Trademarks – Page 3 – Attorney Evan Brown

October 21, 2019 Trademarks

Cost of domain name was relevant in establishing secondary meaning of trademark

In a trademark dispute between two companies in the real estate space, the court was called upon – at the summary judgment stage – to determine if there was a triable issue as to whether plaintiff’s STOCKDALE mark was not merely descriptive but instead had acquired distinctiveness.

Defendants had argued that plaintiff’s case failed because plaintiff did not have a protectable mark. Plaintiff countered that its STOCKDALE mark, which it had used for 30 years and which the court found was primarily merely a surname, had acquired distinctiveness. Guided by the principles in the case of Viacom Int’l v. IJR Capital Investments, LLC, 891 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. 2018) (the Krusty Krab case), the court examined, concerning plaintiff’s mark:

length and manner of use of the mark or trade dress,
volume of sales,
amount and manner of advertising,
nature of use of the mark or trade dress in newspapers and magazines,
consumer-survey evidence,
direct consumer testimony, and
the defendant’s intent in copying the [mark].

It determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the mark was protectable as one that had acquired distinctiveness. Interestingly, the plaintiff had not kept track of its advertising expenditures, but did introduce evidence that it had paid more than $50,000 to acquire the domain name stockdale(.)com. The court found that information relevant to inquiry.

Stockdale Investment Group, Inc. v. Stockdale Capital Partners, LLC, No. 18-2949, 2019 WL 5191526 (S.D. Tex., October 15, 2019)

About the Author: Evan Brown is a Chicago technology and intellectual property attorney. Call Evan at (630) 362-7237, send email to ebrown [at] internetcases.com, or follow him on Twitter @internetcases. Read Evan’s other blog, UDRP Tracker, for information about domain name disputes.

October 11, 2019 Cybersquatting, Trademarks

Yahoo successor does not prevail in bid to obtain ymobile.com domain

Oath, Inc., the successor to Yahoo! Inc., filed an action under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) against a domainer that acquired ymobile.com earlier in 2019. The split 3-member FORUM panel denied the complaint, finding that Oath failed to demonstrate that the respondent lacked rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and failed to show it registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith.

On the question of rights or legitimate interests, the panel found that the respondent’s purchase and sale of the domain name comprised of the generic term “mobile” prefixed by “y” was legitimate, so long as the respondent did not intend to capitalize on Oath’s YMOBILE mark, which is registered in Japan. The panel accepted the respondent’s assertion that it had no notice of the YMOBILE mark prior to acquiring the disputed domain name.

Regarding bad faith registration and use, the panel similarly found that the respondent was not targeting the Y! or YMOBILE mark, and that it had no knowledge of the YMOBILE mark’s existence prior to acquiring the disputed domain name.

One of the panelists dissented, arguing that the disputed domain name should have been transferred. He emphasized how the respondent was using the disputed domain name – which the panel found was identical to a mark the complainant owns – to display pay-per-click ads for goods and services competitive with the complainant’s. Some of the ads, for example, were for online games and downloadable software. And on the issue of bad faith, this panel member observed that although the respondent claimed to not know of the complainant’s YMOBILE mark, a simple web search would have revealed it.

Oath Inc. v. Mira Hold, No. FA 1909001858330 (Forum, October 8, 2019)

October 9, 2019 Trademarks

Seventh Circuit requires trademark defendants to pay plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees

Court held this was an “exceptional case” and that trial court judge should have awarded plaintiff its attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act.

While it is fairly common for successful litigants in copyright cases to be awarded the attorneys’ fees they incur in bringing or defending the case, that fee-shifting is not as common in trademark cases. There is a higher standard that must be met in trademark cases – the prevailing party must show that it has won an “exceptional case”. That recently occurred in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff home remodeling company and defendants – a manufacturer of storm shelters and one of its owners individually – found themselves in a trademark dispute over rights to use a mark plaintiff had developed to use as a distributor of defendants’ storm shelters.

Defendants disregarded on oral license agreement it had with plaintiff and used the mark for years outside the territorial scope of the license. The evidence showed that defendants intended to just buy the mark in the event plaintiff noticed defendants’ out-of-scope use.

Plaintiff indeed noticed and sued. The trademark infringement case went to trial. The trial court – though it found in plaintiff’s favor on the liability question and awarded more than $17 million in damages to plaintiff – declined to order defendants to pay plaintiff’s attorneys fees. Plaintiff sought review of the denial of attorney’s fees with the Seventh Circuit.

