Online terms of service were not effective to prohibit data scraping

CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 2012 WL 5269213 (E.D. Pa. October 25, 2012)

paint scraping

Plaintiff sued its competitor, another platform for providing online college transfer services. Among other things, plaintiff alleged that defendant breached plaintiff’s online terms of service, violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and was unjustly enriched by copying and “scraping” course catalog information from plaintiff’s service and using that collected data to populate defendant’s own database.

Defendant moved for summary judgment on these claims. The court granted the motion.

Breach of Contract

The court held that defendant’s scraping and collection efforts did not fall within the scope of plaintiff’s online terms of service.

Although certain of defendant’s employees had subscribed to plaintiff’s premium services (and thereby agreed to tems of service that prohibited data scraping), the documents and information defendants used were gathered through a different service. Plaintiffs provided a function called “CataLink”, through which colleges could link website visitors to documents stored on plaintiff’s server. End users clicking on those links would not be presented with any terms of service by which to be bound.

Plaintiffs attempted an unsuccessful workaround on this point, arguing that the terms for the subscription services bound users of all “Services” provided by plaintiff (including the separate CataLink services). The court rejected this argument, finding it possible that a typical user may never even have known he visited a CataLink link. Moreover, the court found, if plaintiff had intended its subscriber agreement to include CataLink, it did not make its intention clear.

Unjust Enrichment

The court held that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim was preempted by the Copyright Act. Plaintiff asserted that defendant was unjustly enriched because it copied and displayed on its website course descriptions from plaintiff’s catalogs, and in doing so derived a financial benefit. And plaintiff argued that the facts in this case differed substantially from those required to state a claim for copyright infringement, in that defendant had misrepresented, or had taken in an underhanded way. But the court found that these elements (misrepresentation and acting underhandedly) did not avoid preemption. Nor did the element of “benefit conferred” defeat preemption, since a copyright infringer always accepts the benefit of the copyrighted work.

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The court found that defendant did not violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, because the documents alleged to have been copied were available to the general public. And since plaintiff obtained the documents using the CataLink service — which, as discussed above was not subject to the terms of service — there were no contractual restrictions to define “without authorization” or “exceed[ing] authorized access” as used in the CFAA.

Image courtesy Flickr user fontplaydotcom under this Creative Commons license.

The day I met Neil Armstrong

I spent an afternoon with Neil Armstrong in July 1985, when I was 10 years old. He was my childhood hero. The day I met him was, up to that point, the biggest day of my life. So it has been particularly poignant for me to learn of his death earlier today.

Back then I was really into — or should I say, obsessed with — space flight and astronomy. And I had some nerd cred. My parents gave me an awesome telescope and I was among the first in my community to spot Halley’s Comet when it came around. I went to Space Camp the summer after Challenger exploded. I built and launched model rockets. I read every book about astronomy in our local library. Inspired by Gus Grissom and by Charlie Walker, NASA astronauts who hailed from my county in Indiana, I was set on being an astrophysicist and traveling into space one day. That determination was what made me resilient (or maybe just oblivious) to the jeers I got when I wore my blue NASA flight suit to school one day in fifth grade.

My parents’ good friend Ned Boyer was a fraternity brother of Neil Armstrong’s at the Phi Delt house at Purdue back in the 50’s. Ned and Neil had stayed in touch over the years, and when Ned saw how much I loved space flight and astronomy, and how I idolized the NASA astronauts, he arranged for our families to travel to Lebanon, Ohio to meet Neil.

We met Neil and his then-wife Janet at the historic Golden Lamb restaurant in Lebanon. We sat at a long table for lunch, with Neil at one head of the table, and me at the corner of the table, at his right hand. I asked him the battery of simple-minded questions that a 10 year old geeky kid would ask, like how he would describe the dust on the moon as his boot sank in. I remember also asking him about his and David Scott’s emergency undocking from the Agena during Gemini 8 — a topic on which I imagine he was interrogated less frequently than Apollo 11. In the years since meeting him, I’ve often reflected on what questions I would ask him from a mature perspective, like how does one deal with the profundity of the singular accomplishment of being the only human in the history of the world to ever have the distinction of being the first to step foot on a celestial body other than the Earth.

After lunch we decided to go see the local YMCA which at that time was either new or newly-renovated. I’m not sure of the details, but I know Neil was involved in that project somehow. Here’s the awesome part of that — I rode in the back seat of his beige station wagon while he drove us there. I remember thinking to myself how incredible it was that I was being transported at that moment by the Commander of the Eagle — the very person who uttered those eternal words, “that’s one small step for [a] man, one giant leap for mankind.” We hung out there at the YMCA for awhile longer. That’s where the picture of him and me you see above was taken.

Neil’s family issued a statement earlier today requesting that we should “honor his example of service, accomplishment and modesty.” To say he was modest is an understatement. Though he was one of the most famous people in the world — and indeed one of the most important people in all of history — he never sought to capitalize on his celebrity.

