Category: Ethics

July 23, 2025 Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, Litigation

AI fake cases crisis reaches Illinois Appellate Court for the first time

illinois appellate

The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District issued a decision that marks the first time an Illinois court at this level has addressed attorney misuse of artificial intelligence. While the sad underlying matter involved the termination of parental rights, the appellate decision is noteworthy for another reason: the use of fictitious legal citations generated by AI.

The Appeal

Respondent appealed from a trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two minor children. The appeal raised several arguments, including challenges to the trial court’s findings on unfitness and best interests, a due process claim regarding self-representation, and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s decision. However, the focus of the opinion shifted when the court found irregularities in the appellate briefs that respondent’s appointed counsel had filed.

The Court’s Review of the Briefs

After reviewing the briefs, the court noticed that eight cited cases did not exist. The court ordered counsel to explain the source of these citations and to appear in person. Counsel responded by acknowledging that five of the cited cases were fictitious. He explained that he had used AI to assist in drafting the brief and did not independently verify the citations it produced. For the remaining three cases, which were real, the court found that the actual content did not support the legal arguments presented in the brief.

The Role of AI and Legal Responsibility

The court’s opinion noted that AI tools such as generative chatbots can assist legal professionals but must be used with caution. Citing recent guidance from the American Bar Association and the Illinois Supreme Court’s new AI policy, the court emphasized that attorneys are responsible for reviewing and verifying all material submitted to a court, regardless of how it was generated.

The court concluded that the attorney had not reviewed the AI-generated citations and that this lack of verification resulted in inaccurate filings. It clarified that while use of AI is not prohibited, reliance on unverified outputs can compromise the integrity of legal proceedings.

Sanctions Imposed

Rather than striking the briefs, the court chose to address the appeal on the merits but imposed monetary sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375. It ordered the attorney to (1) return the $6,925.62 he had been paid by Sangamon County for his representation, (2) pay an additional $1,000 fine to the appellate clerk, and (3) submit a copy of the opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.

The court noted that these measures were intended to ensure accountability and to reinforce the expectations surrounding the use of AI in court proceedings.

In re Baby Boy, — N.E.3d —, 2025 WL 2046315 (Ct. App. Ill. 4th Dist., July 21, 2025)

July 10, 2025 Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, Litigation

Immigration attorney hit with sanctions for using Claude to generate fake case citations

A federal court imposed sanctions on a petitioner’s attorney for submitting fabricated legal quotations generated by the AI tool Claude Sonnet 4 in an emergency habeas case seeking to halt a client’s deportation. Facing an expedited timeline and suffering from a respiratory infection, the attorney admitted he used AI to draft a supplemental brief and failed to verify the quotations, despite knowing AI tools are prone to hallucinations.

The court found this conduct violated Rule 11 and constituted subjective bad faith, noting that the attorney either consciously avoided checking his sources or deliberately ignored the opposing party’s warning about the fake quotes.

While courts have typically imposed monetary sanctions ranging from $1,500 to $15,000 in similar cases, the court here imposed a reduced $1,000 fine in light of mitigating factors, including the attorney’s prompt admission, withdrawal of the filing, and enrollment in a continuing legal education (CLE) course on ethical AI use. He was also ordered to file proof of CLE completion.

The decision underscores that AI use in legal practice does not excuse attorneys from their duty to confirm the accuracy of filings and that even in emergency settings, courts will hold lawyers accountable for unverified, fictitious legal content.

Kaur v. Desso, 2025 WL 1895859 (N.D.N.Y. July 9, 2025)

July 7, 2025 Artificial Intelligence, Electronic Discovery, Ethics, Litigation

Relying on AI for help in discovery meet-and-confer was not good faith

AI good faith

When a party in a lawsuit claims that the other side is not fully responding to discovery requests, that party can file a motion to compel, asking the court to require the noncompliant party to respond fully to the discovery requests. Before filing such a motion, however, the party must – according to the Rules of Civil Procedure – confer in good faith with the other side.