On appeal, the court reversed and remanded. It found that the trial court’s findings made this an “exceptional case” and thus appropriate for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Specifically, the court found that defendants’ conduct was willful, egregious and intentional. Likewise, defendants had acted in bad faith and maliciously, and refused to cease infringing activity, causing plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.

4SEMO.com Inc. v. Southern Illinois Storm Shelters, Inc., Nos. 18-1998 & 18-2095 (7th Cir., October 7, 2019)

December 13, 2018 Defamation, First Amendment, Trademarks

Restraining order entered against website that encouraged contacting children of plaintiff’s employees

Plaintiff sued defendant (who was an unhappy customer of plaintiff) under the Lanham Act (for trademark infringement) and for defamation. Defendant had registered a domain name using plaintiff’s company name and had set up a website that, among other things, he used to impersonate plaintiff’s employees and provide information about employees’ family members, some of whom were minors.

Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order and the court granted the motion.

The Website

The website was structured and designed in a way that made it appear as though it was affiliated with plaintiff. For example, it included a copyright notice identifying plaintiff as the owner. It also included allegedly false statements about plaintiff. For example, it included the following quotation, which was attributed to plaintiff’s CEO:

Well of course we engage in bad faith tactics like delaying and denying our policy holders [sic] valid claims. How do you think me [sic], my key executive officers, and my board members stay so damn rich. [sic]

The court found that plaintiff had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims.

Lanham Act Claim

It found that defendant used plaintiff’s marks for the purpose of confusing the public by creating a website that looked as though it was a part of plaintiff’s business operations. This was evidenced by, for example, the inclusion of a copyright notice on the website.

Defamation

On the defamation claim, the court found that the nature of the statements about plaintiff, plaintiff’s assertion that they were false, and the allegation that the statements were posted on the internet sufficed to satisfy the first two elements of a defamation claim, namely, that they were false and defamatory statements pertaining to the plaintiff and were unprivileged publications to a third party. The allegations in the complaint were also sufficient to indicate that defendant “negligently disregarded the falsity of the statements.”

Furthermore, the statements on the website concerned the way that plaintiff processed its insurance claims, which related to the business of the company and the profession of plaintiff’s employees who handled the processing of claims. Therefore, the final element was also satisfied.

First Amendment Limitations

The court’s limitation in the TRO is interesting to note. To the extent that plaintiff sought injunctive relief directed at defendant’s speech encouraging others to contact the company and its employees with complaints about the business, whether at the workplace or at home, or at public “ad hominem” comments, the court would not grant the emergency relief that was sought.

The court also would not prohibit defendant from publishing allegations that plaintiff had engaged in fraudulent or improper business practices, or from publishing the personally identifying information of plaintiff’s employees, officers, agents, and directors. Plaintiff’s submission failed to demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction how such injunctive relief would not unlawfully impair defendant’s First Amendment rights.

The did, however, enjoin defendant from encouraging others to contact the children and other family members of employees about plaintiff’s business practices because contact of that nature had the potential to cause irreparable emotional harm to those family members, who have no employment or professional relationship with defendant.

Symetra Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 2018 WL 6338723(D. Maine, Dec. 4, 2018)

November 28, 2018 Cybersquatting, Trademarks

UDRP Panel found no bad faith, but gave the Complainant additional opportunity to prove its case

[This post originally appeared on UDRP Tracker.]

The Complainant established its business beginning in March 2018 and sought to acquire the disputed domain name <zoyo.com> through communications with the Respondent facilitated by the registrar. After the Respondent demanded $10,000 for the disputed domain name – which was the same amount the Respondent claimed to have paid for the disputed domain name “a few years ago” – the Complainant sought relief from a single-member WIPO Panel under the UDRP.

The Panel denied the Complaint, finding that the Complainant failed to show bad faith use and registration under the UDRP.

The evidence on this point was controverted. The Respondent claimed (not in a formal response but through the above-noted negotiations) that he acquired the disputed domain name years ago, and the WhoIs data showed it was first registered in 2002. But the Complainant – looking to the “last updated” field in the WhoIs data, claimed that the Respondent acquired it in April 2018.

The Panel found that “failed to establish that the Respondent’s statement in response to the Complainant’s enquiry that it acquired the disputed domain name ‘some years ago’ [was] false.”

It further noted that the Complainant stated that it required the disputed domain name for use as part of the expansion and development of its business. The Panel surmised that this could indicate that the Complaint was filed as a part of the Complainant’s business expansion plan and perhaps indicated that the Complainant did not fully understand the nature and purpose of the UDRP.

