Copyright – Attorney Evan Brown

January 12, 2026 Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, Litigation

Infringement case against OpenAI failed because there was no copyright registration

Thinking about suing an AI company for copyright infringement? Do not overlook the basics. Before any court will consider the merits of an infringement claim, the plaintiff needs to have an actual copyright registration in hand, not just a pending application.

That notion was confirmed in a recent unsuccessful lawsuit against OpenAI in federal court in California. Plaintiff sued OpenAI alleging that OpenAI infringed the copyright in several artificial intelligence models and content plaintiff claimed to have developed and then destroyed evidence to conceal that alleged infringement.

Plaintiff asked the court to issue a temporary restraining order preventing defendant from deleting or altering data and documents related to the alleged infringement while the case proceeded. The court denied the request for a temporary restraining order and dismissed the complaint.

The court ruled this way because the Copyright Act bars any civil infringement action until copyright registration has been made, and courts interpret that requirement to mean the Copyright Office must have issued a registration certificate, not merely received an application. This left plaintiff in this case unable to show a likelihood of success on the merits.

Gholami v. OpenAI, Inc., No. 26-cv-00174, 2026 WL 61359 (N.D. Cal., January 8, 2026).

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January 6, 2026 Copyright, DMCA, Social Media

Does the DMCA safe harbor cover infringing images in an email?

Plaintiff photographer sued Pinterest for copyright infringement, alleging Pinterest displayed his and other photographers’ copyrighted images in notifications sent outside of the Pinterest website. Pinterest moved for summary judgment, arguing it was protected under the safe harbor provisions of Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The court granted Pinterest’s motion and dismissed the case.

Pinterest is a familiar and massive social media platform, where individuals upload and share image-based “Pins” that function as visual bookmarks. The platform displays Pins in personalized feeds curated by algorithms and which contain advertisements labeled as “promoted.” Pinterest also delivers through notifications such as emails, in-app alerts, and push notifications, which contain hyperlinks that trigger display of images hosted on its servers. One such notification that plaintiff received included his copyrighted photograph, prompting him to file suit six days later.

The court found that Pinterest’s actions fell within the DMCA’s Section 512(c) safe harbor, which shields service providers from copyright liability for content stored at the direction of users. Because Pinterest raised this as an affirmative defense, it had the burden to prove every element of the safe harbor criteria, and the court concluded it had met both the statutory threshold and all required conditions.

Statutory threshold requirements under the DMCA

To qualify for the DMCA safe harbor, Pinterest had to meet several threshold statutory requirements that are found in Sections 512(c) and (i): it had to be a service provider, maintain a designated agent, implement a repeat infringer policy, and accommodate standard technical measures. The court found that Pinterest satisfied all four. As “one of the largest social media platforms in the world,” it operated a qualifying online platform as defined by the statute. The evidence showed that Pinterest maintained a registered agent with the Copyright Office and that it enforced a strike-based policy for repeat infringers. And the court found that Pinterest did not interfere with any recognized standard technical measures that plaintiff implemented with his works. (Plaintiff had asserted that he embedded certain metadata in his photographs, but he did not argue that this metadata qualified as a “standard technical measure” under the DMCA, nor did he claim that Pinterest interfered with it — in fact, he alleged that Pinterest preserved the metadata on its servers.)

How Pinterest met the required conditions

After finding that Pinterest satisfied the DMCA’s threshold requirements, the court turned to whether Pinterest’s conduct of sending out copyright protected images in off-platform notifications was protected under Section 512(c). To do so, Pinterest had to show three things:

the alleged infringement occurred due to user-directed storage;
Pinterest lacked actual or red flag knowledge of the infringement; and
Pinterest either had no right and ability to control the activity or did not receive a direct financial benefit from it.

The court evaluated each element in turn.

By reason of storage at the direction of a user

The court concluded that Pinterest met the first requirement for DMCA safe harbor protection: the alleged infringement occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user.” It emphasized that the image at issue was not embedded in the notification itself but was instead hosted on Pinterest’s servers and accessed via a hyperlink contained in the notification. When a user opened the message, their software triggered a request to Pinterest’s server to retrieve and display the image, just as it would when accessing content directly through the platform. Because this method merely facilitated access to user-uploaded content without altering it, the court found the display was within the statutory definition.

No knowledge of infringement

The court found that Pinterest satisfied the second requirement for DMCA safe harbor protection by showing it lacked actual or red flag knowledge of the alleged infringement. Critically, Harrington never sent Pinterest a DMCA takedown notice or otherwise identified the allegedly infringing material before filing suit. The DMCA operates on a notice and takedown system: platforms are not required to proactively monitor user content but must respond once they receive proper notice. Because Harrington gave no such notice and offered no evidence that Pinterest otherwise knew about the specific image at issue, the court concluded there was no genuine dispute as to Pinterest’s lack of knowledge.

