved in a court of competent subject matter jurisdiction located in Boston, Massachusetts.
The court found that plaintiff had agreed to the forum selection clause, and that the clause was enforceable. In determining whether plaintiff was bound by the clause, the court was guided by “fundamental precepts of contract law.” More specifically, under New Jersey law, “[a] contract term is generally binding if the contract has been mutually agreed upon by the parties, is supported by valid consideration, and does not violate codified standards or offend public policy.” W. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 24-26 (1958).
Plaintiff had argued that the Terms and Conditions amounted to an invalid browsewrap agreement, because she neither received reasonable notice of their existence, nor provided an unambiguous manifestation of assent. Primarily relying upon Specht v. Netscape, plaintiff argued that she was not bound by the Terms and Conditions, because Viator’s website was designed so that a user can use its services without affirmatively assenting to the web page’s terms of use. According to plaintiff, she was ultimately permitted to purchase the ATV tour without ever being asked to check a box or click an “I Agree” button, or even acknowledge that the Terms existed. Without proper notice, plaintiff maintained that enforcing the forum selection was not appropriate.
The court disagreed. It found that the hyperlinked terms on defendant’s website adhered to the requirements of reasonable notice. Regardless of whether plaintiff was required to scroll through the Check Out page, the hyperlinked Terms and Conditions were conspicuously placed directly underneath the “Book Now” icon. Based on its location, therefore, the court found that the hyperlink was not hidden in an area of the screen that plaintiff was unlikely to notice, but, instead, was clearly displayed in a section of the webpage that she needed to review in order to effectuate her purchase of the ATV tour. Stated differently, the hyperlink was placed within the immediate proximity of an icon that plaintiff was required to click, for the purpose of confirming her purchase on defendant’s website.
About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.
Plaintiff sued defendant for copyright infringement over unlicensed use of plaintiff’s musical works in advertisements that defendant created and uploaded to YouTube. Defendant argued that the language and structure of plaintiff’s website – from which the works were downloaded – resulted in an express license or at least an implied license to use the musical works for commercial purposes. The court rejected these arguments and awarded summary judgment to plaintiff.
No express license
The basis for defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s website gave rise to an express license is not clear. In any event, plaintiff argued that a browsewrap agreement in place on the website established that the works could not be used for commercial purposes without the payment of a license fee. Citing to the well-known browsewrap case of Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002), defendant argued that it did not have notice of the terms and conditions of the browsewrap agreement.
The court distinguished this case from Specht. In this case, plaintiff’s home page contained – similar to the case of Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) – “immediately visible” hyperlinks that referenced terms of use and licensing information. A user did not have to scroll to find these links. So the terms and conditions of the browsewrap agreement were enforceable. Since the browsewrap agreement contained provisions requiring a license for commercial use, no reasonable jury could find that plaintiff had granted defendant an express license to use the musical works for commercial purposes free of charge.
No implied license
Defendant argued in the alternative that plaintiff had granted defendant an implied license to use the musical works, based on (1) plaintiff’s company name “Freeplay,” and (2) the absence of any conspicuous warning that the works were not available for commercial use.
The court found these arguments to be “easily disposed of.” Citing to I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 1996), the court noted that an implied license exists only when:
a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work,
the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and
the licensor intends that the licensee-requestor copy and distribute his work.
The court found that defendant failed to prove any of these elements. Defendant never asked plaintiff to create any works. Nor did plaintiff make any works at defendant’s request to be used in defendant’s YouTube videos. Moreover, given plaintiff’s paid license requirements for business use of the copyrighted works available on its website, it could not be said that plaintiff intended that defendant download and distribute those works free of charge. Accordingly, the court found that no implied license existed.
Freeplay Music, LLC v. Dave Arbogast Buick-GMC, Inc., No. 17-42, 2019 WL 4647305 (S.D. Ohio, September 24, 2019)
About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.
Defendants moved to compel arbitration based upon a purported arbitration clause in an agreement between them and plaintiffs that plaintiffs electronically signed through defendants’ website.
The court found that defendants failed to meet their burden to show, by undisputed material facts, that the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate the claims in the case. The court looked to the Ninth Circuit decision in Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) to support the idea that courts will enforce clickwrap-type agreements where the user indicates actual notice of the terms of the agreement or was required to acknowledge the terms of the agreement before proceeding with further use of the site. Enforcement of a browsewrap-type agreement, which lacks such an acknowledgment, will depend upon whether the website’s design and content would put “a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.” The conspicuousness of the terms and notices, as well as the overall design of the webpage, will contribute to the determination that a user was on inquiry notice.