So the Panel’s decision left open the possibility of further action if the facts would support them. The Panel determined that if the Complainant could prove that the Respondent did not acquire the disputed domain name until April 2018, at a time when there was considerable activity and perhaps publicity in relation to the establishment of the Complainant’s group, that might paint a different picture. Accordingly, on the basis of the evidence before the Panel on the present record, the Panel denied the Complaint but without prejudice to the filing of a new Complaint should evidence become available to support the Complainant’s contentions concerning the Respondent’s identity and acquisition of the disputed domain name.

Zoyo Capital Limited v. A. Zoyo, WIPO Case No. D2018-2234

November 26, 2018 Anonymity, Litigation, Trademarks

Anonymous online trademark infringer can be identified through subpoena to domain registrar

Plaintiff trademark owner noticed that an unknown party was using plaintiff’s mark to sell email templates online without plaintiff’s authorization. After the unknown infringer’s domain name registrar (the case does not say whether it was also the web host) refused to take down the allegedly infringing content, plaintiff filed suit against the “John Doe” defendant. Since it needed to learn the identity of the defendant to move the case forward, plaintiff asked the court for early discovery that would permit plaintiff to send a subpoena to the registrar that would compel the registrar to identify its customer.

The court granted the motion for leave to take early discovery. It applied the standard set out in OpenMind Solutions, Inc. v. Does 1-39, 2011 WL 4715200 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011) (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999)), which requires that prior to early discovery being permitted, a plaintiff must show:

Plaintiff can identify the missing party with sufficient specificity such that the court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal court;
Plaintiff has identified all previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant;
Plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss; and
Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a reasonable likelihood of being able to identify defendant through discovery such that service of process would be possible.

On the first factor, plaintiff had alleged that the Doe defendant owned or was using the specified domain name associated with the offending website to sell email templates using plaintiff’s trademark.

As for the second factor, plaintiff had contacted the domain name registrar, and asked that the information be taken down, but the registrar refused to do so. The domain name alone was not sufficient for plaintiff to identify the Doe defendant, and plaintiff had no other means to identify the Doe defendant besides the registrar’s record which it refused to provide without a subpoena.

Regarding the third factor, plaintiff made the required showing by alleging that it holds a valid trademark for its mark that the Doe defendant used to sell products on the offending website.

And concerning the fourth factor, the plaintiff had alleged that the registrar was the registrar for the domain name associated with the offending website and that it had stated it would pass the complaint information on to the website owner. The court found that plaintiff had thus demonstrated that a subpoena to the registrar should reveal the identity of the Doe defendant.

One should note this court’s willingness to permit early discovery as being in contrast to another court’s recent apparent disdain for a copyright troll plaintiff seeking the identity of an anonymous online infringer.

Marketo, Inc. v. Doe, 2018 WL 6046464 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2018)

October 23, 2017 Cybersquatting, Litigation, Trademarks

Court orders transfer of domain name at preliminary injunction stage of trademark case

Plaintiff sued a competitor under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(d) (“ACPA”)) and brought other trademark-related claims concerning the competitor’s alleged online scam of selling infringing nutritional supplement products. Plaintiff also sued the domain name privacy protection service Namecheap, which the competitor had used to register the domain name. As part of the order granting plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the court ordered Namecheap to transfer the domain name to plaintiff.

The court noted that a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” and that the “traditional purpose of a preliminary injunction is to protect the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of the lawsuit.” Given these parameters, one may be reasonably surprised that the court went so far as to transfer the domain name before the case could be taken all the way through trial. Usually the transfer of the domain name is part of the final remedy awarded in a cybersquatting case, whether under the ACPA or the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.

The opinion did not address the issue of whether the domain name transfer prior to trial might go further than to “protect the status quo”. It would seem the court could have just as easily protected the status quo by ordering the domain name not be used. The court apparently found the evidence to be drastically in favor of plaintiff. And since the defendant-competitor did not show up for the hearing, plaintiff’s evidence went unrebutted.

Nutramax Laboratories, Inc. v. Nutra Max Labs, Inc., 2017 WL 4707447 (D.S.C. October 20, 2017)

Court keeps door open on cabinet retailer’s domain name lawsuit

acpa

A guy named Plaza worked for defendant cabinet retailer for a few years and then left to start a competing business called 411 Kitchen Cabinets. Defendant seems to have not liked the new competition and registered the domain name <411kitchencabinet.com>. This allegedly caused confusion among consumers and negatively impacted the new business.

So the new company sued in federal court alleging claims under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection (15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)) (“ACPA”) and for trademark dilution. Defendant moved to dismiss. The court dismissed the dilution claim but allowed the ACPA claim to move forward.

