So-called “Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement” only protected one party’s information

mutual NDA

Eastern sued Herbalife for breach of the “Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement” into which the parties had entered. Eastern claimed Herbalife breached the agreement by disclosing Eastern’s confidential information to a competitor. Herbalife moved for summary judgment on Eastern’s claim for breach of the NDA. The court granted the summary judgment motion.

Was there trickery in drafting?

The NDA in many respects read like an NDA that would bind both parties to protect the other party’s confidential information. Its title contained the word “mutual”. It referred to a “Disclosing Party” and a “Receiving Party”. And it defined “Confidential Information” not by referring to the parties by name, but by saying that Confidential Information was comprised of certain information that the Disclosing Party makes available to the Receiving Party. So on quick glance, one might think it bound both parties to protect the other’s information.

But one critical feature of the agreement was fatal to Eastern’s claim. The word “Disclosing Party” was defined to include only Herbalife.

But what about other parts of the agreement?

Eastern argued that the parties intended the NDA to be mutually binding by pointing to the title of the agreement, references to the obligations of the “Parties”, and discussion of the remedies section which discussed remedies to which a “non-breaching party” would be entitled. Eastern argued that these instances of language showed that a remedy for breach should not be considered as available only for Herbalife.

Plain definitions prevailed

The court rejected Eastern’s argument, looking at the plain language of the agreement and noting that the general references that Eastern emphasized did not “vitiate” the NDA’s express definitions of “Disclosing Party” and “Confidential Information”.

Herbalife Int’l of America, Inc. v. Eastern Computer Exchange Inc., 2024 WL 1158344 (C.D. Cal., March 18, 2024)

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Website terms and conditions were unenforceable because of fraud

Duick v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 2011 WL 3834740 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. August 31, 2011)

Someone signed plaintiff up through a Toyota website to take part in a “Personality Evaluation.” She got an email with a link to a website, and on the second page that she had to click through, she was presented with the well-known check box next to the words “I have read and agree to the terms and conditions.”

Later plaintiff started getting creepy emails from an unknown male calling himself “Sebastian Bowler” who indicated that he was on a cross-country road trip to come and visit plaintiff. He even listed plaintiff’s physical address. One of the emails had a link to Bowler’s MySpace page, which revealed he “enjoyed drinking alcohol to excess.” A few days later plaintiff got another email from someone purporting to be the manager of the hotel in which Bowler had trashed a room, and attempted to bill plaintiff for the damage.

As one would expect, plaintiff was disturbed by these messages. She finally got an email with a link to a video that said Bowler was a fictional character and that the emails were part of an elaborate prank, all to advertise the Toyota Matrix.

Plaintiff sued Toyota for, among other things, infliction of emotional distress. Toyota moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the online terms and conditions contained an arbitration provision, so the case did not belong in court but before an arbitrator. The court rejected this argument, finding that the terms and conditions were void, because plaintiff’s agreement to them was procured by “fraud in the inception or execution.”

The court found that the terms and conditions led plaintiff to believe that she was going to participate in a personality evaluation and nothing more. A reasonable reader in plaintiff’s position would not have known that she was signing up to be the target of a prank. For example, the terms and conditions were under the heading “Personality Evaluation Terms and Conditions” and made vague and opaque references to terms such as “interactive experience” and a “digital experience.” Simply stated, plaintiff, through no fault of her own, did not know what she was getting herself into.

For these reasons, the court held that the terms and conditions were void, and all the provisions contained in those terms and conditions, including the purported agreement to arbitrate any disputes, did not bind the parties.

Blog post violated nonsolicitation clause in Amway agreement

Amway Global v. Woodward, 2010 WL 3927661 (E.D.Mich. September 30, 2010)

Amway Global went after some of its former distributors in arbitration for, among other things, violating the “Rules of Conduct” which serve as an agreement as to how the distributors (formally known as Independent Business Owners or “IBOs”) operate. Amway claimed that the IBOs violated the Rules of Conduct by soliciting others to leave Amway and join competing enterprises.

The arbitrator found in Amway’s favor, and Amway filed a motion with the court to confirm the award. The court granted the motion.

One of the factual questions was whether one of the IBOs violated the rules against solicitation by blogging about his decision to leave Amway and join another company. One of his posts said “[i]f you knew what I knew, you would do what I do.”

The IBOs argued that this statement did not constitute actionable solicitation because the communication was passive and untargeted, and because there was no evidence that anyone responded to the solicitation by leaving Amway.

The court rejected these arguments. As to the “passive and untargeted” argument, the court observed that:

[C]ommon sense dictates that it is the substance of the message conveyed, and not the medium through which it is transmitted, that determines whether a communication qualifies as a solicitation. The [statement] is readily characterized as an invitation for the reader to follow his lead and join [Amway’s competitor], and this is true despite the diffuse and uncertain readership of the site.

As to the argument based on the fact that no one responded, the court found that the express language of the nonsolicitation clause which prohibited “encourag[ing], solicit[ing], or otherwise attempt[ing] to recruit or persuade any other IBO to compete with” Amway did not turn on the success of those prohibited efforts.

Web host did not breach contract by terminating rude customer

Mehmet v. Add2net, Inc., — N.Y.S.2d —-, 2009 WL 3199876 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. October 8, 2009)

Plaintiff website operator didn’t pay his monthly hosting fees on time. He called the hosting company and said he’d be sending a check, but in the meantime the web host exercised its right under the hosting agreement to suspend Plaintiff’s account for nonpayment. Plaintiff called and left a nasty voicemail, using an obscene word to threaten to sue the hosting company if his website was not reactivated.

In response to this angry voice mail, the web host terminated Plaintiff’s account. He sued for breach of contract. The web host moved to dismiss at the trial court level and the court granted the motion. Plaintiff sought review. On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal.

Of particular importance was a provision in the hosting agreement that incorporated by reference an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP), and provided that any breach of that policy would be grounds for suspension or termination of plaintiff’s account. Under the AUP, plaintiff agreed “not to abuse whether verbally or physically or whether in person, via email or telephone or otherwise … any employee or contractor of [defendant].”

The nonpayment coupled with this violation of the web hosting acceptable use policy undercut Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

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