In this case, according to the court, defendants had not offered evidence explaining the design and content of the webpage in question, or how the agreement appeared on the website. The court could not determine whether the terms of the agreement appeared on the registration page itself, or if a user would have had to click a link to see the full terms. Likewise, the court could not determine other factors that might contribute to determining plaintiffs’ notice of the terms, such as the size of the font or other aspects of the appearance and presentation of the terms online. The declaration offered by defendant did not provide evidence to show that: (1) either of the plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the arbitration agreement; or (2) whether the agreement was a clickwrap or a browsewrap agreement, how the website was designed and where these terms appeared, and whether plaintiffs assented by clicking an “I agree” box, or were deemed to agree by continuing in the registration process.
Given the lack of evidence of how the registration process appeared on its website, how one of the plaintiffs had declared that he did not see an arbitration agreement, and the reasonable doubts and inferences that must be drawn in that plaintiff’s favor under the applicable standard, the court found that plaintiffs had presented a genuine issue of fact concerning notice of, and assent to, the arbitration agreement here. The court could not find that plaintiffs were reasonably on notice of the agreement to arbitrate, and the accordingly the motion to compel was denied.
Chen v. Premier Financial Alliance, Inc., 2019 WL 280944 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2019)
Ticketmaster.com terms of use did not govern claims arising from related ticket exchange website
Plaintiff sued defendants Ticketmaster and Live Nation asserting violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and a similar state law. He claimed that Ticketmaster’s NFL Ticket Exchange website did not provide information about wheelchair-accessible seating. Defendants filed a motion asking the court to compel the parties to arbitrate the case. The court denied the motion.
Neither party argued that the terms and conditions of the Ticket Exchange website governed the dispute between them. Defendants instead argued that the clickwrap agreement governing previous purchases defendant had made from ticketmaster.com for concerts applied to plaintiff’s use of the Ticket Exchange website.
This clickwrap agreement contained an arbitration provision that changed over time. Before November 2012, the provision contained broad language stating that the parties “agree[d] to arbitrate all disputes and claims between [them].” The language after November 2012 limited the arbitration provision to any “dispute or claim relating in any way to [plaintiff’s] use of the Site, or to products or services sold or distributed by … or through [defendants].” The definition of “Site” did not include the Ticket Exchange website.
The court rejected defendants’ arguments that the ticketmaster.com terms of service governed plaintiff’s use of the Ticket Exchange website.
The pre-November 2012 terms governed only “the use of ticketmaster.com and mobile versions thereof.” The court observed that at the time, the Ticket Exchange website did not yet exist, and that ticketmaster.com contained a “section” serving the same purpose as the now-existing Ticket Exchange website. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff would not be deemed to have agreed to arbitrate claims relating to his use of a website before the website was even created.
As to the November 2012-onward terms, the court easily determined those did not apply, as they did, by their own terms, apply only to the Site (which did not include Ticket Exchange). And since Plaintiff had made no purchase on the Ticket Exchange website, the scope of the terms purporting to cover “products or services sold or distributed by … or through [defendants]” still failed to reach the Ticket Exchange website.
Long v. Live Nation Worldwide, 2017 WL 5194978 (W.D. Wash., November 9, 2017)
About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.
Company could not argue it was not bound by competitor’s browsewrap agreement, because it used a browsewrap agreement for its own website.
Oilpro filed a counterclaim for breach of contract against its competitor, DHI, arguing that DHI breached the agreement it had with Oilpro – such agreement being in a browsewrap agreement found on Oilpro’s website – to not scrape, crawl, or use other automated means to download data from Oilpro’s website. DHI moved to dismiss the breach of contract claim, arguing that Oilpro had insufficiently pled that DHI assented to the terms of the browsewrap agreement. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
In browsewrap cases, because there is no affirmative step to acknowledge assent to the agreement, the party claiming breach has to show that a valid contract exists by demonstrating that the breaching party had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms and conditions. Just having a link to the terms at the bottom of the page, or having them available for review (without having to affirmatively click on something) may not be enough (though there are exceptions to this).