Not like “Budweiser, Camel and Barbie”

To properly plead dilution, plaintiff was required to allege, among other things, that its mark was “famous”. Under the federal trademark law – the Lanham Act – a mark is “famous” when “it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).

The court found that plaintiff had not alleged enough facts to show fame. In the court’s view, at most, plaintiff had alleged that its mark “ha[d] enjoyed a good name and reputation in the cabinets, countertops, vanities and granite industry.” That allegation did not establish the requisite fame required for a dilution claim and fell “well-short of alleging that Plaintiff’s mark [was] on the same scale as marks like Budweiser, Camel, and Barbie,” citing Brain Pharma, LLC v. Scalini, 858 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

Yes on the cybersquatting claim

But the ACPA claim fared better. The court found plaintiff’s complaint sufficient to allege that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that its use of its mark in commerce prior to the registration of the disputed domain name made the mark distinctive and entitled to protection. It also successfully pled that defendant’s domain name was confusingly similar to plaintiff’s mark. And the court also found that plaintiff successfully alleged that defendant had a bad faith to intent in registering and using the domain name. Key to this last portion was the fact that plaintiff alleged that defendant used the domain name to divert customers to its main website for commercial gain.

411 Kitchen Cabinets LLC v. King of Kitchen and Granite Inc., 2016 WL 7335840 (S.D. Fla. October 25, 2016)

See also:

September 16, 2016 Cybersquatting, Trademarks

When can you use a competitor’s trademark in a domain name?

The recent case of XPO CNW, Inc. v. R+L Carriers, Inc. coming out of a federal court in Michigan tells the interesting story of one company opportunistically using its competitor’s trademark in a domain name to set up an employee recruiting website. The decision sketches out certain circumstances when this practice passes legal muster.

23804702986_5e19fb1b98_b

The parties to the dispute are major trucking lines. If you have driven on any highways in the United States, you have no doubt seen 18-wheelers bearing the trademarks of the parties involved in this case. In late 2015, plaintiff XPO acquired Con-Way Freight. Shortly thereafter, defendant R+L launched a website targeting Con-Way’s employees using the domain name conwaylayoff.com. The website included the following statement:

Were you laid off from Con-way? Don’t worry about the XPO Logistics acquisition, when one door closes another opens. R+L Carriers is hiring today….Turn your valuable years of knowledge and experience into a new career with R+L Carriers, which was named a Top National/Multiregional LRL Carrier in Logistics Management magazine’s 2015 Quest for Quality Awards. R+L Carriers launched Conwaylayoff.com to inform those employees that may have been affected by the recent acquisition of Con-way Freight, of similar opportunities that we have where they may be able to put their skills to work.

Plaintiff sued for trademark infringement and for cybersquatting under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”). Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the motion.

The court found there to be no sufficient allegations of trademark infringement because the documents before the court showed there was no likelihood of confusion as to the origin of defendant’s services. The language on the website (quoted above) contradicted plaintiff’s assertions of likely confusion.

On the ACPA claim, the court found there was no evidence that defendant used the domain name with a bad faith intent to profit.

The court compared this situation with the one in the case of Lucas Nursery and Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2004). In Lucas Nursery, there was no evidence that defendant intended to divert consumers from the plaintiff’s online location. Nor was there evidence that defendant ever sought to mislead consumers with regard to the site’s sponsorship. The site explicitly stated that it was established for the purposes of relaying defendant’s experience with the plaintiff’s nursery. Moreover, there was no offer to sell the site to plaintiff, and no other indicators of bad faith existed, such as providing misleading contact information or acquiring batches of additional domain names.

In this case, it was undisputed that defendant set up a web site and used plaintiff’s trademark in the domain name. But this was insufficient to establish that defendant operated in bad faith. Plaintiff did not allege that defendant ever offered to sell the domain name to plaintiff. Nor did it allege that defendant acquired other suspect domain names. Instead, plaintiff offered the court a barebones recital of the statutory language, stating that defendant registered and has used the domain name without plaintiff’s authorization and with bad faith, to profit from plaintiff’s trademark, and that the infringing domain name directed or redirected to a website controlled by defendant, who profited from its use. The court found this to be insufficient to survive the relevant pleading standard. Accordingly the court granted the motion for partial judgment on the pleadings concerning this claim.

XPO CNW, Inc. v. R+L Carriers, Inc., No. 16-10391, 2016 WL 4801283 (E.D. Mich. September 14, 2016)

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Jean-Pierre Magnan under this Creative Commons license.

