Court flushes septic company’s request for injunction in copyright suit

Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, — F.Supp.2d —-, 2007 WL 4212411 (S.D.N.Y. November 29, 2007)

Back in 2005, industrial-strength septic system cleaning products company Bio-Safe One, Inc., needed a “jumbo mortgage,” so its president, one Jorgensen, did a web search for brokers and located Messrs. Hawks and Skierkowski, who helped Bio-Safe One with its mortgage needs. Although that transaction was over in June 2005, Jorgensen believed that Hawks and Skierkowski used information he had provided them during the mortgage transaction to start up a competing septic business.

Jorgensen and Bio-Safe One filed a lawsuit against Hawks and Skierkowski in New York federal court alleging, among other things, copyright infringement. They claimed that the competing enterprise illegally copied elements Bio-Safe One’s website.

The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Hawks and Skierkowski from continuing what they believed to be copyright infringement. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction.

It held that although the plaintiffs had established ownership of the copyright in the Bio-Safe One website by presenting a registration certificate for it, they failed to show that the defendants had engaged in illegal copying of any original elements of the site.

Applying the “ordinary observer test,” the court held that a side-by-side comparison simply would not prompt a person to regard the aesthetic appeal of the websites as the same. Rather, it was difficult to detect any similarities. The arrangement, photographs, and graphics on the websites were “decidedly dissimilar.” And the textual elements that were similar on the websites, including minor phrasing and terminology, were so far spaced throughout that they were not noticeable.

Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiffs would not likely succeed on their claim of copyright infringement.

Booklocker.com on the copyright offensive in Maine

Booklocker.com, Inc. v. Sartain, No. 07-0176 (D. Me., Filed November 21, 2007). [Download the Complaint]

Online, on demand book publisher Booklocker.com has filed a declaratory judgment action against Utah-based artist Julie Sartain, in response to a cease and desist letter Sartain sent to Booklocker alleging copyright infringement.  In the case, Booklocker seeks a determination by the United States District Court for the District of Maine that Booklocker’s use of artwork on book covers does not infringe on any copyright right held by Sartain.

The allegations are a bit sparse, as one may expect to see in federal pleading, but it appears that Booklocker believes Sartain does not own the copyrights in the cover artwork, but that such artwork is owned by the authors who have Booklocker print their books on demand.  In the alternative, Booklocker asserts that it has some sort of implied license to reproduce the artwork through the course of dealing between the parties during the past four years.

In asserting that the individual authors — and not Sartain — own the copyrights in the individual pieces of cover art, Booklocker is putting a lot of faith in the process whereby the authors may have commissioned Sartain to create those works.  The complaint says that there are more than a thousand works at issue.  Are we to believe that there is a detailed, written agreement in place for each one of those works, in which Sartain assigned her copyright rights to these authors? 

Beaded jewelry website tussle turns into lawsuit alleging bogus DMCA takedown notice

Does a hosting provider breach the contract with its customer when it responds to a DMCA takedown notice concerning its customer’s content? The plaintiff in this case would have you believe that. [Download the Complaint]

Jades Creations, LLC v. White, No. 07-50225 (N.D. Ill., Filed November 16, 2007)

Rockford, Illinois-based Jades Creations, LLC has filed suit in federal court against its competitor in the beaded jewelry industry over what Jades claims were unmeritorious takedown notices sent to Earthlink under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

Back in October, SW Creations sent a DMCA takedown notice to Earthlink, the host of Jades Creations’ Web site, claiming that material located thereupon infringed SW Creations’ copyright and trademark rights. (Never mind the DMCA does not apply to trademarks.) Jades, of course, disputed the fact that there was infringing content on its site, and successfully had access to its site restored after sending Earthlink a counternotification.

But Jades didn’t stop there. Obviously perturbed by what it believed to be an unwarranted takedown notice that caused it to lose business, it filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois, asking for a declaration of non-infringement and asserting various tort claims for the takedown notice.