Control and financial benefit

The court found that Pinterest met the third and final requirement for DMCA safe harbor by showing it neither had the right and ability to control the alleged infringement nor received a financial benefit directly attributable to it. While Pinterest used algorithms to curate content and monetize its platform generally, the court held that this did not amount to the kind of “substantial influence” over user activity that would disqualify it under the DMCA. Pinterest did not direct users to upload specific content, nor did it participate in any purposeful conduct related to the display of plaintiff’s photo.

The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that Pinterest profited directly from the infringement. Pinterest presented evidence that its notifications did not contain advertisements and that it earned no revenue specifically tied to the image in question. Plaintiff’s counter-evidence failed to show otherwise. Even if ads had appeared near the image, the law requires a direct connection between the infringing display and revenue, which was absent here. Therefore, Pinterest satisfied this final element of the DMCA safe harbor defense.

Harrington et al. v. Pinterest, Inc., No. 20-CV-5290, 2026 WL 25880 (N.D. Cal., January 5, 2026)

July 15, 2025 Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, Electronic Discovery, Trade Secrets

Court bars expert from accessing AI source code in high profile copyright case

expert testimony

Plaintiffs sued Stability AI for misusing their copyrighted artwork to train generative AI models. As part of the lawsuit, plaintiffs sought to designate a University of Chicago professor and AI researcher as an expert. Plaintiffs asserted it would be necessary to disclose defendants’ highly confidential materials to the professor.

Defendants asked the court to block disclosure of their “ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” and “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – SOURCE CODE” material to the expert. They argued that the expert’s work – particularly concerning his projects designed to “poison” or “protect against” generative AI training – put him in “functional competition” with their models.

The court ruled in favor of defendants because it found the risk of competitive harm outweighed plaintiffs’ need for the expert testimony. Although the expert was a respected academic and not a commercial competitor, the court reasoned that his tools were designed to interfere with AI model performance and that he continued to develop such technologies. Even unintentional use of confidential information could influence his future work.

Additionally, the court found that while the expert was well-qualified, he was not uniquely qualified. Plaintiffs could rely on other experts in the AI field, including one of the expert’s former students, who was approved as an expert in a related case.

Andersen v. Stability AI Ltd., 2025 WL 1927796 (N.D. Cal., July 14, 2025)

July 11, 2025 Artificial Intelligence, Copyright

Voice cloning case presents novel AI copyright issues

digital voice clone

Two professional voice actors based sued Lovo, a company that sells AI-generated voiceover software alleging, among other things, copyright infringement. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant took their voices without permission and used them to create digital clones. Those clones were sold to customers under the pseudonyms “Kyle Snow” and “Sally Coleman.” Defendant moved to dismiss the copyright claims. The court provided a mixed ruling.

How it started

Plaintiffs asserted that defendant first contacted them on the freelance platform Fiverr in 2019 and 2020. Defendant’s representatives allegedly assured plaintiffs the recordings would only be used for private research, not public or commercial projects. Based on those promises, plaintiffs delivered the recordings. Each was paid a few hundred dollars.

Several years later, plaintiffs discovered their voices had been cloned. In 2023, they heard a podcast produced using Lovo’s software. Plaintiff Lehrman’s friends and colleagues said the cloned voice sounded exactly like him. After further research, plaintiffs learned that defendant had built digital voice profiles from their recordings and offered those profiles to customers as part of a paid AI service.

What plaintiffs claimed

Plaintiffs made four different types of copyright claims. One was that defendant had directly copied Plaintiff Sage’s recording and used it in a promotional video for investors. Another was that defendant had used both of their recordings to train defendant’s AI system called Genny. They also claimed that the cloned voices produced by Genny were infringing. Finally, they argued that defendant should be liable for contributory infringement because it let its customers use those clones.

What the court decided

The court allowed one copyright claim to move forward. Plaintiff Sage alleged that defendant used a real recording of her voice in public investor presentations and YouTube videos. Defendant admitted to using a portion of the recording, and the court agreed that this could be outside the scope of the license.

The other copyright claims were not as successful. The court dismissed the copyright claim based on use of the voice recordings to train the AI model. Plaintiffs did not explain in their complaint how the training process worked or how it infringed their rights. The court said plaintiffs could amend the complaint and try again.

