Category: Social Media

January 31, 2018 Section 230, Social Media

Ninth Circuit upholds decision in favor of Twitter in terrorism case

Tamara Fields and Heather Creach, representing the estates of their late husbands and joined by Creach’s two minor children, sued Twitter, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged that the platform knowingly provided material support to ISIS, enabling the terrorist organization to carry out the 2015 attack in Jordan that killed their loved ones. The lawsuit sought damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), which allows U.S. nationals injured by terrorism to seek compensation.

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant knowingly and recklessly provided ISIS with access to its platform, including tools such as direct messaging. Plaintiffs argued that these services allowed ISIS to spread propaganda, recruit followers, raise funds, and coordinate operations, ultimately contributing to the attack. Defendant moved to dismiss the case, arguing that plaintiffs failed to show a direct connection between its actions and the attack. Defendant also invoked Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which shields platforms from liability for content created by users.

The district court agreed with defendant and dismissed the case, finding that plaintiffs had not established proximate causation under the ATA. Plaintiffs appealed, but the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal. The appellate court ruled that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a direct link between defendant’s alleged support and the attack. While plaintiffs showed that ISIS used defendant’s platform for various purposes, the court found no evidence connecting those activities to the specific attack in Jordan. The court emphasized that the ATA requires a clear, direct relationship between defendant’s conduct and the harm suffered.

The court did not address defendant’s arguments under Section 230, as the lack of proximate causation was sufficient to resolve the case. Accordingly, this decision helped clarify the legal limits of liability for platforms under the ATA and highlighted the challenges of holding technology companies accountable for how their services are used by third parties.

Three Reasons Why This Case Matters:

  • Sets the Bar for Proximate Cause: The ruling established that a direct causal link is essential for liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act.
  • Limits Platform Liability: The decision underscores the difficulty of holding online platforms accountable for misuse of their services by bad actors.
  • Reinforces Section 230’s Role: Although not directly addressed, the case highlights the protections Section 230 offers to tech companies.

Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018)

December 15, 2017 First Amendment, Social Media

Pastor’s First Amendment rights affected parole conditions barring social media use

Plaintiff – a Baptist minister on parole in California – sued several parole officials, arguing that conditions placed on his parole violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Among the contested restrictions was a prohibition on plaintiff accessing social media. Plaintiff claimed this restriction infringed on both his right to free speech and his right to freely exercise his religion. Plaintiff asked the court for a preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of this condition. The court ultimately sided with plaintiff, ruling that the social media ban was unconstitutional.

The Free Speech challenge

Plaintiff argued that the parole condition prevented him from sharing his religious message online. As a preacher, he relied on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to post sermons, connect with congregants who could not attend services, and expand his ministry by engaging with other pastors. The social media ban, plaintiff claimed, silenced him in a space essential for modern communication.

The court agreed, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Packingham v. North Carolina, which struck down a law barring registered sex offenders from using social media. In Packingham, the Court emphasized that social media platforms are akin to a modern public square and are vital for exercising free speech rights. Similarly, the court in this case found that the blanket prohibition on social media access imposed by the parole conditions was overly broad and not narrowly tailored to address specific risks or concerns.

The court noted that plaintiff’s past offenses, which occurred decades earlier, did not involve social media or the internet, undermining the justification for such a sweeping restriction. While public safety was a legitimate concern, the court emphasized that parole conditions must be carefully tailored to avoid unnecessary burdens on constitutional rights.

The Free Exercise challenge

Plaintiff also argued that the social media ban interfered with his ability to practice his religion. He asserted that posting sermons online and engaging with his congregation through social media were integral parts of his ministry. By prohibiting social media use, the parole condition restricted his ability to preach and share his faith beyond the physical boundaries of his church.

The court found this argument compelling. Religious practice is not confined to in-person settings, and plaintiff demonstrated that social media was a vital tool for his ministry. The court noted that barring a preacher from using a key means of sharing religious teachings imposed a unique burden on religious activity. Drawing on principles from prior Free Exercise Clause cases, the court held that the parole condition was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, as it broadly prohibited access to all social media regardless of its religious purpose.

The court’s decision

The court granted plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that he was likely to succeed on his claims under both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The ruling allowed plaintiff to use social media during the litigation, while acknowledging the government’s legitimate interest in monitoring parolees. The court encouraged less restrictive alternatives, such as targeted supervision or limiting access to specific sites that posed risks, rather than a blanket ban.

Three reasons why this case matters:

Intersection of Speech and Religion: The case highlights how digital tools are essential for both free speech and the practice of religion, especially for individuals sharing messages with broader communities.

Limits on Blanket Restrictions: The ruling reaffirms that government-imposed conditions, such as parole rules, must be narrowly tailored to avoid infringing constitutional rights.

Modern Application of First Amendment Rights: By referencing Packingham, the court acknowledged the evolving role of social media as a platform for public discourse and religious expression.

Manning v. Powers, 281 F. Supp. 3d 953 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2017)

January 20, 2017 Social Media

Ownership of domain names and social media accounts a key issue in case

Plaintiff sued defendant for unauthorized use of domain names and social media accounts. Plaintiff asked the court to declare its rights to these digital assets and to hold defendant accountable for trademark infringement and other claims. The court decided to allow some claims to proceed while dismissing others based on New York law’s treatment of intangible property.

Plaintiff, a luxury grooming and fragrance company operating under the name MiN New York, hired defendant, Mindy Yang, through her company Superego Management LLC, to manage marketing and social media efforts. After the business relationship ended, plaintiff alleged that defendant retained control of website domains and social media accounts. Defendant allegedly redirected these assets to promote its new business, even using plaintiff’s accounts to advertise its own events.