The case of Tijerino v. Spotify USA Inc. is a patent case in which the pro se plaintiff claimed defendant was not fully responding to discovery. He held a phone call with defendant’s attorneys and – according to defendant’s attorneys’ account of the call which plaintiff did not dispute – used an artificial intelligence program to guide him in the conversation.

After the call, plaintiff filed a motion to compel, which the court denied. The court observed that plaintiff’s failure to be prepared in the conference meant that he did not confer in good faith. It was not sufficient to “outsource” such preparation to artificial intelligence.

Tijerino v. Spotify USA Inc., 2025 WL 1866057 (E.D. Louisiana, July 7, 2025)

March 6, 2024 Artificial Intelligence, Ethics

Lawyers and AI: Key takeaways from being on a panel at a legal ethics conference

Earlier today I was on a panel at Hinshaw & Culbertson’s LMRM Conference in Chicago. This was the 23rd annual LMRM Conference, and the event has become the gold standard for events that focus on the “law of lawyering.”

Our session was titled How Soon is Now—Generative AI, How It Works, How to Use it Now, How to Use it Ethically. Preparing for and participating in the event gave me the opportunity to seriously consider some of the key issues relating to how lawyers are using generative AI and the promise that wider future adoption of these technologies in the legal industry holds.

Here are a few key takeaways:

    • Effective use. Lawyers are already using generative AI in ways that aid efficiency. The technology can summarize complex texts during legal research, allowing the attorney to quickly assess if the content addresses her specific interests, is factually relevant, and aligns with desired legal outcomes. With a carefully crafted and detailed prompt, an attorney can generate a pretty good first draft of many types of correspondence (e.g., cease and desist letters). Tools such as ChatGPT can aid in brainstorming by generating a variety of ideas on a given topic, helping lawyers consider possible outcomes in a situation.

 

    • Access to justice. It is not clear how generative AI adoption will affect access to justice. While it is possible that something like “legal chatbots” could bring formerly unavailable legal help to parties without sufficient resources to hire expensive lawyers, the building and adoption of sophisticated tools by the most elite firms will come at a cost that is passed on to clients, making premium services even more expensive, thereby increasing the divide that already exists.

 

    • Confidentiality and privacy. Care must be taken to reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosure of information when law firms adopt generative AI tools. Data privacy concerns arise regardless of the industry in which generative AI is used. But lawyers have the additional obligation to preserve their clients’ confidential information in accordance with the rules governing the attorney-client relationship. This duty of confidentiality complicates the ways in which a law firm’s “enterprise knowledge” can be used to train a large language model. And lawyers must consider whether and how to let their clients know that the client’s information may be used to train the model.

 

    • Exposing lawyering problems. Cases such as Mata v. Avianca, Park v. Kim and Kruse v. Karlen—wherein lawyers or litigants used AI to generate documents submitted to the court containing non-existent case citations (hallucinations)—tend to be used to critique these kinds of tools and tend to discourage lawyers from adopting them. But if one looks at these cases carefully, it is apparent that the problem is not so much with the technology, but instead with lawyering that lacks the appropriate competence and diligence.

      •  

    • AI and the standard of the practice. There is plenty of data suggesting that most knowledge work jobs will be drastically impacted by the use of AI in the near term. Regardless of whether a lawyer or law firm wants to adopt generative AI in the practice of law, attorneys will not be able to avoid knowing how the use of AI will change norms and expectations, because clients will be effectively using these technologies and innovating in the space.

Thank you to Barry MacEntee for inviting me to be on his panel. Barry, you did an exemplary job of preparation and execution, which is exactly how you roll. Great to meet my co-panelist Andrew Sutton. Andrew, your insights and commentary on both the legal and technical aspects of the use of AI in the practice of law were terrific.

February 14, 2024 Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, Litigation

Using AI generated fake cases in court brief gets pro se litigant fined $10K

fake ai cases

Plaintiff sued defendant and won on summary judgment. Defendant sought review with the Missouri Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal and awarded damages to plaintiff/respondent because of the frivolousness of the appeal.