The court also dismissed the claim based on the AI-generated voices themselves. It explained that copyright law does not protect imitations of a voice, only the actual recordings. Plaintiffs had not alleged that the AI clones were identical to the originals, only that they sounded very similar. That kind of mimicry was not covered by copyright law.

Finally, the court dismissed the contributory infringement claim. Since there was no direct infringement based on the AI-generated outputs, the court said there could be no indirect liability either.

Lehrman v. Lovo Inc., — F.Supp.3d —, 2025 WL 1902547 (S.D.N.Y., July 10, 2025)

June 26, 2025 Copyright, Litigation

Court lets authors expand copyright case to target Databricks’ new AI models

amending complaing

Five copyright holders sued Databricks and Mosaic ML, claiming their copyrighted works were used to train artificial intelligence systems without permission. Plaintiffs originally alleged that Mosaic ML directly infringed their works by training its MPT large language models on datasets that included their works. Plaintiffs also accused Databricks, Mosaic ML’s parent company, of vicarious liability for that conduct.

After Databricks released a new set of AI models called DBRX, plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs asked the court to allow a new claim of direct copyright infringement against Databricks for allegedly using the same protected works to train DBRX. Plaintiffs also sought to update the list of copyrighted works allegedly copied. Defendants opposed the request, arguing that the amendment came too late and would unfairly change the case.

Timing

The court acknowledged that plaintiffs waited more than a year after DBRX was released before requesting to amend the complaint. That delay was significant, and plaintiffs did not provide a strong explanation. However, the court noted that discovery was still open, and key deadlines had not yet passed. Because the case was still active, the court said the delay alone was not enough to deny the motion.

Intent

Defendants claimed plaintiffs acted in bad faith by dragging out the case and making vague statements in court filings. But the court saw no signs of deliberate delay or dishonesty. Instead, it found that plaintiffs’ motion to amend reflected an effort to match the complaint with new information obtained through discovery.

Prejudice

Defendants argued that allowing new claims about DBRX would cause unfair prejudice by drastically changing the case. The court disagreed. It found that the parties were already engaged in discovery related to DBRX and that any added burden would be limited. Since the DBRX and MPT models might rely on overlapping data, the new claims would not require a completely new approach to the case.

Futility

Defendants also said the new claims were too vague and would not survive a challenge. But the court said such issues should be dealt with after the complaint is amended. Unless the new claims are clearly invalid, courts usually allow amendments and address legal sufficiency later in the process.

So the court granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend. The lawsuit will now include direct copyright infringement claims against Databricks based on its newer DBRX models, along with an updated list of works that plaintiffs claims were copied.

In re Mosaic LLM Litigation, 2025 WL 1755650 (N.D. California, June 25, 2025)

April 29, 2025 Copyright, Social Media

TikTok and Meta terms granted other users remix rights

Plaintiff sued TikTok and Meta after other users on those platforms incorporated clips from her video into their own posts, allegedly without her permission. She claimed this was copyright infringement and also alleged that TikTok failed to protect her from harassment by users in the comments of her live videos. Plaintiff filed the lawsuit on her own, without a lawyer.

Plaintiff asked the court to hold TikTok and Meta liable for copyright infringement and to consider tort claims against TikTok for harassment. But both companies responded by asking the court to dismiss the case. They pointed to the user agreements Plaintiff had accepted when she signed up. Those terms gave the platforms and their users broad rights to use, modify, and distribute any content she uploaded. TikTok also invoked immunity under 47 U.S.C. 230, a provision in federal law protecting platforms from liability for user-generated content.

The court agreed with the platforms. It found that plaintiff had granted TikTok and Meta valid licenses to use her video, so there could be no copyright violation. The court also ruled that it had no authority to hear the tort claims because plaintiff had not shown that the court had jurisdiction over those parts of the case. The court rejected plaintiff’s arguments that she did not fully understand the contracts or that the agreements were unfair. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the decision, finding no clear error in how the lower court handled the case and ruling that plaintiff had waived her right to challenge the licensing issue by not objecting to it specifically.

In the end, the court dismissed all claims against both companies. The court also declined to take up any new claims plaintiff tried to raise during the appeal, saying she had not brought those up earlier and did not support them with enough detail.

Three reasons why this case matters:

It reinforces how powerful and far-reaching social media terms of service can be in protecting platforms from copyright claims.
It shows the importance of making specific objections and arguments in court—especially during appeals.
It highlights how courts apply procedural rules strictly, even when someone is representing themselves without a lawyer.