One of the claims is for tortious interference with the contract between Jades and her hosting provider Earthlink. This is intriguing, but it looks like there could be a bit of a hurdle here.

Under Illinois law, a successful plaintiff in a tortious interference with contract action has to prove, among other things, that an actual breach of contract occurred because of the defendant’s conduct. Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1980). Did Earthlink breach the contract with its hosting customer when it obeyed the demands of a third party DMCA takedown notice?

Jades alleges that this was a breach (see paragraph 60 of the complaint). Do you agree?

Earthlink’s terms of service can be found here. And remember, 17 U.S.C. 512(g) provides that “a service provider shall not be liable to any person for any claim based on the service provider’s good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing.”

This case is not off to a good start

Windy City Marketing, Inc. v. Places Advertising, Inc., No. 07-6401 (N.D. Ill., filed November 12, 2007) [Download the complaint]

Windy City Marketing, a Chicago company, has filed a federal lawsuit against a startup competitor, Places Advertising, Inc. The suit alleges infringement of copyright allegedly owned by Windy City Marketing in certain bound marketing pieces called “inside chicago”. Windy City Marketing claims that Places Advertising has wrongfully copied the marketing materials and is distributing those to Windy City Marketing’s customers.

The big problem with the complaint is that there is no allegation that Windy City Marketing owns a registration in the works at issue. A quick read of Section 411 of the Copyright Act will reveal what’s wrong with this picture. You gotta have a registration before you can file a lawsuit for copyright infringement. For the plaintiff’s sake, thank goodness for Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.

Scandal over use of Creative Commons photo on Flickr results in lawsuit

The details on this are still sketchy, but according to this article, the mother of a Texas minor has sued in state court over Virgin Mobile’s use of a Creative Commons attribution-only licensed photo found on Flickr. From what I can tell, Virgin Mobile found the photo on Flickr, cropped it, did a horizontal flip, and added the moniker “Dump Your Pen Friend.” A guy in Australia noticed the Creative Commons work in the add, posted a picture of it on Flickr [here], where the subject of the photo noticed it. [This story unfolds in the comments for the picture.]

I’m sure that more details will emerge and we’ll get a better picture of what’s going on here. There’s one nagging question that in my mind needs answering. Why is the plaintiff suing Creative Commons? Apparently the claims in the lawsuit are state-based right of publicity claims. How, by merely providing a licensing mechanism for the copyright in a photo, could Creative Commons be liable for anything in this situation?

Hat tip to Michael Geistfor alerting me to this story.

Do ad blocking plugins cause copyright and terms of use problems?

CNet News has run this interesting article which raises questions about whether ad blocking software may face legal challenges from website publishers and advertising providers. What we’re talking about here are browser plugins that the user chooses to install, that allow web pages to be viewed sans the advertisements. Website publishers that rely on ad revenue (as well as upstream providers of advertising services, read: Google) may be concerned about such practices for obvious reasons.

The article speculates that if this kind of software were to face legal scrutiny, the plaintiffs would argue copyright infringement and violation of the sites’ terms of service, which may prohibit the use of this kind of software.

But who exactly would the plaintiffs sue? The individual users? The makers of the software? Maybe both, and depending on the defendant, the theories may be different.

Going after millions of users would seem impracticable, and the damages calculations in each of those situations would be problematic. What we could see, if we see anything at all on the lawsuit front, are challenges against the makers of these browser plugins.

This will require some creative theory-making. It does not seem like the software providers are the ones doing the actual “infringing” (i.e., aren’t the ones changing the appearance of a page thereby making an unauthorized derivative work). So I suppose the advertising side would put forward some type of inducement theory of secondary copyright infringement liability. Grokster will come in handy in those cases. And for the breach of contract aspect, perhaps we’ll see theories of tortious interference.

Maybe it’s a tempest in a teapot, and nothing will happen. But there could be a lot of money at stake, and that aspect could provide a strong catalyst. On the other hand, doesn’t it seem like the individual user has a clear right to determine what content is delivered?