Today we lost one of the most important historical figures of our age. I put Neil Armstrong’s significance in the same category as that of Christopher Columbus. Until today we were all contemporaries of the man who accomplished one of the most meaningful things ever. Now he precedes us. Godspeed, Neil!

Social media angle on SCOTUS healthcare decision

I’ve seen three interesting social media issues arise in the hours following the Supreme Court’s decision this morning on Obamacare:

1. Premature enunciation and the ensuing bruhaha

In a rush to report on the extremely complex decision, CNN’s website briefly stated that the healthcare law had been overturned. [Screenshot] Folks on Twitter were quick to pounce, and it still seems to be kind of flying under the radar that FOX News’ side-scrolling ticker got it wrong too. The comparisons to Dewey Defeats Truman are obvious. The picture below by @garyhe captures this notion visually.

But there are a couple important differences in modern and social media versus the 1940s.

Because of the faster means to get the word out, there is even more pressure for a media outlet to be the first. (The same kind of pressure, felt by a humble blogger like me to be among the first to analyze the issues herein is making it difficult for me to type right.) And members of mainstream media are not just competing against other mainstream media participants. As @roncoleman tweeted, “[t]he central role of @SCOTUSblog in this discussion is the truly historical event occurring today.” (@SCOTUSblog’s coverage of the decision was driven largely by the work of 81-year-old Lyle Denniston.)

And it’s easy to forget that mistakes in reporting can easily be undone. Unlike the paper in the Dewey Defeats Truman situation, which had to literally stop the presses, reset the type, print out new stacks of papers and physically deliver them hours later, the CNN website was changed immediately with little human effort. And the fact that CNN got it wrong couldn’t have harmed anyone, given that there were millions of commentators on Twitter to instantly lampoon it, thereby drawing attention to the error.

2. It’s not just law professors who can be constitutional scholars

@jonathanwpeters observed the profundity of how the discourse on Twitter had become erudite by simply noting: “June 28, 2012: the day that “Commerce Clause” trended on Twitter.” But maybe that eruditeness is just a facade. @jbtaylor gives us a warning: “Brace yourself. Everyone on Twitter is about to become a Constitutional scholar.”

3. Everyone’s a comedian and all the world’s a comedy club

Probably the best part of the social media response to the decision is the humor. Here are a few of my favorite tweets that look at the farcical side of this:

  • “Remember when John Roberts botched the President’s swearing-in on Inauguration Day? I think they’re all good now.” (by @johnsberman)
  • “I felt a sudden disturbance in the Law, as if millions of nascent law review articles cried out, and were suddenly silenced.” (by @timhwang)
  • “Tea Party just turned into a massive kegger as the last spare change has gone to buy all the beer left in St. Louis ‪#wow‬ (by @mimizhusband)
  • “Now that that’s over who wants to grab a Coke and watch some porn” – Clarence Thomas (by @platypusjones)

Should a person who sends a text to a distracted driver be responsible for the ensuing wreck?

There is an interesting personal injury case pending in New Jersey that highlights an interesting question about responsible use of SMS technology. A guy allegedly hit a motorcycle, severely injuring its two riders, because he was distracted by a text his girlfriend had sent. The motorcycle riders sued the girlfriend who sent the text.

girl sending text message

Even the plaintiffs’ lawyer admits (in this interview) that most people would not be willing to pin responsibility on someone who was not present to cause an accident and injury. But because of the unique facts, namely, that she apparently knew her boyfriend was driving, she became “electronically present” with him in the vehicle.

One of the things the plaintiffs will have to show is that the text proximately caused the accident. In New Jersey, the jury (if the case gets that far) will be asked to find whether the plaintiffs’ injuries are so connected with the negligent actions of the girlfriend that it is reasonable to hold her responsible. Answering that will require the jury to examine whether it was foreseeable that her sending the text would cause that wreck.

What do you think?

Photo credit Ed Yourdon under this license.

Impostor bids in online auction sufficient allegation of interrupted service under CFAA

Yoder v. Equipmentfacts, 2011 WL 2433504 (N.D.Ohio June 14, 2011)

[This is a post by Jackson Cooper. Jackson graduated from DePaul University College of Law in May 2011 with a certificate in intellectual property and information technology law. Jackson also recently passed the Kentucky bar exam and will begin practicing soon. You can find him online at jacksonccooper.com or follow him on Twitter at @jacksoncooper.]

The plaintiffs here were an auction company and a firm employed to assist them with running a private online auction.  They sued the defendant, a firm previously employed by the auction company to assist them with running online auctions.  The plaintiffs  alleged violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030, stemming from the defendant’s unauthorized access to a private auction conducted by the plaintiffs after the defendant’s relationship with the auction company was terminated.  According to the plaintiffs, the defendant made unauthorized access to the auction system using an administrative user name and password to post negative comments, and later impersonated a customer in order to place fraudulent bids as that customer.  The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant, posing as a customer, won auctions for over one million dollars of equipment and failed to pay on those winning bids.