Sethunya v. TikTok, 2025 WL 1144776 (10th Cir. April 18, 2025)

December 1, 2024 Artificial Intelligence, Blockchain, Copyright, Cryptocurrency, non-fungible token, Social Media

X can claim trespass to chattel in data scraping case

X Corp. sued Bright Data Ltd. for unauthorized access to X’s servers and the scraping and resale of data from X’s platform. Plaintiff sought the court’s permission to file a second amended complaint after the court dismissed its prior complaint. The court granted plaintiff’s motion in part and denied it in part, allowing some claims to proceed while dismissing others.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant’s scraping activities caused significant harm to its systems. According to plaintiff, defendant’s automated scraping overwhelmed servers, causing system glitches and forcing plaintiff to purchase additional server capacity. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant used deceptive techniques, including fake accounts and rotating IP addresses, to bypass technical barriers and access non-public data. Plaintiff claimed that these actions violated its Terms of Service, interfered with its contracts, and constituted unfair and fraudulent business practices. Plaintiff also introduced new claims under federal and state anti-hacking laws, including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

The court agreed with plaintiff on several points. It allowed claims related to server impairment, including trespass to chattels and breach of contract, to move forward. The court found that plaintiff’s revised complaint provided sufficient details to plausibly allege harm to its servers and unauthorized access to its systems.

However, the court dismissed claims concerning the scraping and resale of data, ruling that they were preempted by the Copyright Act. Plaintiff had argued that it could prevent defendant from copying user-generated or non-copyrightable data through state-law claims. The court disagreed, holding that such claims conflicted with federal copyright policy, which limits protections for factual data and prioritizes public access. Additionally, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s actions constituted “unfair” business practices, finding no evidence of harm to competition.

Finally, the court allowed plaintiff to proceed with its new anti-hacking claims but left the door open for defendant to challenge these allegations later in the case.

Three Reasons Why This Case Matters

Defines Platform Rights: This case clarifies the limits of platform operators’ ability to control user-generated and public data.
Reinforces Copyright Preemption: The decision highlights the importance of federal copyright laws in preventing conflicting state-law claims.
Explores Anti-Hacking Laws: It illustrates how federal and state anti-hacking statutes may be used to address unauthorized access in the digital age.

X Corp. v. Bright Data Ltd., 2024 WL 4894290 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 26, 2024)

Court blocks part of Texas law targeting social media content

Two trade associations – the Computer & Communications Industry Association and NetChoice, LLC sued the Attorney General of Texas over a Texas law called House Bill 18 (HB 18), which was designed to regulate social media websites. Plaintiffs, who represented major technology companies such as Google, Meta and X argued that the law violated the First Amendment and other legal protections. They asked the court for a preliminary injunction to stop the law from being enforced while the case continued.

Plaintiffs challenged several key parts of HB 18. Among other things, law required social media companies to verify users’ ages, give parents control over their children’s accounts, and block minors from viewing harmful content. Such content included anything that promoted suicide, self-harm, substance abuse, and other dangerous behaviors. Plaintiffs believed that the law unfairly restricted free speech and would force companies to over-censor online content to avoid penalties. Additionally, they claimed the law was vague, leaving companies confused about how to comply.

Defendant argued that the law was necessary to protect children from harmful content online. He asserted that social media companies were failing to protect minors and that the state had a compelling interest in stepping in. He also argued that plaintiffs were exaggerating the law’s impact on free speech and that the law was clear enough for companies to follow.

The court agreed with plaintiffs on some points but not all. It granted plaintiffs a partial preliminary injunction, meaning parts of the law were blocked from being enforced. Specifically, the court found that the law’s “monitoring-and-filtering” requirements were unconstitutional. These provisions forced social media companies to filter out harmful content for minors, which the court said was too broad and vague to survive legal scrutiny. The court also noted that these requirements violated the First Amendment by regulating speech based on its content. But the court allowed other parts of the law, such as parental control tools and data privacy protections, to remain in place, as they did not give rise to the same free speech issues.

Three reasons why this case matters:

Free Speech Online: This case highlights ongoing debates about how far the government can go in regulating content on social media without infringing on First Amendment rights.
Children’s Safety: While protecting children online is a major concern, the court’s ruling shows the difficulty in balancing safety with the rights of companies and users.
Technology Lawsuits: As states try to pass more laws regulating tech companies, this case sets an important standard for how courts may handle future legal battles over internet regulation.

Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Paxton, — F.Supp.3d —, 2024 WL 4051786 (W.D. Tex., August 30, 2024)

Artist’s side hustle lands him in DMCA litigation with autonomous vehicle company

A dispute between a digital artist and his former employer over content rights resulted in a court allowing the employee’s DMCA claim while striking the employee’s state law claims.