Don’t make Christopher Knight the posterboy for copyright oppression

Enough already about Christopher Knight’s purported martyrdom because he had a clip pulled from YouTube. [Boing Boing sums it up in 100 words or less here.] Here’s what happened: Knight made some ridicule-worthy videos and posted them on YouTube. Viacom, through it’s VH1 channel, appropriated some of that video into a portion of its show Web Junk 2.0, with the host of the show adding some comedic commentary. Knight then posted the Web Junk 2.0 footage on YouTube. Viacom had the clip removed pursuant to a DMCA takedown notice.

You can’t swing a cat around the blogosphere these past couple days without hitting a post about this. Christopher Knight is to this week what Nixon Peabody was to last.

Sure, Viacom, like many other big content owners, may overreach from time to time when it comes to the enforcement of its intellectual property rights. That’s a disservice to both Viacom and to the public. And to the extent there is overreaching, criticism is appropriate.

But to truly make that criticism effective, one needs to mount arguments against practices that truly are contrary to law. In this Christopher Knight situation, Viacom’s conduct is not beyond the pale. They have rights in the Web Junk 2.0 clip as it is an original work they created. It may be a derivative work, based on Knight’s clip. Fine. What’s more, Knight’s posting was bodily appropriation of VH1’s work.

In any event, it sure looks like VH1’s use of the work is a fair one. And who doesn’t love fair use? (Then I heard something about a goose and a gander.) So by using Knight’s clip in the first place, VH1 was not being the bad actor here. Owen Thomas gets it.

This situation is the wrong one in which to villainize big media. Look for a more sympathetic victim of copyright abuse.

Copyright infringement threshold set at 70%

Bensbargains.net, LLC v. XPBargains.com, No. 06-1445, 2007 WL 2385092 (S.D. Cal. August 16, 2007).

Before we get into this case, I’d like to thank all the long time readers of Internet Cases. Some of you have been with me since the beginning way back in January 2005. Hard to believe, but this is the 300th post to this weblog. Onward and upward!

And now for an interesting copyright decision from California.

Ben Chui searches the web for good deals on products — from pens to mountain bikes — and posts his findings on his website bensbargains.net. In October 2005, Chui noticed that a competing website, XPBargains.com began featuring a lot of the same deals. Chui sued for copyright infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.

XPBargains.com moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Although it was largely a win for XPBargains.com, the game ain’t over.

There were two main issues in the case. The first related to whether Chui owned a copyright in the selection and arrangement of the deals he selected. The second important issue was whether XPBargains’s conduct amounted to actionable copying.

On the first issue, whether the collection of deals was copyrightable, the court found that there was Feist originality because the “compilation [was] not an inclusive list of all deals for all products.” Instead, Chui used “his individual judgment to select among multiple deals for various product.”

As for actionable copying, the court held that some of XPBargains’s postings were similar enough to Chui’s selections to raise a triable issue. Interestingly, the court set that threshold at 70%. (It’s unusual for a court to be so mathematical.) For those instances where the number of identical selections appeared on both Chui’s site and XPBargains.com, the court held that the question of infringement could continue to trial.

Opinion appears below (or click through if it’s not showing up in the RSS feed):

Open source license bars claim for copyright infringement

Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. 06-1905, 2007 WL 2358628 (N.D. Cal. August 17, 2007).

Plaintiff Jacobsen wrote some decoder definition files and made them available under an open source license used by the Java Model Railroad Interface Project. This open source license granted broad rights to members of the general public to do certain things with the software, including

— the right to distribute and create derivative works from the software, provided that the licensee give proper credit to the JMRI Project original creators.

— the right to make or give away verbatim copies of the source form without restriction provided that the licensee duplicate all of the original copyright notices and associated disclaimers.

— the right to distribute the copyrighted work “in a more-or-less customary fashion, plus [have] the right to make reasonable modifications.”

— the right to “distribute [the material] in aggregate with other (possibly commercial) programs as part of a larger (possibly commercial) software distribution provided that [the licensee] not advertise [the material] as a product of [the licensee’s] own.”