Here, the court found that Oilpro was not relying only on the fact that the agreement was on the pages of the website and available. Instead, Oilpro pointed to DHI’s own web design practices to support its knowledge of the terms of the browsewrap agreement. In the court’s words:
Oilpro alleges constructive notice because DHI has a similar site with a similar browsewrap agreement. Thus, even if there are no allegations that DHI took affirmative action to acknowledge assent, the court finds that the allegations relating to DHI’s constructive knowledge provide more than that the agreement was available and raise the claim to plausible.
So the case stands for the proposition that a company that uses a browsewrap agreement on its own website is less likely to be able to argue it is unaware of other companies’ browsewrap agreements. Said another way, browsewrap-using companies may have a higher standard of diligence in their own online dealings.
It should be noted, however, that the conclusion in this case is likely to apply only in the B2B context, and will likely not affect the enforceability (or non-enforceability) of browsewrap agreements in consumer context. The court said “[t]his conclusion is confined, of course, to instances where both parties are sophisticated businesses that use browsewrap agreements on their websites.”
DHI Group, Inc. v. Kent et al., 2017 WL 4837730 (S.D. Texas, October 26, 2017).
About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.
A Florida state appellate court recently held that an online seller’s terms and conditions, appearing in a “browsewrap” agreement linked-to from the bottom of its web pages, were not enforceable.
Plaintiff, an online purchaser of defendant’s dietary supplements, sued defendant seller over liver damage plaintiff allegedly sustained from the products. Defendant filed a motion with the trial court seeking to enforce an arbitration clause in its online terms and conditions. Plaintiff objected to that motion, arguing that he never agreed to the arbitration clause contained in the browsewrap agreement.
The lower court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the terms of the browsewrap agreement were not incorporated into the sales agreement. Defendant sought review with the Florida appellate court. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to compel.
This was a case of first impression in the Florida state courts.
The court observed that in other jurisdictions, browsewrap agreements have generally been enforced only when the hyperlink to the terms and conditions is conspicuous enough on the web page to place a user on inquiry notice of their terms. (Inquiry notice, simply stated, is, as its name suggests, notice sufficient to make the user aware enough of the terms that their natural inclination is to inquire further as to what the particular terms are.)
The court distinguished this case from the case of Hubbert v. Dell Corp., an Illinois case in which the court found a browse-wrap agreement to be enforceable.
Here, unlike in the Hubbert case, the defendant’s website allowed a purchaser to select a product and proceed to checkout without seeing the hyperlink to the terms and conditions. The website user could complete the purchase without scrolling to the bottom of the page where the link to the terms and conditions appeared.
In this situation the court found that the online seller’s website failed to advise the plaintiff that his purchase was subject to the terms and conditions of the sale, and did not put him on the required inquiry notice of the arbitration provision.
Vitacost.com, Inc. v. McCants, — So.3d — 2017 WL 608531 (Fla.Ct.App. Feb. 15, 2017)
About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.
Plaintiff filed a consumer fraud class action lawsuit against defendant, the operator of an ecommerce website. Defendant moved to have the case heard by arbitration, arguing that the arbitration provision in its website’s terms of use required the dispute to be arbitrated instead of heard in court. The terms of use were in the form of a “browsewrap” agreement — viewable by a hyperlink displayed at the bottom of each page of defendant’s website.
The court denied the motion, finding that the hyperlink to the terms of use (containing the arbitration provision) was too inconspicuous to put a reasonably prudent internet consumer on inquiry notice. Since the agreement was not enforceable, plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision. Defendant sought review with the California Court of Appeal. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court.
It observed that for a browsewrap agreement to be enforceable, a court must infer that the end user assented to its terms. This may be more difficult to show than in situations involving “clickwrap” agreements, which require the user to affirmatively do something, such as check a box, to indicate his or her assent to the terms of use.
In this case, the court held that although an especially observant internet consumer could spot the defendant’s terms of use hyperlinks on some checkout flow pages without scrolling, that quality alone was not all that was required to establish the existence of an enforceable browsewrap agreement. Rather, as the Second Circuit observed in Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.2002), “[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility.”
Here, the defendant’s terms of use hyperlinks — their placement, color, size and other qualities relative to defendant’s website’s overall design — were simply too inconspicuous to meet that standard.
Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc., — Cal.Rptr.3d —, 2016 WL 1056555 (Cal Ct. App., March 17, 2016)
About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago attorney advising enterprises on important aspects of technology law, including software development, technology and content licensing, and general privacy issues.