“Due to numerous fatal briefing deficiencies under the Rules of Appellate Procedure that prevent us from engaging in meaningful review, including the submission of fictitious cases generated by [AI], we dismiss the appeal.” With this, the court began its roast of the pro se appellant’s conduct.

The court detailed appellant’s numerous violations of the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedures. The appellate brief was unsigned, it had no required appendix, and had an inadequate statement of facts. It failed to provide points relied on, and a detailed table of cases, statutes and other authorities.

But the court made the biggest deal about how “the overwhelming majority of the [brief’s] citations are not only inaccurate but entirely fictitious.” Only two out of the twenty-four case citations in the brief were genuine.

Though appellant apologized for the fake cases in his reply brief, the court was not moved, because “the deed had been done.” It characterized the conduct as “a flagrant violation of the duties of candor” appellant owed to the court, and an “abuse of the judicial system.”

Because appellant “substantially failed to comply with court rules,” the court dismissed the appeal and ordered appellant to pay $10,000 in damages for filing a frivolous appeal.

Kruse v. Karlen, — S.W.3d —, 2024 WL 559497 (Mo. Ct. App. February 13, 2024)

See also:

May 22, 2013 Ethics, Litigation

Judge who was Facebook friends with victim’s father did not have to recuse himself

Case provides valuable guidance to judges on how to responsibly handle social media connections and communications.

Judge sent defendant to prison for assaulting defendant’s girlfriend. Defendant appealed his sentence claiming, among other things, that the judge was not impartial, given that the judge was Facebook friends with the girlfriend-victim’s father, and that the two of them had communicated through Facebook’s private message feature. The appellate court held that the judge did not err by not recusing himself.

The appellate court found that no rule prohibited the judge from being Facebook friends with the victim’s father. And the judge followed the proper procedure concerning the private message by:

  • discontinuing reading it once he realized it pertained to the case
  • warning the victim’s father not to communicate ex parte in that manner
  • printing the message out and placing it in the case file
  • notifying counsel for the parties

Moreover, the private message was not adverse to defendant, but actually asked for leniency. On these facts, the court found an insufficient showing of bias to find reversible error.

Youkers v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2013 WL 2077196 (Tex.App. May 15, 2013)

April 1, 2009 Ethics

Technology ethics: Seminar on responsible telephone use

As an attorney I feel an obligation to preach to you about what’s right and what’s wrong. People routinely trivialize this important duty by characterizing the subject matter as “ethics” or “professionalism.”

As a technology attorney, especially as one cool enough to use Twitter and be on Facebook, I feel a special obligation to instruct you on responsible use of social media. I’ll get to that.

First we need to address some of the basics concerning wise use of technology. Starting with the telephone.

In this downturned economy, I’m looking for every opportunity I can to supplement my income. So I’m offering a one day seminar called Telephone Ethics: Avoiding the Pitfalls Inherent in Voice Communications Technology. Registration is $995 dollars. Email me to sign up. But hurry, only a few seats are still available!

With the advent of the telephone, lawyers are threatened with almost certain peril and inevitable claims of malpractice. In this full day, in-depth course, we will look at the issues that arise each day as lawyers adopt this frightening intriguing technology. Subjects will include:

  • Diligence: Avoid violating Rule 1.3 — which requires a lawyer to be diligent in representing a client — by promptly returning phone calls.
  • Confidentiality: Oops! Did I just spill the beans and violate Rule 1.6 by forgetting to shut the door of that phone booth?
  • Polite Ambulance Chasing: What to say when phoning the victim of that bad accident you saw on the freeway. How to delicately let him know you’re a lawyer while navigating the Rule 7.3 minefield.
  • Much, much more!

And we’ll also have some fun. I’m lining up a special telephone expert TBA who will give some practical tips on how to better monetize your telephone use. That session will be called “Dialing for Profit: Let Your Fingers Do The Walking to a Successful Law Practice.” Check back at this Web page later for more details.