Jacobsen sued defendant Katzer for copyright infringement, claiming that without permission or consent, Jacobson made copies of the software, distributed copies to the public, or created derivative works. He also moved for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion.

The opinion explains the distinction between causes of action for infringement on one hand, and and breach of contract on the other, when a licensee violates some term of the agreement. In general, the court observed, a non-exclusive license, like the one in this case, is a waiver of the right to sue for infringement. So long as the licensee’s use of the work is within the scope of the license (say, only to distribute and not make copies), any other violation of a condition of the agreement, (like providing attribution), would allow only for a breach of contract action.

In this case, the court looked to the open source license at issue and found that

[T]he scope of the nonexclusive license is, therefore, intentionally broad. The condition that the user insert a prominent notice of attribution does not limit the scope of the license. Rather, Defendants’ alleged violation of the conditions of the license may have constituted a breach of the nonexclusive license, but does not create liability for copyright infringement where it would not otherwise exist.

Accordingly, the Court found that Jacobsen’s claim properly sounded in contract and therefore had not met his burden of demonstrating likelihood of success on the merit of his copyright claim.

Case appears below (or click through if it’s not showing up in the RSS feed):

Internet Archive malfunction leads to interesting DMCA and infringement case

Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, — F.Supp.2d —-, 2007 WL 2085358 (E.D. Pa., July 20, 2007). [Download the opinion]

(This case has been pretty well covered already in the legal blogosphere, including here and here, but this is my $0.02 anyway.)

Plaintiff Healthcare Advocates sued defendant law firm Harding, Earley Follmer & Frailey, as well as a number of attorneys and staff at the firm for copyright infringement and violation of the anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the alleged infringement was excused under the doctrine of fair use, and that the alleged conduct under the DMCA did not constitute a “circumvention” as contemplated under the statute. The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The dispute between the parties arose from a novel factual scenario. The defendants used the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine to access cached versions of the plaintiff’s website. A few days earlier, the plaintiffs had configured a robots.txt file to be used in connection with their site, which should have – in the normal course of operations – prevented the web pages from showing up in the Internet Archive. [More on robots.txt files] But as it turns out, the Internet Archive’s servers were malfunctioning when the defendants conducted their searches, so the pages that should have been excluded under the instructions in the robots.txt file showed up anyway.

The plaintiff claimed that by viewing the archived pages on their office computers without authorization (such lack of permission stemming from the exclusion instructions in the robots.txt file), the defendants violated the plaintiff’s exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. §106 to publicly display their copyrighted works, thereby committing infringement. And by accessing the cached versions in spite of the robots.txt file, the plaintiff argued, the defendants circumvented a technological measure used to prevent access to a copyrighted work, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1201.

The court agreed that the plaintiffs established the two necessary elements of copyright infringement, namely, (1) ownership of valid copyrights in the web pages, and (2) that the defendants, by viewing the web pages on their office computers, violated the exclusive display right under §106. But the court went on to determine that there was no infringement, because the use made by the defendants was a protected fair use.

On the fair use question, the most significant factor in the court’s analysis was the “purpose and character” of the subsequent use that the defendants had made. The defendants had viewed the archived web pages in connection with their work in defending their client against allegations of infringement in another case brought by Healthcare Advocates. In holding that this investigation of the plaintiff’s online materials was a permissible fair use, the court stated that “[i]t would be an absurd result if an attorney defending a client against charges of trademark and copyright infringement was not allowed to view and copy publicly available material, especially mater that his client was alleged to have infringed.”

As for the DMCA anticircumvention claims, the court held that because the malfunctioning of the Internet Archive servers made it such that the exclusion instructions in the robots.txt file were not present, there was no protective measure in place to be circumvented. Plaintiffs had argued that even though the protective measure was not in place, defendants should have known that they did not have permission to view the cached pages, as some of the requests were met with messages that the page was blocked by the website owner. The court rejected this argument, and, nodding to the case of I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Bershire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F.Supp.2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), held that a lack of permission is not circumvention under the DMCA.

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