The defendant asked the court to dismiss the CFAA claim, challenging the plaintiffs’ pleadings on the issue of “loss” as defined by the CFAA. The CFAA defines “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.” Plaintiffs alleged lost commission resulting from the defendant’s fraudulent bids and resulting failed auctions.  Defendant claimed that the small scale sabotage as at issue here did not satisfy the “interruption of service” requirement, and therefore could not support the claimed violation of the CFAA.

The court, noting the lack of a definition of “interruption of service” in the statute and the lack of case law dealing with disruptions of this type, treated the issue as one of first impression.  The court concluded that the disruption alleged here was sufficient to support the “interruption of service” requirement in the CFAA.

The court found that the defendant’s alleged “intentional disruption of even a portion of the online auction” constituted an interruption of the service of the site. Although the auction system was not taken offline by defendant’s alleged activities, the court found that thwarting individual transactions and the resulting denial of service to plaintiffs and their customers was an interruption as envisioned by the statute.

NLRB’s Facebook firing decision had little to do with Facebook

Hispanics United of Buffalo, Case No. 3-CA-27872 (NLRB, September 2, 2011)

Folks are talking about the decision handed down by an Adminstrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) last week, finding that a nonprofit employer violated federal law by terminating five employees over a Facebook status update and comments thereto. It is an inherently intriguing case because, as Eric Meyer points out, this is the first time the NLRB has actually issued a ruling that employees were wrongfully fired over Facebook content.

But if you read the decision [PDF], you will see that the NLRB’s decision does not turn on the fact that the communications among the terminated employees took place on Facebook. I am no expert in NLRB matters, but from what I can tell, the ALJ’s analysis is a straightforward look at whether the posting and comments were “concerted activity” which is protected by the National Labor Relations Act.

Here’s a skeletal outline of the analysis:

  • It is an unfair labor practice for employers to, among other things, restrain employees from engaging in “concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”
  • “Concerted activities” are those engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, not solely by one employee alone, though a single employee’s activities to enlist the support of other employees is protected.
  • For there to be a violation, an empolyer must know that the activities were concerted.

In this case, the ALJ found that the terminated employees, by communicating on Facebook, were taking a first step towards taking group action to defend themselves against the accusations they could reasonably believe [another employee] was going to make to management.” The termination prevented them from taking further group action, and the fact that they were fired as a batch tended to show that the employer knew the activity was concerted. So this was thus an unfair labor practice.

If anything, the fact that the communications were on Facebook — during non-work hours and on the employees’ own computers — fortified the claim that the termination was improper. An employer can argue that employee misconduct during the course of otherwise protected activity can be “so opprobrius as to lose protection.” Among the factors the NLRB is to consider in this “opprobriousness” test is the place of the discussion. The communications on Facebook, although maybe not good for the employer’s PR, were separate from work hours and facilities, so as to help disqualify them from being “misconduct.”

Lost sales were not “loss” under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

CustomGuide v. CareerBuilder, LLC, 2011 WL 3809768 (N.D.Ill. August 24, 2011)

Plaintiff and defendant had discussed a licensing arrangement whereby defendant would provide certain of plaintiff’s materials online. The parties never entered into that agreement. But plaintiff claimed that defendant went ahead and accessed the materials stored on plaintiff’s computer system, and thereby caused plaintiff to miss out on certain sales in the business to business marketplace for the materials.

So plaintiff sued, alleging a variety of claims, including a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Defendant moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion.

The CFAA defines a “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11).

The court looked to the case of Cassetica Software v. Computer Sciences Corp., 2009 WL 1703015, (N.D.Ill. June 18, 2009) which explained that “[w]ith respect to ‘loss’ under the CFAA, other courts have uniformly found that economic costs unrelated to computer systems do not fall within the statutory definition of the term.” Rather, the purported loss “must relate to the investigation or repair of a computer system following a violation that caused impairment or unavailability of data.” For these reasons, the court in Cassetica Software held that lost revenues that were not related to the impairment of a computer system were not recoverable under the CFAA.

In this case, the court found that plaintiff did not allege any facts connecting its purported “loss” to an interruption of service of its computer systems. Instead, the complaint described an economic loss of revenues related plaintiff’s making business to business sales. Because such economic losses do not fall within the definition of “loss” under the CFAA, the court tossed the CFAA claim.

Court won’t let marijuana activist change his legal name to njweedman.com

In re Robert Edward Forchion, Jr., 2011 WL 3834929, (Cal.App. 2 Dist. August 31, 2011)

A long time marijuana activist (who now self-identifies as a “marijuana capitalist”) asked a California court to legally change his name to match the domain name of his website — njweedman.com. The court denied the request.

The court gave three reasons why it would not allow the name change:

  • A name change would last indefinitely, but a domain name could expire or be lost. Therafter, people might be confused.
  • The name change would associate the petitioner’s legal name with a website that advocates illegal activities, and that should not be allowed.
  • The petitioner tried to change his name in New Jersey back in 2001 but failed. The California court, looking to principles of “comity,” went along with the New Jersey Court.

At least we know Sunshine Megatron is not as controversial.

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