Future seminar topics will include Responsible Faxing: How to Keep the Disciplinary Committee Off Your Line, and Appropriate PowerPoint Obfuscation: Making Sure Your Bullet Points Aren’t Too Sparse.

CLE accreditation will be requested if there is sufficient interest. Heaven knows we need those ethics credits. Oh, and happy April 1.

Telephone photo courtesy Flickr user smudie under this Creative Commons license.

November 15, 2007 Employment, Ethics, Litigation, Privacy

Be careful with email because your employer is “looking over your shoulder”

Workplace email policy destroyed attorney-client privilege

Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center, — N.Y.S.2d —-, 2007 WL 3053351 (N.Y. Sup. October 17, 2007).

Dr. Scott, who used to work for Beth Israel Medical Center in New York, sued his former employer for breach of contract and a number of other different things. Before he was terminated, however, he had used his work email account to send messages to his attorneys, discussing potential litigation against Beth Israel.

When Dr. Scott found out that Beth Israel was in possession of these email messages, he asked the court to order that those messages be returned to him. He argued that they were protected from disclosure to Beth Israel under the attorney client privilege.

Beth Israel argued that they were not subject to the privilege because they were not made “in confidence.” There was an email policy in place that provided, among other things, that the computers were to be used for business purposes only, that employees had no personal right of privacy in the material they create or receive through Beth Israel’s computer systems, and that Beth Israel had the right to access and disclose material on its system.

Dr. Scott argued that New York law [CPLR 4548] protected the confidentiality. Simply stated, CPLR 4548 provides that a communication shouldn’t lose its privileged character just because it’s transmitted electronically.

The court denied Dr. Scott’s motion for a protective order, finding that the messages were not protected by the attorney client privilege.

It looked to the case of In re Asia Global Crossing, 322 B.R. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) to conclude that the presence of the email policy destroyed the confidential nature of the communications. The policy banned personal use, the hospital had the right to review the email messages (despite Scott’s unsuccessful HIPAA argument), and Dr. Scott had notice of the policy.

The decision has implications for both individuals and the attorneys who represent them. Employees should be aware that when they are sending messages through their employer’s system, they may not be communicating in confidence. And attorneys sending email messages to their clients’ work email accounts, on matters not relating to the representation of the employer, must be careful not to unwittingly violate the attorney client privilege.

What’s more, although the decision is based on email communications, it could affect the results of any case involving instant messaging or text messaging through the company’s server.

August 16, 2005 Ethics

In the Land of the Midnight Semantics

(I hope that loyal readers of this weblog will forgive a brief foray off-topic.)

In the recent case of Crane v. State, — P.3d —-, 2005 WL 1926464 (Alaska App., 2005), the Alaska Court of Appeals was asked to examine whether there are substantive differences between the terms “counselor” and “attorney”.

Petitioner Crane was charged with drunk driving. While awaiting trial, he asserted that the court had no jurisdiction over him because he could not obtain the assistance of counsel, as there were no “counselors at law” in Alaska. He contended that there is a legal distinction between “counselors at law” and “attorneys” and that there were no “counselors at law” available to him because Alaska only licenses “attorneys”.

In rejecting Crane’s arguments, the court issued a somewhat lengthy opinion examining the history of the relevant terms. It discussed the etymology of the various words, looking to their origins in French, and also the ways in which the terms had been used in early sources such as the Blackstone Commentaries.

The court noted that the common law did in fact distinguish between “attorneys” and “counselors at law”, but concluded that this distinction no longer exists in Alaska. Instead, attorneys perform both functions. The court further noted that in 1976, the legislature repealed the statute that specified the procedure for admission to the practice of law in Alaska, but gave rule-making authority to the Board of Governors of the Alaska Bar Association, so that the admission procedure could be specified by court rule.

Crane v. State, — P.3d —-, 2005 WL 1926464 (Alaska App., August 12, 2005).

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