Defendant argued that the claims for replevin, conversion, and trespass should be dismissed because domain names and social media accounts are intangible and not considered property under New York law. Defendant also sought dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, asserting that as an independent contractor, it did not owe fiduciary obligations to plaintiff.

The court partially agreed with defendant. It dismissed the trespass claim, finding that plaintiff failed to show harm to the online assets themselves. However, the court allowed plaintiff’s claims for replevin and conversion to proceed, ruling that domain names and social media accounts can qualify as property under New York law. The court recognized that these assets were crucial to plaintiff’s business and plausibly alleged to have been wrongfully controlled by defendant.

On the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the court ruled in plaintiff’s favor. The court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged that defendant, by accessing sensitive accounts, using a corporate credit card, and managing key aspects of plaintiff’s marketing, owed fiduciary duties despite being an independent contractor. This established that defendant had a responsibility to act in plaintiff’s best interests.

Three reasons why this case matters:

  • Addresses rights to digital assets: The court’s decision tends to confirm that domain names and social media accounts can be considered property under New York law.
  • Defines fiduciary duties for contractors: The ruling clarifies that independent contractors can owe fiduciary obligations when entrusted with significant responsibilities.
  • Offers a blueprint for online disputes: This case sets important standards for businesses seeking to reclaim control over misappropriated digital assets.

Salonclick LLC v. Superego Management LLC, 2017 WL 239379 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017).

August 12, 2016 Section 230, Social Media

Twitter avoids liability in terrorism lawsuit

Update 1/31/2018: The Ninth Circuit upheld the court’s decision discussed below.

The families of two U.S. contractors killed in Jordan sued Twitter, accusing the platform of providing material support to the terrorist organization ISIS. Plaintiffs alleged that by allowing ISIS to create and maintain Twitter accounts, the company violated the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). Plaintiffs further claimed this support enabled ISIS to recruit, fundraise, and promote extremist propaganda, ultimately leading to the deaths of the contractors. The lawsuit aimed to hold Twitter responsible for the actions of ISIS and to penalize it for facilitating the organization’s digital presence.

Twitter moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) at 47 U.S.C. §230. Section 230 provides immunity to internet platforms from being treated as the publisher or speaker of content posted by third parties. The court had to decide whether Twitter’s role in allowing ISIS to use its platform made it liable for the consequences of ISIS’s acts.

The court dismissed the case, finding that Section 230 shielded Twitter from liability. The court ruled that plaintiffs’ claims attempted to treat Twitter as the publisher of content created by ISIS, which is precisely the type of liability Section 230 was designed to prevent. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish a plausible connection, or proximate causation, between Twitter’s actions and the deaths. Importantly, in the court’s view, plaintiffs could not demonstrate that ISIS’s use of Twitter directly caused the attack in Jordan or that the shooter had interacted with ISIS content on the platform.

The court further addressed plaintiffs’ argument regarding private messages sent through Twitter’s direct messaging feature. It ruled that these private communications were also protected under Section 230, as the law applies to all publishing activities, whether public or private.

Three reasons why this case matters:

  • Expanding the scope of Section 230: The case reinforced the broad immunity provided to tech companies under Section 230, including their handling of controversial or harmful content.
  • Clarifying proximate causation in ATA claims: The ruling highlighted the challenges of proving a direct causal link between a platform’s operations and acts of terrorism.
  • Balancing tech innovation and accountability: The decision underscored the ongoing debate about how to balance the benefits of open platforms with the need for accountability in preventing misuse.

Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964 (N.D. Cal., August 10, 2016).

May 31, 2016 Section 230, Social Media

Immunity denied for website that failed to warn of dangerous activity

Jane Doe sued Internet Brands, the owner of the website Model Mayhem, for negligence after she was lured into a trap by two criminals who used the site to target victims. Plaintiff asked the court to hold Internet Brands liable for failing to warn users about the known threat posed by the criminals. The district court dismissed the case, finding the claim barred by the provision of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) found at 47 U.S.C. 230. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the CDA did not shield Internet Brands from liability for failing to warn.

Plaintiff, an aspiring model, joined Model Mayhem, a networking site for modeling professionals. In 2011, Plaintiff was contacted by individuals associated with the defendant, who posed as talent scouts and convinced her to travel to Florida for an audition. Once there, Plaintiff was drugged, raped, and recorded for pornography. The lawsuit revealed that Internet Brands had known since 2010 about these criminals and their use of the site to target victims but did not warn users.

Plaintiff argued that Internet Brands had a duty to warn users like her about the danger. Defendant argued that the CDA, which protects websites from liability as “publishers” of third-party content, barred the claim. Defendant claimed that issuing a warning would have effectively treated it as a publisher of user-generated content, a role protected under the CDA.

The court disagreed. It found that plaintiff’s claim did not depend on treating defendant as a publisher or speaker of third-party content. Instead, the claim arose from defendant’s alleged failure to act on its knowledge of the rapists’ activities. The court explained that the CDA does not provide blanket immunity for websites, especially when the obligation to warn does not require altering or removing user-generated content.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and sent the case back for further proceedings, stating that the CDA did not block Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

Three reasons why this case matters:

  • Defining CDA Immunity: This decision clarified that the CDA does not protect websites from all legal claims, especially those unrelated to user-generated content.
  • Website Accountability: The case demonstrates that platforms can be held liable for failing to protect users from known risks.
  • Victim Protection: It shows that courts may balance user safety with the legal protections for online platforms.

Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir., May 31, 2016)

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