June 22, 2016 Trademarks

Six things business owners should know about trademarks

#1 – Trademark law protects your brand.

shield

Trademarks are intellectual property. The different categories of intellectual property can be confusing, and as you are identifying and evaluating the different legal issues your business faces, you should seek to understand the role that each category plays. That way you can determine where you should focus your resources to cover the company’s greatest needs. Every business has trademark needs. Trademark law gives exclusive rights to providers of goods and services to use the company’s distinctive marks in connection with the company’s goods and services. A trademark (or a service mark, collectively “marks”) identify the source of goods and services. So while the company is the one that may claim rights in the trademark, it is useful to remember that the ultimate reason for trademark protection is to keep members of the consuming public from being confused about where the goods or services come from.

#2 – Registration is not necessary, but it is a good idea.

seal

At least in the U.S., trademark rights arise from using the mark in commerce. This means a couple of different things. For one, the law will provide your company with exclusive rights to use a certain mark in connection with certain goods or services by virtue of your having used the mark in commerce in connection with those goods or services. But there are limits to this protection — you can only claim that exclusivity in the geographic area in which you’ve actually used the mark. Getting a registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office helps you in this area. Once the USPTO awards your company a registration certificate for the mark, you are the presumed owner of the exclusive rights to that mark in connection with those goods and services anywhere in the United States, regardless of where you have actually done business. A registration carries with it other benefits as well — you can use the “circle R” designation with the mark, and your registration serves to help give notice to (i.e., warn) other companies who might consider adopting the same or similar mark.

#3 – Descriptive words and phrases generally cannot be trademarks.

descriptive

Trademark law does not allow a company to claim exclusive rights on words or phrases that merely describe the product or some characteristic of it. This is a common issue that companies face when deciding on a mark for adoption and registration. Descriptive terms are good in that they convey to the consuming public what the product is all about. But descriptive terms are to be avoided in that they are not distinctive. Unless a mark is distinctive, the trademark laws do not recognize it as a trademark or service mark. A mark can be “inherently distinctive” in a number of ways. It may be a made up word (e.g., Kodak), “arbitrary” in that the original meaning of the word does not correspond with the products (e.g., Apple for computers), or “suggestive” – sort of describing the product but requiring a step in imagination (e.g., Beautyrest for mattresses). Or the mark can be a design. Marks can become distinctive over time (usually after 5 years of use). This is known as “acquired distinctiveness.”

#4 – Smart business owners do trademark clearance.

clearance

Trademark clearance is the process that a company goes through before actually using or seeking to register a mark. The goal is to become reasonably sure that the use of the proposed mark will not put you at high risk of infringing someone else’s mark. Clearance also helps prevent wasting resources on a trademark application that will get rejected by the USPTO because there is already a similar mark that someone else has applied for or registered. Clearance usually has a couple steps. Many companies have their trademark counsel perform “knockout searches” to identify any obvious risks of conflict. This can be as simple as doing a web search and a search of the USPTO database for marks that look and sound the same and are for similar goods or services. Before going all out on adopting and seeking to register a mark, however, it is a good idea to have trademark counsel perform a comprehensive search and advise on the results. A number of parties offer comprehensive search services. The key question in trademark clearance is likelihood of confusion. A mark owner needs to be reasonably sure that using the proposed mark in commerce will not cause confusion among the confusing public as to the source of the goods or services offered under the mark.

#5 – Trademark fair use is a thing.

starbucks

In some circumstances a company can use another company’s trademark without much risk of infringement. Generally this falls under the heading of “fair use.” Classic fair use is when one company uses another’s mark in just a descriptive sense. For example, a laundromat may say in its advertising that it is next door to the Burger King. In that case, the use of Burger King is not an infringement. Nominative fair use is when a company uses another mark to describe some characteristic of that mark. A commercial for Toyota, for example, may use the Honda trademark for purposes of comparing the two product lines.

#6 – Use it or lose it. Protect it or lose it.

abandoned

Trademark rights come from the company’s use of the mark, and there is always a risk that those rights might be abandoned. If a company stops using a mark, a court may find that it has abandoned its rights, and another company would be free to adopt and use the mark. The USPTO requires that documents be filed every few years to ensure that marks that are listed as registered remain in use. If a company does not take appropriate steps to ensure its mark is distinctive in the marketplace, it can similarly be found to have abandoned its rights. So mark owners should do some “policing” to see that there no one else uses a confusingly similar mark on similar products. If the company discovers such use, it must be diligent in seeking to get the other company to stop, through sending a cease and desist letter or through litigation when appropriate.

Food&Beverage photo courtesy schatz under this Creative Commons license.

Coffee sign photo courtesy Aaron Gustafson under this Creative Commons license.

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago advising clients on matters dealing with trademarks, copyright, technology, the internet and new media.