For over five years, plaintiff worked for defendant, crafting digital street scenes of San Francisco to train the company’s self-driving vehicles. But plaintiff’s passion for digital art extended beyond his day job. So, in his spare time, using his own equipment, he created intricate urban scenery for video games, which he then sold on the Epic Games marketplace.

When defendant learned of plaintiff’s side hustle, it claimed plaintiff’s project infringed defendant’s copyright rights. It demanded that plaintiff cease all sales of his digital art. Plaintiff refused to comply. He argued that his creations were made on his own time, with his own resources, and did not utilize any proprietary information from defendant.

Defendant considered plaintiff’s refusal as a resignation and terminated his employment. But that did not end the matter. Defendant escalated the situation by sending a takedown notice to Epic Games under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), alleging that plaintiff’s content infringed on defendant’s copyrighted material. This resulted in Epic removing plaintiff’s content from its marketplace.

The lawsuit

Plaintiff sued, claiming that that defendant sent the takedown notice in bad faith, asserting federal claims under the DMCA and state law claims for interference with contractual relations, interference with prospective economic advantage, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. Defendant moved to dismiss the DMCA claim and also moved to strike the state law claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, which aims to prevent lawsuits that chill the exercise of free speech.

The court’s decision

The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the DMCA claim, allowing plaintiff’s federal claim to proceed. It found that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that defendant acted in bad faith when it issued the takedown notice, a key requirement under Section 512(f) of the DMCA. But the court granted defendant’s motion to strike the state law claims. It held that the state law claims were preempted by the DMCA and were also barred by California’s litigation privilege, which protects communications made in anticipation of litigation.

Shande v. Zoox, Inc., 2024 WL 2306284 (N.D. Cal., May 21, 2024)

X avoids much of music industry copyright lawsuit

Plaintiffs sued X for copyright infringement arising from X’s users uploading tweets that contained copyright-protected music. Plaintiffs accused X of “trying to generate the kind of revenue that one would expect as a lawful purveyor of music and other media, without incurring the cost of actually paying for the licenses.” For example, plaintiffs highlighted a feature within the X platform whereby one could seek out tweets that include audiovisual media. And they pointed out infringing content surrounded by “promoted” content on the platform that generated revenue for X. The parties disputed the extent to which X actively encouraged infringing conduct. Plaintiffs sent many DMCA takedown notices to X but complained that the company took too long to respond to those notices. And plaintiffs asserted that X did not have an appropriate procedure in place to terminate users engaged in repeated acts of copyright infringement.

The complaint alleged three counts – direct, contributory and vicarious infringement. X moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion for the most part, except as to certain practices concerning contributory liability, namely, being more lenient to verified users, failing to act quickly concerning DMCA takedown notices, and failing to take steps to in response to severe serial infringers.

No direct infringement liability

The court found that plaintiffs had not successfully alleged direct infringement liability because their claims did not align with the required notion of “transmission” as defined in the Copyright Act and interpreted in the Supreme Court case of American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 US 431 (2014). The court distinguished X’s actions from the defendant in the Aereo case by noting that X merely provided the platform for third-party transmissions, rather than actively participating in the transmission of copyrighted material. Therefore, the court concluded that X’s role was more akin to a passive carrier, similar to a telegraph system or telephone company, making its actions more suitable for consideration under theories of secondary liability rather than direct infringement.

Some possible contributory liability

The court found that certain portions of plaintiffs’ claims for contributory infringement liability survived because they plausibly alleged that X engaged in actions that could materially contribute to infringement on the X platform. These actions included failing to promptly respond to valid takedown notices, allowing users to pay for less stringent copyright policy enforcement, and not taking meaningful steps against severe serial infringers. Consequently, the court dismissed the broader claim of general liability across the X platform but allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with their claims related to these specific practices.

No vicarious liability

Finally, the court determined that plaintiffs had not successfully pled vicarious liability for copyright infringement because their allegations did not establish that X had the requisite level of control over the infringing activities on X. The court found that simply providing a service that users might exploit for infringement did not equate to the direct control or supervisory capacity typically required for vicarious liability, as seen in traditional employer-employee or principal-agent relationships. Consequently, the court rejected the application of vicarious liability in this context, emphasizing that contributory infringement, rather than vicarious liability, was the more appropriate legal framework for the plaintiffs’ claims.

Concord Music Group, Inc. v. X Corp., 2024 WL 945325 (M.D. Tenn. March 5, 2024)

See also: